Abstract: I am ignorant of many things. Sometimes that ignorance seems epistemically permissible. At other times it seems impermissible. The problem of permissibility is the problem of providing a principled epistemic distinction between cases of permissible and impermissible ignorance. I argue that the problem of permissibility is particularly acute for evidentialism. Sensitivity to the evidence fails to distinguish cases of permissible and impermissible ignorance: ignorance can be impermissible in the absence of evidence, and permissible in the face of it. This threatens the evidentialist claim that evidence is the crucial epistemic difference-maker. Instead, I suggest that problematic cases of ignorance tend to be resilient. Capturing the epistemic significance of that resiliences requires us to expand the scope of our epistemic norms, to include the salience structures that underwrite our dispositions to gather and respond to evidence more broadly.