TITLE: Instantiation

What is it, metaphysically, for a universal property to be instantiated in a concrete particular, and for a concrete particular to instantiate a universal property? The mainstream approach is to take a universal property to be in a concrete particular by being a part of it. Two issues arise from this stance: What kind of part can a property be, in a physical object? And how can a property, as such, recur in multiple physical objects at the same time (which is presupposed by those who use recurrence to explain resemblance), and thus be a part of each of them? These two issues have put instantiation under critical fire, with some claiming it to be a ‘bankrupt’ idea. This bears directly on whether Aristotle’s metaphysics of objects and their properties is approached as philosophically valuable to us, or to be junked, in relation to progress in current research in metaphysics.

In this paper I argue against those interpretations according to which Aristotle accounts for the instantiation of properties in objects by positing a compositional relation between properties and matter, or alternatively a mereological relation between properties and objects. I offer my own understanding of Aristotle’s position, and then attempt taking a step further. I argue that for Aristotle, an instantiated property is in an object, but neither as a part, nor as related to its matter; rather, properties are in objects as qualifications of a metaphysical subject. My further step is to argue that this move, and not holism (contrary to what some have argued, both among scholars and contemporary followers of Aristotle), also explains the oneness of objects.