Abstract: Plato and Pegasus do not exist, but otherwise they have so much going for them. They are nameable, in range of quantifiers, and able to stand in some relations. These familiar points lead to a range of puzzles (including what Quine famously called “Plato’s beard”), as to how we can name, quantifier over, and relate to what does not exist. I propose a solution—novel as far as I know—that breaks the Quinean association between the domain and what exists in a specific way. The first ingredient is a big constant “outer” domain always including Plato, Pegasus, and Putin alike. The second ingredient is a semantics on which ‘exists’’ (/‘is’) is a composite of at least three distinct elements: root-exist (/root-be), present tense, and indicative mood. The domain is what root-exists, but to satisfy ‘exists’ is to root-exist in the actual present, and thus there are things that do not exist (such as Plato and Pegasus). The end result is a system with the full domain of Lewisian modal realism, with none of the incredulous-stare-inducing claims about there existing talking donkeys or flying horses.