Abstract: Suspended judgment is a neutral attitude an agent can have towards a proposition. In the context of a traditional belief framework where an agent has belief or disbelief it seems natural to include the attitude of suspended judgement or at least withholding belief or disbelief. In this talk, I will examine how we ought to understand suspended judgment and give an account of how suspended judgment should be understood in the context of degrees of belief. In particular, I argue that suspended judgment should not be understood as having credence 0.5 since this fails to capture the neutrality of the attitude.

I argue that suspended judgment should instead be understood as having imprecise credences. A version of this view has been offered by van Fraassen (1998). I show that his view also fails to capture the neutrality of suspended judgment but that by amending his view we can give conditions on the form and interpretation of imprecise credences that do capture suspended judgment in a credal framework.