Abstract

In this paper, I explore the idea that ontological disputes might be metalinguistic negotiations. In the first part, I look at three orders of reasons why one might want to connect ontological disputes with the phenomenon of metalinguistic negotiation, which in turn give rise to theses with different degrees of strength. In the second part, I inquire into what theoretical assumptions might make the metalinguistic negotiation hypothesis palatable for someone who holds a position along the Realism-Antirealism spectrum. I then examine how positions that I dub “Plain Realism” (à la Devitt or Sider), “Relativist Realism” (à la Quine) and “Relativist Antirealism” (à la Goodman) would fare with the metalinguistic negotiation idea, noting that absence of some form of pluralism precludes appreciation of this hypothesis. I conclude with some challenges for the pluralist who is attracted by the metalinguistic negotiation thesis.