Abstract

Recent work in the theory of essence has focused on whether one can reduce constitutive essence to consequential essence. Many have followed Fine and Rosen in claiming that the best way to do so employs ground theoretic principles. On this view, constitutive essence is to be defined in terms of consequential essence and partial ground. I defend this proposal against counterexamples raised against it in the recent literature. I argue that the problematic cases are all cases of universal generalizations that are zero-grounded. So, by amending the reductive account to include not just partial but also zero-ground the reductionist can sidestep these worries. In so doing, however, the reductive account faces deeper worries. It makes it impossible to specify essences for the logical connectives and impoverishes the constitutive essences of ordinary objects. I argue that these problems generalize beyond the ground theoretic approach. Reduction in any terms will fail.