Abstract: What should the interaction between non-experts and experts look like when it comes to moral inquiry? In this talk, I discuss this interaction from both perspectives. In the first part, I argue that whether non-experts should treat experts as authorities or advisors depends on the aim of moral inquiry which in turn varies with context. I propose a hybrid model: by default, the aim of moral inquiry is moral understanding and non-experts should therefore treat moral experts as advisors. If, however, moral understanding is unavailable or only attainable at high risk, moral knowledge becomes the aim of moral inquiry and non-experts should treat moral experts as authorities. In the second part, I argue that we should be careful not to conceive of moral experts as completely analogous to non-moral experts. In particular, we can expect that many moral experts will be those negatively affected by injustices. This creates special procedural obligations for non-experts in their pursuit of moral expertise.