Abstract: Inadequacies in our interpretive resources are epistemically and communicatively disabling; in some cases, these inadequacies can constitute (hermeneutic) injustice. Accounts of hermeneutic injustice have primarily centred on the absence of necessary resources; however, critics have highlighted cases in which the problem is a resource we do possess (‘positive hermeneutic injustice’). In this talk I examine how access to an interpretive resource may be communicative and epistemically disabling. I begin by distinguishing two sorts of interpretive resource: constituents of representations and ‘scaffolds’ which enable us to grasp said representations. I show that scaffolding resources may enable us to grasp inaccurate representations of a target: I term these mis-interpretive resources. I then turn to consider how these mis-interpretive resources may be epistemically and communicatively disabling. Considering the role scaffolding resources enables us to explain how interpretive resources may ‘compete’, meaning that a new resource may render agents less competent. Attending to scaffolding resources thus offers a richer understanding of positive hermeneutic injustice which explains details the original account fails to capture. Finally, I note that mis-interpretive resources may give rise to particularly pernicious forms of disablement, due to the apparent feeling of understanding they furnish one with.