News from Arché
- Arché members at European Epistemology Network Meeting (27th June 2022)
- Jessica Brown – inaugural address (19th April 2022)
- Research Grant Success (28th October 2021)
- Publication: Jessica Brown (3rd May 2021)
- Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship (10th December 2020)
- Publication: Jessica Brown (13th December 2019)
- Grant Success (21st January 2019)
- Book Publication: Jessica Brown (27th April 2018)
- Jessica Brown – elected as a fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh (27th February 2018)
- Research Grant Success (30th March 2017)
Research
Epistemology, moral and epistemic responsibility, philosophical methodology
Prof Brown’s main areas of research are epistemology, responsibility, and philosophical methodology.
Within epistemology, she works on a wide range of issues concerning both individual and group epistemology, including evidence, knowledge, justification and defeat, the closure and transmission of knowledge and warrant, fallibilism vs infallibilism, contextualism vs invariantism, scepticism, the epistemic norms of assertion and practical reasoning, blameworthy belief, epistemic blame.
Within responsibility, Prof Brown is interested in both epistemic and moral responsibility as it affects both individuals and groups. She is currently writing a book on group epistemology and responsibility.
Within philosophical methodology, Prof Brown is interested in a range of methodological issues including the nature of philosophy (it’s subject matter and evidence); the role of ordinary language, linguistics and conceptual analysis in philosophy; thought experiments and intuitions; and, sources of scepticism about philosophy (disagreement, evolutionary debunking worries, experiment philosophy).
Selected publications
Group motivation
Brown, J., 23 May 2022, In: Noûs. 56, 2, p. 494-510 17 p., 12366.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Epistemically blameworthy belief
Brown, J. A., 14 Dec 2019, (E-pub ahead of print) In: Philosophical Studies. First Online, 20 p.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
What is epistemic blame?
Brown, J., 20 May 2020, In: Noûs. 54, 2, p. 389-407Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Fallibilism: evidence and knowledge
Brown, J., 12 Apr 2018, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 197 p.Research output: Book/Report › Book
The Gettier case and intuition
Brown, J. A., 30 Nov 2017, Explaining knowledge: new essays on the Gettier problem. de Almeida, C., Borges, R. & Klein, P. (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 191-212Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter
Immediate justification, perception and intuition.
Brown, J. A., 2013, Seemings and justification. Tucker, C. (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 71-88 17 p.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter
Intuitions, evidence and hopefulness
Brown, J. A., 2013, In: Synthese. 190, 12, p. 2021-2046 26 p.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Impurism, practical reasoning, and the threshold problem
Brown, J. A., Mar 2014, In: Noûs. 48, 1, p. 179-192Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Assertion and practical reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?
Brown, J. A., 2012, In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 84, 1, p. 123-157Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning
Brown, J., Jun 2008, In: Noûs. 42, 2, p. 167-189 23 p.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review