The paper challenges the dogma that imagery is both pictorial and perception-like. I argue that this view is untenable because the feature that best defends pictorialism against Dennett’s Striped-Tiger argument – imagery’s capacity for non-commitment – undermines perceptualism. I present two sets of incompatible claims characterising imagery’s pictorial format: the Structural Parts Principle and the Holism Principle on the one side, and the Non-commitment Principle on the other. If imagery satisfies the Structural Parts Principle and the Holism Principle, it may be perception-like, but pictorialism becomes vulnerable to Dennett’s challenge. If imagery satisfies the Non-commitment Principle, pictorialism can be preserved, but imagery no longer shares perception’s relevant phenomenal structure. Thus, pictorialism and perceptualism may each be defensible, but not together in the standard way.