Abstract

We contrast prominent naturalistic lines of research on the traditional method of cases (MoC), exemplified by Williamson (2007) and Machery (2017). Both philosophers hold that MoC is best described in fallibilist, non-exceptionalist terms that accommodate moderate modal skepticism. However, Gettier cases showcase a key dispute. Williamson claims these typically induce cogent reasoning that strongly supports the ‘Gettier judgment’ (knowledge is not justified true belief). Machery claims MoC should be abandoned entirely, on grounds of unreliability. Naturalists should side, we argue, with Williamson. We find no compelling reason to worry about the reliability of the Gettier judgment: the data accrued by experimental philosophers does not license this worry; Gettier cases need not exhibit ‘disturbing characteristics’ that explain why philosophical thought experiments sometimes induce dubious judgments; and Williamson offers a promising naturalistic account of how Gettier-reasoning yields knowledge. We conclude that disciplined uses of MoC plausibly produce knowledge that is naturalistically explicable and philosophically profound. Machery’s severe conclusion, and its supporting argument, are thereby placed in doubt.