Recently, there has been renewed interest in collective phenomena. Social epistemology has the lead on this topic; but there is a lot left to say on the subject of collective speech. In this talk, I’m interested in discussing the distinction between group lies and other kinds of deception committed by groups. In this work, I present a case of group lies that is problematic for most group intention and belief accounts. The main idea is that individuals can lie about P on behalf of a group without the members of the group having any idea (mental state or attitude) about P. I call these external lies. If I’m right this would be not just a surprising result but also problematic data for most accounts of group belief and intention. Possible replies to my claim include modifying our accounts of lies and characterizing my case as a case of bullshiting. A debate about external lies may prove fruitful to discuss how to extend our theories of lies and distinctions between speech acts to the collective case, and improve our general understanding of deception.