Abstract: Epistemic norms have negative critical power, let’s say, iff there are cases in which an agent has a doxastic attitude but, according to epistemic norms, shouldn’t have it. They have positive critical power iff there are cases in which an agent lacks a doxastic attitude but, according to the norms, should have it.

Most epistemologists readily accept that epistemic norms have negative critical power, and I assume as much in this talk. For instance, there are cases in which someone believes p, but because they have counterevidence against p, epistemically shouldn’t believe p. But it is a matter of controversy whether agents ever epistemically should have beliefs they lack, or even should have particular beliefs at all. Some philosophers, e.g., Mark Nelson, Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, argue that epistemic norms are merely permissive and do not tell us to believe particular propositions.

I argue that in a range of paradigm cases in which one epistemically shouldn’t have certain beliefs which one has are also cases in which one epistemically should have beliefs which one lacks, namely those beliefs that comprise parts of the “route” to the abandonment of the belief one shouldn’t have. Thus, we see that epistemic norms must have positive critical power if they are to have the negative critical power they plausibly have.

Having argued that epistemic norms have positive critical power, I explore other sorts of cases in which, plausibly, we epistemically should hold a particular belief.

I finally consider possible explanations of the source of the positive critical power of epistemic norms.