According to Peter Geach, ‘a proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted’. Geach calls this ‘the Frege point’. It conflicts with the view (held by Aristotle) that to predicate a property of an object is to ascribe the property to the object (i.e., to judge/assert that the object has the property). The Frege Point suggests that the propositions generated via predication are intrinsically forceless: force is added from outside, as it were, when the act of judging or asserting occurs. There is another option, however, which Geach mentions and associates with Spinoza: the cancellation account. According to that account, which has become popular in recent times, a thought is assertoric in character unless its force is cancelled and it loses this character, e.g. by occurring only as an element in a more complicated thought. Different ways of understanding the cancellation account will be presented, and its relations to the Aristotelian view discussed.