Everyone admits that some theories are better than others. What makes good theories good? A natural first thought is that an ideal theory must at least be true, so our acceptance of our best current theories rests on the idea that they are at least closer to truth than the seemingly inferior theories that they superseded. But this conception of inquiry has been called into question. Philosophers of science, in particular, have often maintained that scientific theories aim at usefulness, or at observational adequacy, so that an ideal scientific theory might be (at least in part) untrue. Despite much debate about particular views of scientific inquiry, general questions about the metaphysics and epistemology of claims about aims and theoretical success have been relatively neglected. What are aims? What makes it the case that a given discipline (or theorist, or theory) is aimed at truth, and how can we tell? Moreover, these questions are rarely addressed outside of philosophy of science. How do these debates play out with respect to theorizing in other areas (including philosophy itself)? Questions to be addressed include:

Does inquiry (in science, in philosophy, or elsewhere) aim at truth? If not, what constitutes progress in these areas of inquiry?
How can we evaluate claims about aims?
Plausibly, most if not all forms of inquiry have multiple aims. (Even those who maintain that truth is an aim typically deny that compiling trivial truths is sufficient for theoretical success – features such as explanatory scope and power, simplicity, novelty, beauty, etc. are also necessary.) How are these aims related?
What psychological states (belief, suspension of belief, etc.) are involved in inquiry? How do questions about the aims of theoretical inquiry relate to questions about the aims of psychological states, such as belief?
Do the roles of idealisations, abstractions, and models in some theoretical disciplines suggest that these disciplines do not aim at truth?
Some well-known models of assertion and belief, and of representational content generally, (e.g., Stalnaker’s) seem to presuppose that inquiry aims at truth. How can these models be adapted to forms of inquiry that are not focused on truth?

Speakers include: Derek Ball (St Andrews), Nancy Cartwright (Durham/UCSD), Jane Friedman (NYU), Allan Hazlett (Edinburgh), Juha Saatsi (Leeds), Andreas Stokke (Umea)

Saturday:

09:30 – 10:00 Coffee/Tea
10:00 -11:30 Allan Hazlett Understanding and Structure
11:30 -12:00 Coffee
12:00 -13:30 Juha Saatsi tba
13:30 -14:30 Lunch
14:30 -16:00 Jane Friedman Inquiry and the Doxastic Attitudes

Tba
Conference dinner
 Sunday:

09:30 – 10:00 Coffee/Tea
10:00 – 11:30 Derek Ball Untrue and Unbelievable: Assertion and Inquiry in Philosophy
11:30 -12:00 Coffee
12:00 -13:30 Andreas Stokke tba
13:30 – 14:30 Lunch
14:30 – 16:00 Nancy Cartwright tba
This event is made possible by the generous support of the Scots Philosophical Association.

For more information, please send an email to the workshop organisers at arche@st-andrews.ac.uk