The literature on proper names has grown considerably in the past decades, with the formulation of a wide variety of new ways to analyse these expressions both semantically and metasemantically. Many in the literature have attempted to solve the problems of the classical views of naming by advancing new kinds of semantic accounts of these expressions. In contrast with these approaches, my aim in this talk is to maintain a broadly classical referentialist semantic analysis of naming expressions (roughly inspired by the considerations in Naming and Necessity) and to attempt to solve some of the problems advanced in the literature by presenting a new metasemantic picture of names. As such, in this talk I will present and clarify a partially revised notion of names’ Introduction, focusing particularly on the necessary and sufficient conditions an act of introduction for a name must satisfy in order to be successful. The account presented will importantly diverge from some of the traditional metasemantic theories, giving centrality to the notion of conceivability and relying on speakers’ referential intentions.