Relevant Alternatives and Missed Clues: Redux

I construe Relevant Alternatives Theory (RAT) as an abstract combination of epistemic fallibilism and epistemic modesty, then re-evaluate the challenge posed to it by the missed clue counterexamples of Schaffer (2002). The import of this challenge has been underestimated, since Schaffer’s specific argument invites distracting objections. But more forceful and precise arguments are nearby. I offer a novel formalization of RAT that accommodates a suitably wide class of concrete theories. Then, I introduce abstract missed clue counterexamples and prove that every RA theory, as formalized, admits such a counter-example. This yields an argument – in the spirit of Schaffer’s – that resists easy dismissal. To respond, the RA theorist must endorse an error theory concerning our intuitive judgments about missed clue cases. Her best bet is to admit a category of ‘primitive’ knowledge and explain the problematic intuitions as discomfort with acknowledging knowledge that has no rational basis.