Abstract: Epistemic Logic, as a spinoff of normal modal logics, suffers from the problem of logical omniscience: its agents are perfect reasoners with unlimited deductive power. We argue that, even from a normative point of view, this modelling is inadequate for it sets requirements that cannot be actually attained according to solid empirical evidence. We therefore design a non-standard dynamic framework, making use of (a) impossible worlds (not closed under logical consequence), and (b) quantitative components capturing the agent’s cognitive capacity and the cognitive costs of inference rules with respect to certain resources (e.g. memory, time). These ingredients allow us to avoid problematic logical closure principles and at the same time account for the agent’s bounded reasoning steps. Moreover, such impossible-worlds models induce awareness-like structures, contributing towards a unifying overview of the omniscience literature and the extraction of useful formal results. We finally show that this approach can be generalized in order to encompass the dynamics of higher-order reasoning, communication, group deliberation, and thus do justice to multiple facets of human reasoning.