Abstract: I defend the Moorean theory of organic unities against an influential kind of value atomism.

First, I introduce the relevant brand of atomism, which I call “Thin Atomism” (TA), and describe its place in the debate on the nature of intrinsic value and, in particular, in the discussion on organic unities. I examine Michael Zimmerman’s elaborate implementation of TA, which recruits the determinable-determinate distinction to defend the idea that there are no organic unities. In other words, TA claims–against Moore–that there is no whole the intrinsic value of which is not equal to the sum of the intrinsic values of its proper parts; or, at least, no such mereological complex has been presented in the philosophical literature to this day.

Second, I present two arguments against TA’s claim that no credible case of an organic complex has been produced and that alleged organic unities involve problematically determinable parts. According to TA, once the latter parts are adequately specified, it becomes evident that the intrinsic value of any alleged organic complex is simply the sum of the intrinsic values of its proper parts.

In my first argument, I show that TA misapplies the determinable-determinate distinction. In my second argument, I show that TA also fails to address the diversity of the supposed cases of organic unities, which I take to include fittingness complexes, diversity complexes, and pattern complexes.

I conclude by assuming, for the sake of argument, that both of my objections fail and applying the determinable-determinate distinction to alleged organic complexes in the manner that TA prescribes. I highlight, that, once fully unpacked, TA faces the risk of morphing into world holism, which is a surprising and unwelcome risk to face for an atomist theory.