Title: Impossibility results in the theory of partial truth and subject-matters

Abstract: Truth is nice but sometimes (for prudential, pragmatic or metaontological reasons) we can settle for less. Following that line of thought, this talk is about partial truth – the idea that a false proposition can still have true parts. We assume that this notion has any semantic usefulness only if some falsities are partially true but not all of them. This requirement puts pressure on the logical principles partial truth can satisfy relative to the logic of propositions one ascribes to. Indeed, it is known that the possible world account of propositions is incompatible with very desirable logical principles for partial truth. This has motivated an hybrid account of propositions which supplements sets of possible worlds with subject-matters. While this solves some issues, we show that some problem persists involving the status of negation in the theory of subject-matters. More generally, we argue that the interaction between the logic of partial truth and the hybrid account of propositions puts undesirable conditions of the behaviour of subject-matters.