Abstract. — Do conceptual revisions change the subject? Do revolutionary analyses of familiar kinds? A standard picture of meaning — that an expression’s truth conditions are essential to it — suggests so. I present an alternative. The novel usages philosophers propose have analogues in ordinary discourse that figure in a family of puzzles about diachronic synonymy. The main obstacle to continuity of subject appears to be a kind of contingency in how we go on with a term. So, for instance, it might seem that if we could have properly withheld “phone” from cellphones when first invented, “phone” has since changed its meaning. I argue that, seen aright, there is more than one way to go on in the same way. The meaning of, say, “phone” or “woman”, does not settle how to go on, because there is no absolute fact of the matter about what that meaning is. But, whichever way we go on, in hindsight, will be going on in the same way. This talk defends the view that intensions are projected, a version of semantic relativism. Tune in.