Abstract:Extant accounts of subject matter all assume that an agent either fully grasps or does not grasp a given subject matter. Although useful, this idealization also comes with limitations, and like theories spelled out in terms of full belief can be enriched when modified to account for credences, so can theories spelled out in terms of full grasp on a subject matter be enriched when modified to account for degrees of grasp on a subject matter.

In this talk I’ll start by presenting an intuitive and formal understanding of what it is to have a partial grasp on a subject matter and how it differs from having more or less information on it, both notions which I cash out in terms of answers to a question under discussion. I then show with examples how agents having a partial grasp on a subject matter can come about from cases such as those involving limited conceptual resources, limited information, and personal biases and patterns of discrimination in one’s social environment. Having done that, I consider how the notions of a partial grasp and partial information on a subject matter interact with each other and with Yablo’s (2014) notion of content inclusion. Finally, I motivate the need for a better understanding of a partial grasp on a subject matter by showing how a common occurrence – conflating two different topics or questions – can only be understood once partial grasp is accommodated.