Title: Mini-Meno: How to Get More Out of Your Transmission

Abstract: My positive thesis is that competent deduction can add justification not already present in the premise – contrary to a tradition inaugurated by Plato’s dialogue Meno. My negative thesis is there is a novel counter-example to Counter-closure. According to this conservative principle, if you now know a conclusion by virtue of deducing it from a premise, then you knew that premise all along the inferential process. The counter-example features a lazy but logical student Mini. Doctor Evel tells her D: All deductive arguments reason from general to particular.  When she is unpersuaded, Doctor Evel cites the definition of deduction in the Oxford English Dictionary. In light of this authority, Mini does not know that D is false. But then she rallies: Not D, therefore. Not D. Whether her premise counts as general or particular, her own deduction constitutes a direct counterexample to D.