The confirmed speakers include Elinor Mason (Edinburgh), Paulina Sliwa (Cambridge), Rick Peels (VU Amsterdam), Dana Nelkin (UCSD), Elizabeth Harman (Princeton), Brian Weatherson (St Andrews) and Jessica Brown (St Andrews).
The notion of blame has historically been central to much work in ethics. What is it to blame someone and what is it for someone to be blameworthy? Itís widely accepted that one can be blameless for violating a norm, say because one has an overriding reason to do so. More recently, the idea that whether one conforms to a norm can come apart from whether one is blameworthy has become central to epistemology. Much recent work focuses on the idea that there are epistemic norms for activities or states, such as the suggestion that assertion or practical reasoning is governed by a knowledge norm. Just as in the ethical case, we should expect that whether one conforms to the norm and whether one is blameless can come part. Indeed, this idea has been used to defend the idea that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reasoning. Further, some epistemologists have been interested in how blame might be instrumental in shaping social practices, such as testimony, and what it might tell us about the nature of epistemic norms governing such practices.
This workshop aims to bring together work on blame from both epistemology and ethics to cast light on the nature of blame, and the conditions under which one blamelessly violates a norm or conforms to it but in a blameworthy way.
This event is open to all philosophers in Scotland and beyond and is made possible by the generous support of the Scots Philosophical Association