Home / Arche staff / Jessica Brown

 
Prof Jessica Brown

Arché role: Management Committee

Current Projects: Epistemology: Current Themes (Member)

Past Projects: Evidence, Justification and Knowledge (Principal Investigator)

 

News from Arché

Research

Epistemology, moral and epistemic responsibility, philosophical methodology

 

Prof Brown’s main areas of research are epistemology, responsibility, and philosophical methodology.

 

Within epistemology, she works on a wide range of issues concerning both individual and group epistemology, including evidence, knowledge, justification and defeat, the closure and transmission of knowledge and warrant, fallibilism vs infallibilism, contextualism vs invariantism, scepticism, the epistemic norms of assertion and practical reasoning, blameworthy belief, epistemic blame.

 

Within responsibility, Prof Brown is interested in both epistemic and moral responsibility as it affects both individuals and groups. She is currently writing a book on group epistemology and responsibility.

 

Within philosophical methodology, Prof Brown is interested in a range of methodological issues including the nature of philosophy (it’s subject matter and evidence); the role of ordinary language, linguistics and conceptual analysis in philosophy; thought experiments and intuitions; and, sources of scepticism about philosophy (disagreement, evolutionary debunking worries, experiment philosophy).

Selected publications

Group motivation

Brown, J., 23 May 2022, In: Noûs. 56, 2, p. 494-510 17 p., 12366.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Epistemically blameworthy belief

Brown, J. A., 14 Dec 2019, (E-pub ahead of print) In: Philosophical Studies. First Online, 20 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

What is epistemic blame?

Brown, J., 20 May 2020, In: Noûs. 54, 2, p. 389-407

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Fallibilism: evidence and knowledge

Brown, J., 12 Apr 2018, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 197 p.

Research output: Book/ReportBook

The Gettier case and intuition

Brown, J. A., 30 Nov 2017, Explaining knowledge: new essays on the Gettier problem. de Almeida, C., Borges, R. & Klein, P. (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 191-212

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Immediate justification, perception and intuition.

Brown, J. A., 2013, Seemings and justification. Tucker, C. (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 71-88 17 p.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Intuitions, evidence and hopefulness

Brown, J. A., 2013, In: Synthese. 190, 12, p. 2021-2046 26 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Impurism, practical reasoning, and the threshold problem

Brown, J. A., Mar 2014, In: Noûs. 48, 1, p. 179-192

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Assertion and practical reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?

Brown, J. A., 2012, In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 84, 1, p. 123-157

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning

Brown, J., Jun 2008, In: Noûs. 42, 2, p. 167-189 23 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review