Title: FDE worlds or inexact truthmaker semantics?

Abstract: In this talk I will present models for what minimally rational agents know given what they know that meet several (as I shall claim) plausible desiderata for the knowledge states of non-ideal agents. These models can be given either in terms of a space of possible and impossible worlds that Berto and Jago (2019) call FDE worlds, or in terms of a space of states satisfying a relation of inexact truthmaking, when both are conjoined with a specific view of subject matters. As far as the semantics goes, then, the two approaches are in equally good standing. Should we prefer a talk of states and inexact truthmaking or of impossible worlds and worldly representation? The answer lies in the underlying metaphysics presupposed by both theoretical approaches. I conclude, then, by comparing the prospects of both approaches in terms of their metaphysical commitments.