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Prof Jessica Brown

Arché role: Management Committee

Current Projects: Epistemology: Current Themes (Member)

Past Projects: Evidence, Justification and Knowledge (Principal Investigator)

 

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Research

Prof Brown’s main areas of research are epistemology, responsibility, and philosophical methodology.

Within epistemology, she works on our knowledge of our own minds and our ability to reason, as well as closure and transmission of knowledge and warrant, scepticism, fallibilism vs infallibilism, evidence, defeat, the debate between contextualism and invariantism, the epistemic norms of assertion and practical reasoning, blameworthy belief, epistemic blame, group belief and action. Within responsibility, Prof Brown is interested in both epistemic and moral responsibility, blame for beliefs and actions, as well as the moral responsibility of groups and how it relates to the moral responsibility of group members. Within philosophical methodology, Prof Brown is interested in a range of methodological issues including the nature of philosophy (it’s subject matter and evidence); the role of ordinary language, linguistics and conceptual analysis in philosophy, thought experiment; intuition; and, sources of scepticism about philosophy (disagreement, evolutionary debunking worries, experiment philosophy).

Selected publications

What is epistemic blame?

Brown, J., 20 May 2020, In : Noûs. 54, 2, p. 389-407

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Epistemically blameworthy belief

Brown, J. A., 14 Dec 2019, In : Philosophical Studies. First Online, 20 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

The norm of assertion and blame

Brown, J. A., 11 Feb 2019, Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Goldberg, S. C. (ed.). Oxford University Press

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Fallibilism: evidence and knowledge

Brown, J., 12 Apr 2018, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 197 p.

Research output: Book/ReportBook

Pragmatic approaches to belief

Brown, J. A., 8 Feb 2018, Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Whiting, D., McHugh, C. & Way, J. (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 26-46 20 p.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Blame and wrongdoing

Brown, J., 7 Sep 2017, In : Episteme. 14, 3, p. 275-296

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

The Gettier case and intuition

Brown, J. A., 30 Nov 2017, Explaining knowledge: new essays on the Gettier problem. de Almeida, C., Borges, R. & Klein, P. (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 191-212

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Anti-intellectualism and ignorance

Brown, J. A., 2016, (Accepted/In press) The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance. Peels, R. & Blaauw, M. (eds.). Cambridge University Press

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Contextualism about evidential support

Brown, J. A., Mar 2016, In : Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 92, 2, p. 329-354 26 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Evidence and epistemic evaluation

Brown, J. A., 2015, In : Oxford Studies in Epistemology. 5

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Impurism, practical reasoning, and the threshold problem

Brown, J. A., Mar 2014, In : Noûs. 48, 1, p. 179-192

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle