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In this project, we examined the connections between semantic modelling, possible worlds semantics and the nature of logic and meaning. Questions which the project examined include the following:

  • Are proof-theoretic and model-theoretic semantics complementary in giving an account of meaning, or does one have priority over the other?
  • What are the formal connections between the notions of logical necessity, metaphysical necessity, analyticity and aprioricity?
  • Two-dimensional theories of meaning posit two different dimensions of meaning. What can be learned about the nature of logic from these theories ? For instance, is logic relative to a dimension of meaning?
  • To what extent and how is logical consequence normative for reasoning?
  • Modal logic standardly deploys a notion of possible world. Is the notion of an impossible world similarly useful?
  • What can be learned about the nature of logic from an examination of the history of the notion of logic consequence?
  • To solve the semantic paradoxes, Bradwardine proposed that meaning is closed under some notion of consequence. For what notions of consequence, if any, is this true?
    Can this phenomenon be modelled?
  • How do the logics of metaphysical necessity and context-sensitivity interact? Can their interaction shed light into other debates , such as that between the necessitist and the contingentist?

Project leader: Stephen Read

Co-investigators: Derek Ball, Aaron Cotnoir, Ephraim Glick

Research students: Spencer Johnston, Laura Celani, Ryo Ito, Bruno Jacinto, Poppy Mankowitz, Fenner Tanswell, Alexander Yates