"Gobbet" Archive (PV) - 1999

Halifax states that he wants Beck to know that he has made it clear to Hitler that Britain is 'irrevocably determined to implement their obligations'. By this he is assuring the Poles that Britain is prepared to honour their agreement that was reached on 25th August, emphasising that Britain will fight with Poland and so she must not give in to Hitler's demands for Danzig and the Corridor. He goes on to emphasise this by stating that in Berlin they are fully aware of the British position. He states that the position of the Polish government is very different to the one they occupied in March, when talks took place between Ribbentrop and Lipski. Indeed, in that month (31st) a provisional Anglo-French guarantee was given to Poland; only provisional though, meaning that the Poles were in no position to achieve any military success, despite their willingness to fight. Halifax emphasises that the guarantee is now 'direct' and 'promised'. Halifax still desired negotiations with Germany (and Poland) over the Corridor and Danzig. By promising this guarantee, he was attempting to gain the upper hand for Britain and the Poles in any subsequent negotiations, which is what he is alluding to when he states that, '…the conversations would be carried on against this background.' By the forcefulness of its tone and content, Halifax is sending a message to the Poles that they will not stand by and let Hitler do to her what he had to Czechoslovakia, a message which was also designed to 'force' the Poles to not accede to Hitler's demands.

The first point of interest is the term 'constant oppression' that the Austrian people are enduring. This implies that the Austrians were being subjected to a reign of tyranny at the hands of the Austrian government. Firstly, factual evidence shows this not to be the case and ironically it was Hitler who subjected individuals to suffering, not the Austrian government. The use of those words is simply justification for the annexation of Austria and prior to that, the dismissal of Schuschnigg. Hitler's desire to emphasise the fact that the Austrians are being made to suffer is achieved by repetition of the word 'oppression'. He mentions it three times in the opening two sentences. This is indicative of Hitler's style of writing. In Mein Kampf, repetition is common place and is just another example of his poor command of language. However, the very fact the style of the document is similar to Mein Kampf enhances its authenticity and ensures that it is a useful document. 'Son of this soils' again does not make grammatical sense but probably refers to the fact that Hitler looked upon himself as a German and an Austrian, hence his fixation with the Anschluss. Finally, he alludes to the plebiscite by saying that he will let 'people decide their own fate'; a slight parody since the plebiscite was conducted amidst an atmosphere of threatened force and heightened propaganda.

The phrase 'changes in the European system' I interpret to be a way of referring to the map of Europe. By 1937, Hitler had signalled his intent by withdrawing from the League of Nations and re-militarising the Rhineland amongst other things. These events had gone by without any serious contentment and it was only a matter of time before other Versailles grievances were re-addressed. According to the document, it would seem that Britain was sympathetic to the German predicament. For instance, comments like changes 'probably could not be avoided' and the 'British did not believe that the status quo had to be maintained under all circumstances' seem to verify this assertion. The significance of Danzig, Austria and Czechoslovakia is the German contingent that lived in those places. Germans occupied some of the port of Danzig, part of Sudeten Czechoslovakia and a large proportion of Austria. If we are to believe the document which paints Britain in an apathetic light, even more surprising in light of the fact that Hitler described Britain as 'hate inspired antagonists' 17 days earlier, then it would suggest that the changes to Danzig, Czechoslovakia and Austria would be acceptable. Finally, the final line finishing with 'peaceful development' adds veracity to the piece because it is a reference to British appeasement, whereby they were content to concede parts of Czechoslovakia and Austria as long as war was avoided.

The first point of interest is the use of the term 'irrevocably determined'. It alludes to the British intention to carry out their 'obligations' if they are indeed necessary. The former is a very strong use of language and suggests that whatever happens, Britain will not desert the cause of Poland. The latter is a reference to the British guarantee to Poland, by which Britain was committed to coming to the aid of Poland in the likely event of a German offensive. Halifax then goes on to point out that the Polish position is considerably more secure than 'last March', which is another reminder of the British guarantee to Poland, signed on the 31st of March, 1939. By doing this, he is intending to allay fears in Poland via the British intelligence in Warsaw. He ends by saying that 'conversations would be carried on against this background'. This has two points of significance. Firstly, these are conversations with the Germans and the wording confirms what is known, which is that negotiations between Britain and Germany ( regarding the Polish situation ) were taking place right up to the outbreak of war. Secondly, all discussions were conducted with the knowledge that Britain was fully supportive of Poland and would look after her best interests.

The 'conditions put' and 'Your Lordship's statement' refer to Chamberlain's announcement in the House of Commons on the 2nd of September. The British Prime Minister had made an initial warning to Germany after she had invaded Poland on the 1st but on the 2nd, the warning was unequivocal in its tone. Chamberlain implored the German government to completely withdraw from Poland otherwise Britain was left with no option than to honour its guarantee to Poland - provisionally signed on March the 31st, 1939 and later confirmed on the 22nd of August - by declaring war on Germany. The gobbet goes on to mention figures like Count Ciano and Mussolini. The latter was of course the Italian Duce, whilst Ciano was the Italian Foreign Secretary. The key phrase within the extract is the final one - 'Signor Mussolini's suggestion'. What is meant by that was that the Italian leader was frantically trying to mediate between the Allies and Germany in order to prevent a world war. Specifically, his suggestion is a reference to a proposed conference to discuss grievances a a result of Versailles. However, ostensibly the Italians were on the side of the Central Powers and after Chamberlain's ultimatum to Germany, Mussolini's compromised position rendered him unable to 'press' the 'German government', in other words Hitler, who was the supreme commander of German policy, into proceeding with the Duce's suggestion.

Indeed, the political situation had deteriorated to such an extent that attempts to mediate were finally abandoned on the 3rd of September. Italy could not longer persuade Germany to compromise and Britain herself were forced into declaring war on Poland. Italy initially fought on the side of Germany, despite protestations that she would not get involved. However, towards the end of the war, even she deserted Germany - another contributory factor to the Reich's downfall in 1945.

The first expression to note is the term 'compounding'. In the context of the document, it means that the chances of Russia and Germany coming together in the 'political sphere' were remote. Seeds deliberately chooses the latter terminology because at the time, the two countries were negotiating economically. However, it was Seeds' understanding that this would not lead to a more concrete political agreement. He goes on to justify this belief by saying that Russia was 'sufficiently covered' by the commitments that Britain and France had made to Poland, Greece and Rumania and that would be made to Turkey in the foreseeable future. It is important to highlight that Russia still had grievances with the diplomatic situation that was developing in the middle of 1939, namely that she felt vulnerable from an attack through the Balkan states. However, Seeds believed that the negotiations had 'removed any serious temptation' to 'indulge in a volte face'. The latter means an about turn or even a u-turn, thus in this instance it would mean moving away from the allied camp to the side of the Germans. Seeds considered that this was extremely unlikely but he was unaware of Russian-German negotiations and moreover, he did not realise the extent to which the Russians were growing tired of the Allied inability to offer something that the Russians would benefit from. The time the Allies took to reply to the Russians was not a helping factor either.

The 'British encirclement policy' refers to the German interpretation of Britain's attempt to secure a set of alliances in case of German aggression. In German eyes, Britain had an alliance with France, a reciprocal understanding with Poland and were pressing for an agreement with Russia. However, the word encirclement implies an offensive manoeuvre and as this is in complete contrast to what in reality was happening at the time; this justifies the phrase ' so called'. The term 'complete surprise' is an allusion to the sudden u-turn of British foreign policy in the opinion of the German hierarchy. If we are to believe the document's veracity in respect to Germany being caught unaware by the British guarantee to Poland, it is possible to empathise with German thinking in light of the fact that Britain showed no remotely threatening response to events such as the re-occupation of the Rhineland and the Anschluss. However, we must bare in mind that the document is a tertiary source since it originated from an official at the foreign affairs ministry, who had in turn alerted another member of staff before Ogilvie-Forbes has been informed. Thus, it is highly questionable if the tone of the extract is indicative of German rationale at the time, even though the British guarantee to Poland could be viewed as the first move in the non-appeasement direction. Even though there is suspicion over the reliability of the source, the use of the word 'deplored' is both interesting and probably accurate in terms of highlighting the German reaction to the Allied guarantee of Poland. The word in question is very forceful and justifiably so; the guarantee had seemingly placed Poland in a stronger position that enabled the Poles to 'dig their toes in over Danzig' to such an extent as to ignore 'German proposals'. Ostensibly, the latter were a compromise to settle the issue of Polish territory which may have agreed without the interruption of Britain and France, who offered sufficient security to ensure that nothing was settled.

Henderson's argument is divided into 3 main threads. His first thread relates German demands for Danzig to Germany's treatment at the Treaty of Versailles. Henderson's first sentence, with Danzig as the subject, is both impersonal and passive. Danzig existed as an independent entity. Henderson is echoing reality, since Danzig was declared a Free City under League of Nations control in 1919. However, this move also contravened Wilsonian National Self Determination, since Danzig contained a sizeable German minority. This action was the pretext for Hitler's campaign in May 1939. Through his use of the passive, however, Henderson argued this situation was neither the fault of Britain nor Germany nor Poland. This structure balances the harshness and coarseness of the words "running sore", which are obvious and offensive. Though Danzig was a problem, it could be soothed over. This argument, however, has a caveat. Henderson was pro-German and sympathised with German grievances against the Treaty. Henderson, therefore, criticises Britain for creating the Danzig problem. The words "running sore" imply a metaphorical flesh wound, a wound caused by the Treaty which continued to irritate and fester within Germany. The Anglo-Polish guarantee, in particular, had caused this wound to flare up. This is true. The Anglo-Polish guarantee, instead of deterring Hitler, motivated him to create the "Fall Weiss" invasion plan for Poland. Henderson's second argument moved to a wider scope, encapsulating the Polish Corridor, implying Germany wanted the whole of the Polish Corridor to itself. On grounds of National Self Determination, this argument was plausible. With the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, however, Hitler gave up any right to use this argument. Henderson, therefore, is still labouring under a misapprehension. His pro-German bias was clouding his judgement. Henderson's argument, however, has another level. The belief within government circles of the legitimate German grievance of National Self Determination gave way to realisation of Hitler's economic stranglehold in the east. Henderson employed the same trick, moving to Hitler's economic goals in the east. This was Henderson's third argument. Henderson implied Germany's push to the east was the prime objective, through the use of the phrase "far more interested". This argument was true. In January 1939 Germany was lagging behind in oil supplies needed to fuel her rearmament programme. This problem could be solved through access to the oil supplies of Romania, to the east of the Polish Corridor. Germany, therefore, had fundamental need of expansion in Eastern Europe.

Halifax uses three main lines of argument. Halifax takes a very calculated line in his first argument. This line is first implied in the name "M.Molotov". Molotov, a Germanophile, was the replacement Russian Foreign Minister for Litvinov, a Western sympathiser, on 4 May. Therefore, a sea change away from sympathy for British and French, towards sympathy with, German foreign policy, is implied. With this replacement, Halifax suggests a settlement between Russia and Germany is inevitable. Halifax is therefore absolving the British of all blame for the breakdown in relations between Russia and Britain. The phrase "declared ourselves ready" has positive connotations, implying openness and willingness to discuss information. This protestation contrasts with deep British mistrust of the Russians, such as Chamberlain's reticence to sign a pact of mutual assistance with the Russians in May. In his second argument, Halifax compares the British situation to that of the Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These states had been occupied by both Russia and Germany during and after World War One, and felt continuously threatened by their presence during the 1930s. Like Britain, Halifax implies the Baltic States are powerless to improve their lot. In one sense, he is wrong. During the month of June, the British and French opposition to aid for the Balkan States was great, only changing at the beginning of July. In 1938, moreover, Britain did not raise a finger to aid Lithuania against the secession of the Klaipeda by Germany. Closer agreement between Britain and Russia on the Baltic States, therefore, would have improved the chances of success of the talks. Halifax's third argument considers the inevitability of an attack on the Baltic States by either Russia or Germany. However, he switches to the Russian perspective. In his view, Russian suspicion of British motives for signing an agreement was also high. He is right. The Russians wished to stay aloof from the British, fearing Britain would drag her into a war with Germany. Given this suspicion, an alliance was not practical. Given this conclusion, the words "alienate" and "disregard" implying isolation, are ironic. Britain and Russia were irreconcilable, particularly following Russia's realisation of an alliance with Germany. In a sinister way, the word "practical" highlights the Secret Protocol of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The fate of the Baltic States was inevitable. Therefore the phrase “drive them into the arms of Germany" is irrelevant.

The source is significant in understanding the influence of the Baltic States in the struggle between Britain and Russia and Russia and Germany for an agreement. Its contemporary impact was also great. On 22 June, the decision for a joint Anglo-Russian guarantee of the Baltic States in the political sphere was crucial to progression to military talks with Russia. It was therefore a very typical source. Halifax's implication, however, of an impending agreement between Russia and Germany, make it an exceptional source. On 24 August, after completing both political and economic talks, Russia and Germany signed a Non-Aggression Pact. Hitler was free to attack Poland, and start a new World War.

Seeds style consists of an uneasy middle path, merging both his own sympathy for the Russians with mistrust for the Russians inherent within the British Cabinet. This style affects the three threads of his argument. Seeds first argument concerns German political aid to Russia, and the impossibility of a political agreement between Russia and Germany. In a sense, Seeds is right. Economic talks between Russia and Germany had stalled by March 1939, and only got underway again in June. Since economic agreement was the preliminary to a military and political agreement, these talks had a long way to go. However, Seeds is being extremely pessimistic. By putting emphasis on "political", he foresees the eventual conclusion of the political talks of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939. In light of this knowledge, Seeds is struggling to create a workable settlement. He is also struggling to maintain his own sympathy for the Russians in light of his and the British Government's mistrust of them. This confusion is highlighted by the balance of the negativity of "never" with the line "more than just a possibility". In light of the Nazi-Soviet alliance, the British talks are futile. Seeds second argument, therefore, offers a post-mortem analysis of reasons for breakdown in German and British relations. Seeds uses irony in his reference to the shared commitments of the Soviet Union and Britain. The word "covered" implies a watertight, comprehensive commitment between Russia and Britain to aid Poland, Romania and Turkey. In reality, Britain froze Russia out of these guarantees, forcing the Russians to make their own agreements and abandon an alliance with Britain in favour of an alliance with Germany. The word "covered" surreptitiously conveys black humour. This sentence, however, suggests a degree of formality. The word "commitments" implies security and reassurance. Seeds, therefore, is camouflaging the true extent of his fears amid an aura of surreal security. This message is what politicians like Halifax wanted to hear. Seeds' third argument reaches an end point, moving from his realisation of the making of the Pact through to its consequences. "Volte face" is a punchy phrase, representing a whole change of character, of ideology. Seeds is hitting home the dramatic significance and power of an alliance between the two great economic heavyweights of Europe. The words "serious", however, which has a highly pessimistic connotation, jars with "remarkable", which has positive connotation and implies wonder. Seeds is implying the possibility of future redemption and reconciliation of Russia with Britain. This idea harmonised with the reality after the declaration of the Pact, when the British and French held out hope of an understanding with Russia. Russia was still the key to victory over Germany. This was demonstrated by Russian economic dominance over Germany in January 1939, and in Russian dominance over Germany in Eastern Europe after 1945.

The source is of tremendous historical value in understanding the attitudes behind Anglo-Russian talks in the lead up to the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Its contemporary significance, however, is more dubious. On the one hand, Seeds is a visionary. From his perspective, the source marks the realisation of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and a clear turning point in Anglo-Soviet understanding. For Chamberlain and Halifax, on the other hand, the realisation had yet to occur. Therefore, its contemporary impact was as yet limited. Nevertheless, the source is exceptional. In the years following 1945, the shift to Russian domination of the East would be felt in a new war - the Cold War.

Ogilvie-Forbes uses three main threads of argument. In his first two threads, Forbes analyses the alleged strategic and economic encirclement of Germany by Britain, and the effect this has on Germany. Forbes mocks British strategic encirclement of Germany through the use of the words "so-called". They have negative connotations, implying that both the foundations and the body of the policy are ramshackle, badly constructed and unsuitable for use against Hitler. He is right. The British guarantees to Poland, Romania and Turkey were militarily unviable, since Britain had not the army, navy or air force to back them up. Moreover, it was not true "encirclement", since Russia was frozen out of the guarantees. In essence, the policy was no different to Appeasement, since the Polish guarantee preserved the independence not the integrity of Poland. Chamberlain had still not learnt from Hitler's annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia that Hitler could not be appeased. Forbes comment of the German government's surprise, therefore, is both ironic and poignant, particularly in the context of the ordering of the attack against Poland - "Fall Weiss". In attempting to avert war, the British government hastened it. Forbes attitude, however, contributes to this. In mocking British policy, he encourages Hitler's defiance of it, and undermines the faith his British colleagues had in his execution of foreign policy. His attitude echoes the pro-German policy of Henderson. In the context of economic encirclement, however, it was the Germans who were to blame. German domination of Central and Eastern Europe created fears in both Britain and America of German encirclement. Fear of economic encirclement, then, led to strategic encirclement. In this light, Forbes third argument focuses on the effect of the British guarantees - Polish resistance to Germany. Forbes is comparing German rights to fair treatment of German minorities in Danzig to her economic domination of Eastern Europe. Both are illegitimate. Forbes underlines this idea through the word "deplored", a word implying weakness and which has no potency. Germany, therefore, has brought her problems upon herself.

Seeds points out that he finds it unlikely that there will be any alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union in the 'political sphere'. He emphasises this because the two countries were at that time engaging in economic and commercial negotiations, but he wanted to point out to Halifax that he didn't believe that these would lead to anything more. Seeds justifies this by explaining that he considered the Soviet Union to be 'sufficiently covered' by the commitments that had been made to Poland, Rumania and those that would be made to Turkey in the agreement between the three countries. The Soviet Union had indeed been secured to an extent, but had therefore also been put in an advantageous position by the earlier agreed alliances. She was protected by a belt of guaranteed intervening territory without having had to make any commitments herself. Rather than feel required to make an alliance with the Western powers, therefore, she was in a position to wait for the best deal possible. Russia also felt that the deal with the West did not offer her complete security, believing she was in as much danger from attack through the Balkan states as through the states guaranteed in their agreement. Seeds believes that the negotiations have managed to 'remove any serious temptation' that Russia may feel to make a deal with Germany. However, Germany's moves towards Stalin which began with Nazi-Soviet negotiations for improved relations on 30 March offered Russia greater options. While the West offered the risk of war without any gain, Germany offered gain without having to resort to war. Seeds considered that such a move by Russia would be a 'remarkable volte face' which underlines the fact that Britain was unaware of the extent of the Russian-German negotiations.

The guarantee marked a departure from Britain’s former lack of interest in Eastern Europe, which perhaps contributed to Germany’s “complete surprise”. However, following the complete subsumption of Czechoslovakia by Germany in March, Poland was the only country on which any kind of containment of Germany in the east could be based. This perhaps explains the reference to a “British encirclement policy”. The occupation of Prague is also significant here since it indicated that logically, Poland would be the next victim and perhaps increased Poland’s desire for some kind of alliance. Also, the taking of Memel on 22nd March raised Polish fears that the same sudden annexation would be applied to Danzig. The guarantee is described as a “complete surprise” to Germany. However, while it has been said that Hitler fully expected to be able to end the Polish question through discussions right up until May, in fact talks had reached deadlock by the end of March and Beck was really just biding time. The document implies that the guarantee led to Poland “digging their toes in” over Danzig and the Polish Corridor, but even before the talks with Britain, Beck and his government had refused to concede ground on these issues and it is not true that the guarantee had suddenly enabled Poland to stand up to Germany. The “German proposals” referred to were those made by Ribbentrop in March demanding that Danzig be incorporated into the Reich and for a highway to be built through the Corridor. Beck had already refused them, saying that a highway was not possible and that Danzig must remain a free city to maintain fair German-Polish relations. However, Beck still tried to keep his options open by saying that they were still willing to discuss the situation. Even after the agreement with Britain, Beck was told to avoid an uncompromising or provocative attitude towards Berlin – neither side wanted to take any unnecessary risks. Despite Germany’s attempts to appear diplomatic, the government had actually already decided Poland’s eventual fate – that she would be “so beaten down” that she would not be taken into account as a political factor for several decades.

While the document does seem to be based somewhat on hearsay (an “official… informed a member of my staff”, who presumably told Ogilvie-Forbes), it is correct in recording the German government’s discontent with Britain at their involvement with Poland. This discontent was to be made official on 28th April with Hitler’s renouncement of the Anglo-German naval agreement and the German-Polish pact of 1934. The Danzig situation was to culminate in the problems of July and August and the British-Polish alliance was cemented by a treaty in August, following the announcement of the Nazi-Soviet pact.

The German official had referred to an 'encirclement policy' being used by Britain against Germany, claiming that Britain and France's guarantee to Poland, proposed guarantee to Rumania and their moves to get Russia to support these were an attempt to surround Germany by hostile powers. Ogilvie-Forbes description of this policy as 'so-called' suggests that he did not believe that Britain was pursuing such a policy and that it was instead an example of the German Government's use of propaganda. The German Government claimed that the guarantee offered to Poland by Britain and France had come as a 'complete surprise.' Indeed until this point, Britain had appeased Germany and allowed Hitler to make any advances that he had wished and after the Munich conference, Hitler believed he had been given a green light in Eastern Europe. The Allies, however, considered that Germany's invasion of Czechoslovakia after gaining the Sudetenland showed that Hitler had aggressive expansionist aims and that at some stage he should be stopped. There was clear evidence that Hitler intended to take Poland and Rumania next, with a strong fear that he would then wage war against Western Europe. It was therefore considered an important time to stop Hitler. Nevertheless, Britain was still reluctant to provoke Germany into aggressive action and would have been concerned by the strong manner expressed by the German Government with the use of such a word as 'deplored.' Germany claimed that Poland were now 'digging their toes in' over the discussions concerning Danzig and the Polish Corridor because of the Allies guarantee and therefore making aggression more likely. Although it was true that Poland felt itself in a stronger position because of this guarantee, they had rejected the German government's proposals over these areas on 26 March, before they had been given the Allied guarantee. They would also have been unlikely to make agreement with Germany even without the guarantee as they had earlier seen with Czechoslovakia that sacrificing some land did not guarantee safety.

The document opens with Ogilvie-Forbes stating that the British guarantee of Poland had come as a 'complete surprise' to the German Government. Taken at face value this statement is acceptable for it appears that the British government have indulged in a complete 'volte face' in view of her trenchant appeasement policy that had been followed since Hitler's accession. However, this information has come from a minister in charge of 'British encirclement policy', which means that the validity of the German 'surprise' must be questioned. If the British were seeking encirclement, then the obvious staring point was Poland since Britain was already allied to France. Ogilvie-Forbes continues on to say that the German minister 'deplored' the action of the British as is had led to Poland becoming more stubborn over the issue of Danzig and the Corridor, which is very forceful and aggressive in its tone. This angered the Germans who saw Danzig (created a free city under the League of Nations) as fundamentally important to them as it provided a port to the Baltic. Indeed, the tone and wording implies significant German displeasure at British actions. It also insinuates that the Germans were actively seeking to reach an agreement with Poland over Danzig and the Corridor, to claim back the area of land lost at Versailles that was inhabited by German speaking people, as well as for the economic gains, and that the agreement was being jeopardised by the British guarantee.

Seeds states that he feels that there is no risk of Germany 'compounding' with Russia in the political sphere. Such an agreement already existed between the two in an economic sense, dating back to Rapallo, and at the time negotiations were taking place to cement the agreement. Seeds feels that the risk of a political alliance is 'nothing more than a possibility', which in light of the new discussions between Germany and Russia, may have been a misplaced belief. He justifies his claim by stating that Britain has made commitments to Russia over Poland, Romania and Turkey that 'remove the temptation to indulge in a volte face' (a complete change of attitude or opinion). By this he is referring to the Anglo-French guarantee of Poland on 31st March, which promised to provide aid to the country should she come under attack form the Nazis, and a similar guarantee of Romania (agreed to by Turkey) on 13th April. In his eyes this is enough to enable a satisfactory agreement with Stalin, and encircle Hitler. However, from the Russian perspective, the British offer is insufficient, as the path through the Baltic States is still open to Hitler. What Seeds is unaware of is that Moscow is playing off her two potential allies to see from whom she can receive the most advantageous offer. What is clear is that Seeds is naive in thinking that an ambiguous offer to the Russians is enough to satisfy Molotov, and not precipitate a Russian political alliance with Germany.

The document opens with Halifax stating that Seeds must share his ‘bewilderment’ at the attitude of Molotov, in that he has refused to accept the British proposal for alliance. The document explains why he feels this ‘bewilderment’ as Halifax feels the British have offered Russia everything she asked for. However, there is a great deal of ambiguity in what Halifax says, as he fails to be clear on what constitutes ‘an act of aggression’ or what form the ‘assistance’ will take. For the Russians this is not a solid enough proposal. Molotov was looking for a precise definition of military commitments that, following the British guarantee of Poland, would protect against the threat of attack through the Baltic region. The feeling was that Britain was looking for an alliance that was advantageous to Britain and disadvantageous to Russia. Halifax claims that if the Baltic States in question were named it was against their wishes and it may also force them into the hands of Germany, which is in effect an attempt to justify not over committing to Russia; a country that Chamberlain still harboured great suspicion towards. For Molotov, it was yet more British vagueness, which fuelled suspicion in the Kremlin. Indeed, no firm British guarantee of the Baltic States had been given in Strang’s draft, the guarantee that Molotov was seeking.

This document is very significant for it shows that Britain was still wary of the threat of Russia, and even in late June was not prepared to commit to her defence should she be attacked by Germany. It highlights the ambiguity of British policy towards Russia and emphasises that they were prepared to let Hitler move eastwards despite the guarantee of Poland. The Russians assumed – until August – that Hitler would redirect his attention north-eastwards to avert a collision with Poland, and as such her policy was to guard against this. Therefore, one can see Molotov’s desire for protection of the Baltic. However, it is clear that Halifax et al, should have placed greater emphasis on negotiations with the Russians, for in August 1939 the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed which meant Hitler had avoided a war on two fronts, and effectively began World War 2.

The phrase ‘it is not possible to foretell what Italy may demand of France or what she would consider a satisfactory settlement of her claims under the London Treaty’. From a British perspective, the Italian claims were perplexing, ranging from demanding Tunisia in North Africa, to land on her northern borders. However, it was consistent of a foreign policy conducted by Mussolini, who, in the climate of appeasement, had an in-proportionate amount of power. Having disregarded the Franco-Italian agreement of 1935, Italy believed that she was entitled to territorial concessions from France by virtue of the Treaty of London of 1915. Mussolini nursed desires to acquire Tunisia, and after this telegram had been sent and read, there was a troop build up between the French and Italians in Libya and Tunisia. The British government, who in previous telegrams and in Parliament, said that she did not wish to become involved in negotiations, was concerned with the troop build up and the consequences for her colonies in North Africa, but also the affect that this would have on any attempt by Britain to ally Italy and France together against Germany.

The Earl of Perth describes in very diplomatic terms the relationship between Italy and Germany as ‘…and that Italy will receive at least full diplomatic support from Germany’. The Axis relationship was much more developed than this stage, and previously in this document Count Ciano had said that ‘the military power of Germany and Italy together…would make no difficulty in breaking any coalition on the Continent’. Although Great Britain wanted to support France, since Munich she had hoped to get Italy on side, and the visit by Chamberlain and Halifax reflects this ambition.

Halifax argues that ‘the events of the past few days… [are] a complete repudiation of the Munich Agreement’. Legally, this is not correct. The Munich Pact had decided the fate of the Sudeten German minority. Although the framework had been created through an International Commission to respect the boundaries of post-Munich Czechoslovakia, it had never been fully established. Great Britain and France had entered into such an international obligation which recognised the boundaries of the post-Munich Czechoslovakia, but Germany (and Italy) had never done this. Rather, the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia realised the German ambivalence towards Munich which had existed for the previous few months. Halifax goes on to say that it is ‘a denial of the spirit…to co-operate for a peaceful settlement’. Halifax could confidently argue this, but Hitler could always counter that by saying that the agreement was only valid on an issue which related to Germany, Britain and or France. Great Britain (and similarly France) had no real interest intrinsically in the Czechoslovakian situation. Rather, what is best represented by the ‘spirit’ Halifax talks about is the misreading of German intentions and the now discredited policy of appeasement. The British Foreign Secretary describes the German military action as ‘devoid of any basis of legality’. However, because Dr. Hacha and Dr. Chwalkovsky had ‘placed the destiny of the Czech people and country with confidence in the hands of the Fuhrer’, it became difficult for Britain to genuinely from a legal position undermine the German position. Furthermore, Hitler and Ribbentrop claimed that he was simply trying to restore order and stability in Central Europe.

Halifax says that the reason that cession of territory to Hungary may be unavoidable is because of the “Munich settlement of Sudeten German question” and “the settlement… made with Poland”. This is because the Munich Agreement set a precedent, leading to all other minorities in Czechoslovakia feeling that they should have the same treatment as the Sudeten Germans. Under the Munich Agreement, the Sudetenland was to be occupied in stages, between the first and tenth of October, and certain areas would have plebiscites. An annex to the settlement also stated that the Polish and Hungarian minoritis should also be satisfied before the Four Powers would guarantee the remainder of the state. For Czechoslovakia, it was not so much a settlement as an imposition – Benes was told to accept it or be abandoned by the West (which he ultimately was anyway). The Czechoslovak settlement with Poland was the result of an ultimatum delivered by Poland on September 30th 1938, the same day as the Munich Agreement was signed. Negotiations over Poland’s disputed borders had started before Munich: a minute by Sir O. Sargent of September 19th documents a Polish ‘démarche’ declaring that whatever was agreed as regards the Sudetens, the Polish government would claim similar treatment. Despite being told they should not be forceful, Poland decided to deliver an ultimatum because they wanted their own glory rather than having the West win back their territory for them. Again, this was not really a settlement, as Halifax describes it, inferring that they had an element of choice. Instead, the Czechoslovaks were really forced to accept it because, Dr Krofta, the Czech Minister for Foreign Affairs said, they had been abandoned. The result was the loss of Teschen and Freistadt to Poland and some plebiscites elsewhere. This meant that Czechoslovakia lost an area rich in resources and industry, compounding all her losses. The cession of territory to Hungary was unavoidable after this because Britain and France had promised to treat all minorities equally and did not want further instability in eastern Europe. Hungary had already made a veiled threat that opposition might be aroused in Hungary if it was felt that the government was indifferent to the plight of the Magyars in Czechoslovakia. They eventually were to regain land under the Vienna Award in November.

Their protest is about “the events of the past few days”, that is to say the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia by German troops two days previously, on March 15th. This followed the forced agreement of Dr Hacha, President of Czecho-Slovakia, to hand over the destiny of his country to Hitler’s Germany. Hitler used the discontent in Slovakia as a pretext for invasion because of the ‘intolerable reign of terror’ for Germans there. Hacha was threatened that if he did not comply then Prague could be bombed. Halifax describes the invasion as “a complete repudiation of the Munich Agreement” because the whole point of the settlement was to solve the Sudetenland problem and prevent invasion of Czechoslovakia; it was meant to control Hitler’s ambitions. The document also refers to the fact that Germany had denied the “spirit” in which they co-operated for a peaceful settlement. This is rather a naïve comment since by this time it was perfectly clear that Hitler had only signed the Agreement for his own gains. Halifax protests about the “changes effected in Czecho-Slovakia” but this is quite an understatement since by now Czechoslovakia had been completely swallowed up by her neighbouring states.

An earlier Foreign Office document, written four days previous to this telegram, predicted that a German invasion of Czecho-Slovakia was possible and recognised that this would put “considerable pressure upon His Majesty’s Government to take some action”.(1) However, it also points out that Britain could only take effective action if France was to as well, and this was very unlikely. The written protest here was as far as Britain went against Germany at this point, as was the case with others who sent formal protests to Germany (France, Russia and America). There was never actually any chance that Britain would take decisive action due to the fact she was not militarily prepared for a war. Chamberlain used the excuse that internal disruption in Czechoslovakia had rendered past guarantees void. Five days after the message was delivered (on the 18th), Memel was ceded to Germany by Lithuania – clearly Britains objections had no effect on Germany.

Ogilvie-Forbes talks of Hitler’s hopes that “France can be restrained”, either with her “new western fortifications” or by “diplomatic methods”. At this time, the most likely way seemed to be through diplomacy, with a declaration of friendship having been signed between the two countries on 6th December 1938. The French wanted to avoid war and wanted a clear symbol of détente with Germany. It also seems unlikely that France would have taken any military action against Germany without the backing of Britain anyway. Also mentioned are “complications with Italy”. This refers to the demands Rome was making on France, such as concessions in French Somaliland and seats on the Suez Canal Board; also there were many anti-French articles in the Italian press. Hitler presumably hoped that this issue would be a distraction away from Germany, but also that it would drive a wedge between France and Britain following the Anglo-Italian agreement of mid-November. The other part of the extract is the claim that Hitler was “highly irritated with the rearmament of Great Britain”. Britain had stepped up rearmament but was not yet at the stage of being prepared to fight a major war. Still, Hitler did not want her to be prepared in case she decided to use military force (althought there was no evidence at the time that this was going to happen). The rest of the document does place a lot of emphasis on Hitler’s ambitions to expand eastwards - “his pitch in the east” – but more worryingly the possibility of an attack on Britain, which is perhaps why Ogilvie-Forbes mentions Hitler’s annoyance with her. Other documents written by the same man back up this impression, one of which cites Mein Kampf as a reason to speed up rearmament (1) and another of which talks about an attacking German press campaign against Britain (2). These negative images contrast with those described by the British Ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, who tended to present a more positive image of Nazi Germany.

This document demonstrates Britain’s move away from appeasement with the realisation that Hitler was not going to concede. Reports like this would have contributed towards Britain’s escalating search for alliances and a system of security in eastern Europe.

Ogilvie-Forbes talks of Hitler’s hopes that “France can be restrained”, either with her “new western fortifications” or by “diplomatic methods”. At this time, the most likely way seemed to be through diplomacy, with a declaration of friendship having been signed between the two countries on 6th December 1938. The French wanted to avoid war and wanted a clear symbol of détente with Germany. It also seems unlikely that France would have taken any military action against Germany without the backing of Britain anyway. Also mentioned are “complications with Italy”. This refers to the demands Rome was making on France, such as concessions in French Somaliland and seats on the Suez Canal Board; also there were many anti-French articles in the Italian press. Hitler presumably hoped that this issue would be a distraction away from Germany, but also that it would drive a wedge between France and Britain following the Anglo-Italian agreement of mid-November. The other part of the extract is the claim that Hitler was “highly irritated with the rearmament of Great Britain”. Britain had stepped up rearmament but was not yet at the stage of being prepared to fight a major war. Still, Hitler did not want her to be prepared in case she decided to use military force (althought there was no evidence at the time that this was going to happen). The rest of the document does place a lot of emphasis on Hitler’s ambitions to expand eastwards - “his pitch in the east” – but more worryingly the possibility of an attack on Britain, which is perhaps why Ogilvie-Forbes mentions Hitler’s annoyance with her. Other documents written by the same man back up this impression, one of which cites Mein Kampf as a reason to speed up rearmament (1) and another of which talks about an attacking German press campaign against Britain (2). These negative images contrast with those described by the British Ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, who tended to present a more positive image of Nazi Germany.

This document demonstrates Britain’s move away from appeasement with the realisation that Hitler was not going to concede. Reports like this would have contributed towards Britain’s escalating search for alliances and a system of security in eastern Europe.

Their protest is about “the events of the past few days”, that is to say the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia by German troops two days previously, on March 15th. This followed the forced agreement of Dr Hacha, President of Czecho-Slovakia, to hand over the destiny of his country to Hitler’s Germany. Hitler used the discontent in Slovakia as a pretext for invasion because of the ‘intolerable reign of terror’ for Germans there. Hacha was threatened that if he did not comply then Prague could be bombed. Halifax describes the invasion as “a complete repudiation of the Munich Agreement” because the whole point of the settlement was to solve the Sudetenland problem and prevent invasion of Czechoslovakia; it was meant to control Hitler’s ambitions. The document also refers to the fact that Germany had denied the “spirit” in which they co-operated for a peaceful settlement. This is rather a naïve comment since by this time it was perfectly clear that Hitler had only signed the Agreement for his own gains. Halifax protests about the “changes effected in Czecho-Slovakia” but this is quite an understatement since by now Czechoslovakia had been completely swallowed up by her neighbouring states.

An earlier Foreign Office document, written four days previous to this telegram, predicted that a German invasion of Czecho-Slovakia was possible and recognised that this would put “considerable pressure upon His Majesty’s Government to take some action”.(1) However, it also points out that Britain could only take effective action if France was to as well, and this was very unlikely. The written protest here was as far as Britain went against Germany at this point, as was the case with others who sent formal protests to Germany (France, Russia and America). There was never actually any chance that Britain would take decisive action due to the fact she was not militarily prepared for a war. Chamberlain used the excuse that internal disruption in Czechoslovakia had rendered past guarantees void. Five days after the message was delivered (on the 18th), Memel was ceded to Germany by Lithuania – clearly Britains objections had no effect on Germany.

1. DBFP III vol IV doc 230

Poland had given ‘no final answer’ about the question of them joining the declaration because they said they did not want to if Russia was in it too – the only way Russia could get to Germany, if a war did emerge, was by travelling through Poland who did not want the risks which that entailed. Halifax is being very diplomatic in his explanation of their hesitation to commit, never mentioning the mistrust between the two nations but instead blaming it on the common enemy – Germany – and the fact that Poland does not want to provoke her by showing definite hostility by “joining openly a bloc obviously designed for resistance to German expansion”. This obviously was also a major factor in Poland’s policy, as was the fact that relations with a Communist government such as Russia’s would provoke Germany further towards action against Poland. The fact that Halifax talks of “no final answer” and of Poland’s “hesitation” suggests that Poland have not made a definite decision and that there is still a chance they will agree to join. While Poland was very reluctant to join any kind of alliance, as demonstrated a few months previously when they refused to be part of a guarantee to Czechoslovakia (1), Britain and France were very keen to have Poland with them and believed she was the key to the protection of Rumania. In fact, they thought that Poland would be a more valuable ally than Russia because of her proximity to Germany and therefore were prepared to let go of Russia if they could get Poland on side. Therefore even though Litvinov, the Russian Foreign Secretary, had agreed to sign a declaration if France and Poland did, this was not seen as very important. This may be why Halifax does not really give Maisky any definite answers in the meeting recorded, as they are not too bothered about Russian involvement.

This exemplifies the complicated discussions that were taking place in Europe at this time, with various proposals constantly being put forward. However, Poland became increasingly important to Britain and France and by the end of March they were looking to a definite commitment in eastern Europe, and Russia eventually ended up joining Germany in the Nazi-Soviet pact in August.

The extract is a clear sign that British opinion was stiffening in regards to Germany. In the opening sentence the phrase ' the desire to make it plain' suggests the belief of the British government that Hitler had misunderstood Britains position and that they were now clarifying it. The British government, following the events of the 15th of March believed that the conquest of the rump of Czechoslovakia had been Hitlers plan all along and that he had carried this plan out because Britain had not strongly enough warned him not to and there was a fear that he would continue along this path unless Britain and France placed enough obstacles in his way. The reprimand over the repudiation of the Munich settlement seems to be expressed more in terms of disappointment on behalf of the British that Hitler had let them down by tarnishing the 'spirit of Munich' and through his failure in co-operating in keeping the peace. The issue of Czechoslovakia is mentioned as more of an aside by which they question the legality of dismembering the country creating Bohemia as a 'protectorate' of Germany and declaring Slovakian 'independance'.

The extract is a clear sign that British opinion was stiffening in regards to Germany. In the opening sentence the phrase ' the desire to make it plain' suggests the belief of the British government that Hitler had misunderstood Britains position and that they were now clarifying it. The British government, following the events of the 15th of March believed that the conquest of the rump of Czechoslovakia had been Hitlers plan all along and that he had carried this plan out because Britain had not strongly enough warned him not to and there was a fear that he would continue along this path unless Britain and France placed enough obstacles in his way. The reprimand over the repudiation of the Munich settlement seems to be expressed more in terms of disappointment on behalf of the British that Hitler had let them down by tarnishing the 'spirit of Munich' and through his failure in co-operating in keeping the peace. The issue of Czechoslovakia is mentioned as more of an aside by which they question the legality of dismembering the country creating Bohemia as a 'protectorate' of Germany and declaring Slovakian 'independance'.

The extract is a clear sign that British opinion was stiffening in regards to Germany. In the opening sentence the phrase ' the desire to make it plain' suggests the belief of the British government that Hitler had misunderstood Britains position and that they were now clarifying it. The British government, following the events of the 15th of March believed that the conquest of the rump of Czechoslovakia had been Hitlers plan all along and that he had carried this plan out because Britain had not strongly enough warned him not to and there was a fear that he would continue along this path unless Britain and France placed enough obstacles in his way. The reprimand over the repudiation of the Munich settlement seems to be expressed more in terms of disappointment on behalf of the British that Hitler had let them down by tarnishing the 'spirit of Munich' and through his failure in co-operating in keeping the peace. The issue of Czechoslovakia is mentioned as more of an aside by which they question the legality of dismembering the country creating Bohemia as a 'protectorate' of Germany and declaring Slovakian 'independance'.

The extract is a clear sign that British opinion was stiffening in regards to Germany. In the opening sentence the phrase ' the desire to make it plain' suggests the belief of the British government that Hitler had misunderstood Britains position and that they were now clarifying it. The British government, following the events of the 15th of March believed that the conquest of the rump of Czechoslovakia had been Hitlers plan all along and that he had carried this plan out because Britain had not strongly enough warned him not to and there was a fear that he would continue along this path unless Britain and France placed enough obstacles in his way. The reprimand over the repudiation of the Munich settlement seems to be expressed more in terms of disappointment on behalf of the British that Hitler had let them down by tarnishing the 'spirit of Munich' and through his failure in co-operating in keeping the peace. The issue of Czechoslovakia is mentioned as more of an aside by which they question the legality of dismembering the country creating Bohemia as a 'protectorate' of Germany and declaring Slovakian 'independance'.

The document opens with Perth informing Halifax that he is unsure as to what Italy will demand from the French. By the initial treaty, Italy stood to gain a significant amount of territory, yet nationalists argued that she had been robbed of her rightful gains despite attaining places such as Trieste, South Tyrol and Istria. The second half of the document states that once conversations begin, there will be some 'stiff bargaining.' This is unsurprising considering that many Italians felt they had not received their rightful dues after WW1, but also because the French had let down the Italians. The opinion was that the French would not get off so lightly this time and that the Italians were prepared to 'fight' for everything that they believed was rightfully theirs. Perth concludes by stating that, 'Italy will receive at least full diplomatic support from Germany.' This was not only because of the ideological considerations of Hitler and Mussolini, but also because of the geographical consequences. Following the Anschluss of Austria, Germany now had a land frontier with Italy. As such, Hitler needed his neighbour to be either an ally or neutral so as to prevent a war on two fronts, which clearly shows why Italy was to receive full German diplomatic support. Perth rightly states that the hard bargaining and German support 'are the only certainties' that can be predicted during the negotiations as it is unclear exactly what Mussolini wished to achieve.

Halifax refers to France as being in an 'unreal position' which points to the powerful role she was attempting to play diplomatically despite the weaknesses faced by the country in terms of military, economy and internal politics. Halifax mentions her 'system of alliances' which France had made with many of the Eastern European countries. France saw this as being a useful way of protecting itself, firstly against the threat of the spread of Bolshevism and secondly against Germany of whom she had a strong fear due to its growing power and close proximity. Of particular significance is the protection that she initially offered to Czechoslovakia against Germany. The weak position of France, however, and the 'rising strength of Germany' meant that France was not in a position to offer such guarantees without British assistance. Halifax refers to France's offers of support as a 'continual irritant to Germany' who had ambitions to expand in Eastern Europe, which emphasises the strong British fear of antagonising Germany and therefore the desire to keep her happy and stop any chance of war. Halifax describes France as having made a 'drastic change' in policy. This refers to the country's strong initial stance against Germany and her desire to support the eastern European states, particularly Czechoslovakia. The refusal of Britain to support France over Czechoslovakia, however, and the strong anti-war sentiment within France led to French support of the appeasement of Germany, leaving Czechoslovakia on its own and signing the Munich Agreement which gave the Sudetenland to Germany. Halifax ends the letter by suggesting that relations between France and Germany can have a 'fresh start'. This emphasises the positive hope for peace that existed after the Munich Agreement, as Chamberlain believed he had achieved "peace for our time," and expresses a hope that the antagonism between France and Germany since World War One can be eroded to promote lasting peace in Europe.

Their protest is about “the events of the past few days”, that is to say the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia by German troops two days previously, on March 15th. This followed the forced agreement of Dr Hacha, President of Czecho-Slovakia, to hand over the destiny of his country to Hitler’s Germany. Hitler used the discontent in Slovakia as a pretext for invasion because of the ‘intolerable reign of terror’ for Germans there. Hacha was threatened that if he did not comply then Prague could be bombed. Halifax describes the invasion as “a complete repudiation of the Munich Agreement” because the whole point of the settlement was to solve the Sudetenland problem and prevent invasion of Czechoslovakia; it was meant to control Hitler’s ambitions. The document also refers to the fact that Germany had denied the “spirit” in which they co-operated for a peaceful settlement. This is rather a naïve comment since by this time it was perfectly clear that Hitler had only signed the Agreement for his own gains. Halifax protests about the “changes effected in Czecho-Slovakia” but this is quite an understatement since by now Czechoslovakia had been completely swallowed up by her neighbouring states.

An earlier Foreign Office document, written four days previous to this telegram, predicted that a German invasion of Czecho-Slovakia was possible and recognised that this would put “considerable pressure upon His Majesty’s Government to take some action”.(1) However, it also points out that Britain could only take effective action if France was to as well, and this was very unlikely. The written protest here was as far as Britain went against Germany at this point, as was the case with others who sent formal protests to Germany (France, Russia and America). There was never actually any chance that Britain would take decisive action due to the fact she was not militarily prepared for a war. Chamberlain used the excuse that internal disruption in Czechoslovakia had rendered past guarantees void. Five days after the message was delivered (on the 18th), Memel was ceded to Germany by Lithuania – clearly Britain's objections had no effect on Germany.

Halifax says that the reason that cession of territory to Hungary may be unavoidable is because of the “Munich settlement of Sudeten German question” and “the settlement… made with Poland”. This is because the Munich Agreement set a precedent, leading to all other minorities in Czechoslovakia feeling that they should have the same treatment as the Sudeten Germans. Under the Munich Agreement, the Sudetenland was to be occupied in stages, between the first and tenth of October, and certain areas would have plebiscites. An annex to the settlement also stated that the Polish and Hungarian minorities should also be satisfied before the Four Powers would guarantee the remainder of the state. For Czechoslovakia, it was not so much a settlement as an imposition – Benes was told to accept it or be abandoned by the West (which he ultimately was anyway). The Czechoslovak settlement with Poland was the result of an ultimatum delivered by Poland on September 30th 1938, the same day as the Munich Agreement was signed. Negotiations over Poland’s disputed borders had started before Munich: a minute by Sir O. Sargent of September 19th documents a Polish ‘démarche’ declaring that whatever was agreed as regards the Sudetens, the Polish government would claim similar treatment.(1) Despite being told they should not be forceful, Poland decided to deliver an ultimatum because they wanted their own glory rather than having the West win back their territory for them. Again, this was not really a settlement, as Halifax describes it, inferring that they had an element of choice. Instead, the Czechoslovaks were really forced to accept it because, Dr Krofta, the Czech Minister for Foreign Affairs said, they had been abandoned.(2) The result was the loss of Teschen and Freistadt to Poland and some plebiscites elsewhere. This meant that Czechoslovakia lost an area rich in resources and industry, compounding all her losses. The cession of territory to Hungary was unavoidable after this because Britain and France had promised to treat all minorities equally and did not want further instability in eastern Europe. Hungary had already made a veiled threat that opposition might be aroused in Hungary if it was felt that the government was indifferent to the plight of the Magyars in Czechoslovakia.(3) They eventually were to regain land under the Vienna Award in November.

The British government had previously tried to put off the claims of Poland and Hungary, Halifax in fact giving identical notes to their resective ambassadors in Britain saying they had to wait until the Sudetenland problem was addressed.(4) In this telegram Halifax now seems to be washing Britain’s hands of all responsibility for the situation, claiming it is unavoidable. However that only became the case because of the precedent they themselves had set through the Munich Agreement. Benes was to resign three days later.

1.DBFP III vol III doc 11 2.ibid doc 97 3.ibid doc 15 4.ibid doc 15, 20

The extract is a clear sign that British opinion is stiffening in regards to Germany. In the opening sentence the phrase 'desire to make it plain' suggests the belief that the Germans had misunderstood Britains position and that they were now re-emphasizing it. The British government, following the events of March 15th, believed that the conquest of Czechoslovakia had been Hitlers plan all along and that he had done this because Britain had not warned him strongly enough not too and there was a fear that he would continue to attempt eastern conquests if Britain did not take a harder line with him. The reprimand over the repudiation of Munich seems to have more to do with the hurt pride on the part of the British government who felt let down by Hitler and his 'denial of the spirit' of Munich and his failure to co-operate for peace than the actual annexation of Czechoslovakia which is practically mentioned as an aside to the main point. The final point which deals with the military occupation is questioned legally which is a continuation of Britains belief in attempting to keep the moral high ground. Munich and Germanies gains there had been legally obtained through the principle of self determination but that could not be used here. The changes affected refers simply to the dismembering of the country into the German protectorate of Bohemia and the 'independant' Slovakia.

The extract is a clear sign that British opinion is stiffening in regards to Germany. In the opening sentence the phrase 'desire to make it plain' suggests the belief that the Germans had misunderstood Britains position and that they were now re-emphasizing it. The British government, following the events of March 15th, believed that the conquest of Czechoslovakia had been Hitlers plan all along and that he had done this because Britain had not warned him strongly enough not too and there was a fear that he would continue to attempt eastern conquests if Britain did not take a harder line with him. The reprimand over the repudiation of Munich seems to have more to do with the hurt pride on the part of the British government who felt let down by Hitler and his 'denial of the spirit' of Munich and his failure to co-operate for peace than the actual annexation of Czechoslovakia which is practically mentioned as an aside to the main point. The final point which deals with the military occupation is questioned legally which is a continuation of Britains belief in attempting to keep the moral high ground. Munich and Germanies gains there had been legally obtained through the principle of self determination but that could not be used here. The changes affected refers simply to the dismembering of the country into the German protectorate of Bohemia and the 'independant' Slovakia.

Perth's arguments, however, appear contradictory. On the one hand, he is willing to give Italy the benefit of the doubt in her colonial demands. Perth highlights the London Treaty of 1915, a treaty which promised to cede Italy the Trentino, Tyrol, Trieste, Istria and Albania, but was later denied to Italy by the Allies. This gives Italian claims a sense of legitimacy. In his second idea, however, Perth, brilliantly counterblasts this with the phrase "what Italy may ultimately demand of France". By playing these two ideas off against each other, Perth creates confusion for the reader. In words, he is recreating the uncertainty and nervousness the British and French face in trying to satisfy Mussolini. This is more pressing given the Italian violation of the 1938 Agreement between Britain and Italy over influence in the Mediterranean. Perth hits this idea home with the use of the word "obscure", which has sinister implications, as if a threat is there but not fully revealed. Perth, however, knows the threat will come. This threat was clarified by Italian claims to Tunis, described in document 103. The threat is given impetus by "ultimately", which expresses finality, a specific end game on the Italian's part. In the context of contemporary events, Perth is absolutely spot on. From 1936, Italy was drifting away from the Stresa Front in favour of Germany as an ally. In the same way, Perth's argument moves towards full realisation of German support. This idea is Perth's third argument. On top of the Pact of Steel, Perth not only envisages Germany will provide military support for Italy, but that this support will be extensive and massive. This was true. By 1939, Germany was producing 5,000 aircraft a year, and had a total of 103 army divisions, including 86 infantry and 6 armoured divisions. Her defence was therefore formidable. Perth, however, is wrong, as he says in the line after the end of the exercise, to imply Italy is militarily weak. On her own, Italy had a naval fleet numerically equal to that of Britain and France, with an army of 73 small infantry and 38 larger divisions. This compared favourably with France 84 divisions in 1939. Criticism, however, can be levelled at the British and French for turning Italy towards Germany. The French need for an ally was exacerbated by their defensive military attitude. Abyssinia provided a point where the British and French could have gained Italian support against Hitler, yet they opposed her. In the greater scheme, this was wrong. Perth's last sentence, therefore, is intrinsically regretful, ruing a missed opportunity. In the context of Italy's greater interest in the Mediterranean, notably Albania, the French and British only had themselves to blame.

Halifax's first and second arguments are linked. Firstly, he centres on France's "unreal" commitments in Central and Eastern Europe before 1938. "Unreal" is punchy and has a fantastical connotation, implying French prestige and commitments to Central and Eastern Europe are merely hypothetical and have no sound practical foundations. Halifax's comment is debatable. It has a basis in truth but needs to be qualified in economic terms. The Great Depression hit France later and harder than other countries, such as Britain, leading to a cut in industrial output in 1935 and low levels of foreign imports and exports. France was affected when she needed to consolidate an economic hold on her Eastern allies. French neglect of her allies was, therefore, none of her fault. Halifax, then, is wrong to criticise the French, and to blame the French for resting on their laurels in Eastern Europe. This is supported by the phrase "no longer count upon being able to make her claims effective". Halifax, in his second argument, however, does make the link from France's theoretical to military and economic considerations in Eastern Europe. This argument, however, also contains bias. By using words such as "rising" for Germany in comparison to France's "neglect", Halifax paints France negatively, implying the French as weak and reactive, in comparison to the dominance of Germany. In a sense, Halifax is right. French defeatism created a defensive policy against Germany. However, he is wrong in the military sense. By 1939, France had a total of 4,500 anti-tank guns and 2,200 tanks, as well as eighty-four military divisions. The spirit was there, even if it was a defensive policy. This information clashes with documents 122 and 187, which portrayed great financial and military crisis in France after the Munich Conference. Halifax is therefore wrong in claiming that France deliberately neglected her defences. The devastating legacy of World War One, together with economic slowdown from the Depression, rather caused mitigating factors which affected the French psyche. Consequently, Germany was able to sustain a closed, self -sufficient system in Central and Eastern Europe, providing her with raw materials with which to fuel her rearmament. These were the real reasons for French weakness, ones which Halifax failed to grasp.

This misconception colours Halifax's third argument, encapsulated in "the conclusion of the Munich Agreement". With Hitler's expansion into Central and Eastern Europe, Halifax implied France needed a radical change of policy in Central and Eastern Europe, in other words, pull out of the area completely. In the context of previous events, this is a valid point. Munich and Czechoslovakia proved French policy was out of step with Hitler. In contrast to Halifax, though, such an action provided France with the determination to face up to Germany. This was shown in the French military’s new found confidence in going to war. With the end of economic depression, the shackles which had blighted French outlook had gone. The Munich Conference was the beginning of a more forceful, not weaker, chapter for France.

Halifax divides his argument into three main threads. He first tackles Polish attitudes to an alliance as an entity in its own right. This approach is a masterstroke. "Difficult" is an imprecise, general noun, implying complications. Halifax is implying that Poland's relationship to Germany and Russia is vague, one full of dilemmas requiring a careful middle path. Halifax is absolutely correct in this assumption. Document 479 also described this dilemma. In addition, the Polish-German agreement of 1934 and Poland's refusal to join the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1937 clearly highlight Polish attempts to stay neutral and independent from Germany and Russia, whilst staying true to themselves.

Halifax's second thread juxtaposes this Polish aspiration with harsh reality - the direct threat from Germany to the West. Whilst Germany is a threat, Polish aspirations come to naught. Halifax balances these two ideas with sharp vocabulary. The words "natural" and "openly", which have positive and idealistic connotations and imply freedom, jar beside "obviously", "resistance" and "expansion", words which have negative connotations and imply bitterness, harshness and struggle against oppression. Germany is a monster to be fought at all costs. However, the British guarantee to save Poland is deeply ironic. It sought to preserve Polish independence, but not its integrity. In guaranteeing her safety, Britain would deliver her to her enemy. Halifax's cynicism concerning Poland's fate is therefore merely selfish. The word "bloc", meant to highlight the French, British, Polish and Russian Front, which has no positive connotations, proves this. Poland is beyond saving from Germany.

In this light, Halifax's third argument focuses on Poland's fate at the hands of both Russia and Germany. In grouping Russia and Germany together, Halifax is predicting the future - the Nazi-Soviet Pact - as the "bloc" instead of a bloc involving Britain and France. From every perspective, Poland is beyond saving. In this light, British negotiations, particularly with the Russians, are useless. Polish idealism, as implied by the word "hesitation" is therefore ironic. Any intervention in the Polish situation by the British is a lost cause and will lead to war with Germany.

The source has great historical significance in understanding the role of Central and Eastern Europe in the onset of war. However, its contemporary impact can be doubted. Though Halifax was a member of Chamberlain's cabinet, and sees the failings of the Polish guarantee, it is doubtful whether Chamberlain took any notice. The guarantee preserved only the independence, not the integrity, of the Polish people. It was therefore another phase of appeasement, not a solid guarantee. Chamberlain was still set in his old ways. Halifax, however was a visionary. In seeing an alliance between Germany and Russia, he foresaw the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Poland, and Eastern Europe, had triggered the Second World War. For this reason it is an exceptional source.

Forbes' argument is divided into three parts. The first concentrates on Germany's relationship with France from the past into the present. The past is summarised by the phrase "Germany's new western fortifications". This phrase refers to the Western Wall, which began construction in 1936, after Hitler's invasion of the Rhineland. This construction secured Germany's Western frontier from French invasion, but threatened the possibility of Belgian invasion from Germany. A Belgian frontier against Germany would prove too costly. This exacerbated the French fear of military action by Germany in the years from 1937 to 1939. On the basis of this phrase alone, Forbes is spot on. However, he misses an important point. World War One, with massive French losses, was as much to blame as the Western Wall for the French defensive attitude. In his omission of this argument, Forbes misses the point in his understanding of the French psyche. It is this attitude which is preventing the French from helping its allies in Central and Eastern Europe, allowing Hitler to dominate. It is this reason which links to Forbes phrase "diplomatic methods". Forbes is implying the Pact of Steel, signed between Germany and Italy in 1939. This action stymied French attempts to form an alliance with Italy against Germany. Therefore, he claims that France is lacking in comparison to Germany. However, he is wrong. He omits the turnaround in French attitudes after the Munich Conference from a defensive to an offensive attitude. With this, the French were better prepared to fight Hitler than ever before. Therefore, even the "complications with Italy", by which he means Italian 1938 claims to Corsica, Djibouti and Tunisia, are no longer a problem. Forbes second and third arguments are linked. His second argument deals with the "rearmament of Great Britain" as a threat towards German interests in Central and Eastern Europe. This is interesting. Cadogan, in a letter dating from 1938, stated that Britain had a need to rearm against Germany, due to German self-sufficiency and control over the east. This fact, allied to the Munich Peace Conference, highlighted the urgent need for rearmament. Therefore, Forbes' comment is highly ironic from Hitler’s perspective. In essence, Forbes is right. British military power had a psychological effect on Hitler. Hitler, however, had only himself to blame for British rearmament. The increase of German control in the East together with loss of British and French influence in the area increased fears of an attack against the West. In this light, British rearmament was a defence mechanism against Germany. Hitler’s fears, implied in the phrase “to queer his pitch in the East”, were therefore of his own making. With the follow up of the British guarantee to Poland, which helped start the Second World War, Hitler scored an own goal.

This document can be regarded as expressing the official position of the British Cabinet rather than just Halifax's opinion as it refers to 'His Majesty's Government.' References are made to the Munich and Polish agreements, which resulted in areas of land being transferred from Czech to German and Polish control. The use of the word 'settlement' implies that these were amicable agreements between the countries, despite the fact that the Czechs had protested against these outcomes. This shows the British attitude towards Czechoslovakia, regarding it as insignificant in comparison to the bigger concern of preventing war with Germany and keen to see the issues as being over and sufficiently settled. Both Hungary and Poland had similar grievances as Germany did regarding the Sudetenland, as both countries had lost land to Czechoslovakia in the 1920 Treaty of Trianon. Approximately 700,000 Hungarians and 75,000 Poles were therefore left under the government of the Czechs causing strong feeling in both Hungary and Poland that these lands should be reclaimed. After the Munich Settlement, which awarded the Sudetenland to Germany, both Hungary and Poland made moves to regain their land. Halifax refers to Hungary's potential gaining of land from Czechoslovakia as 'unavoidable'. This is evidence of the Cabinet's emphasis on appeasement and their fear of causing any antagonism with Germany, which was a close ally of Hungary. Similar arguments of the fruitlessness of any action in regard to Austria or the Sudetenland were being repeated to support this policy of inaction. Britain had little interest in Czechoslovakia and was unwilling to go to any great lengths to protect a country which it had already resigned to being indefensible, particularly now that its most crucial area of defence was under German control.

This document is important as it showed the official British line that it was unwilling to give help to Czechoslovakia. Britain had indicated that it had little concern for the position of Czechoslovakia, regarding the policy of appeasement and prevention of war with Germany as a much higher priority. As a result, the country was left in further difficulty and President Benes resigned three days later on 5 October 1938. A month later, Hungary was able to take advantage of this position and on 2 November 1938, the Munich Pact between the Axis powers ceded to Hungary some of the territory that had been part of Czechoslovakia.

The document begins by Halifax stating that, '…it would seem to His Majesty's Government that…' This shows that the information here is an official government document rather than simply the opinion of Halifax. The document refers to both the issue of the Sudeten Germans and also to the agreement between the Czech Government and the Poles as being settlements. This implies that these agreements were cordial in their nature, which suggests that the British government was not against these agreements taking place. Here one can see another strand of appeasement, for Chamberlain was constantly seeking to avert war at all costs. By allowing the ceding of territory to both Germany (at Munich) and the Poles (Czech settlement) he averted any threat of conflict. Halifax goes on to state that because of these settlements, 'some cession of territory on the Hungarian frontier may prove unavoidable'. By this he is referring to the fact that there were some 700,000 Hungarians living in Czechoslovakia, and, in the interests of appeasement, it would not be possible for Britain to take action should Hungary wish to take land in Czechoslovakia. Hungary was allied with Germany, an alliance that pre-dated WW1, and as such any action taken against her would have antagonised Germany, a scenario that Chamberlain had endeavoured to prevent. Halifax's statement regarding the Hungarian frontier was thus a further extension of Chamberlain's futile appeasement policy.

Halifax begins the letter by stating that the opinions he is about to state are the Governments and not necessarily his own personal beliefs. This is important because it is a sign that Halifax, a chief advocate of appeasement was possibly beginning to have doubts over the validity of this policy. Halifax had, in fact shown signs of dissatisfaction with Chamberlains actions previous to Munich and had encouraged Czech mobilisation on 23rd September and had made an appeal to collective security, with Churchill through a communique on 25th September. These actions were taken half-heartedly, Halifax authorised but did not sign the communique, and were supposedly inspired by a call of conscience in the watches of the night. The Munich settlement and the settlement with Poland are used by Halifax as precedents for a possible settlement with Hungary. The Czechs were not present at the Munich conference during which the fate of their country was decided and following their submission to this settlement and the withdrawl of France from Eastern Europe they had little choice but to submit to Polish and Hungarian demands.

What Halifax does'nt make clear is what precedent is being set, the official line was that Munich had been a success for self-determination and that the return of Tesin followed this path. However, Halifax by stating that further territorial losses may be unavoidable presents a second possible precedent, that the Western Great Powers and therefore their 'ally' Czechoslovakia could do nothing to stop the demands so they may as well give them up rather than lose them in a costly war. This latter precedent only hinted at here became a more widely held political belief after the eventual collapse of the remaining Czechoslovak state and its subsequent annexation by Hitler in March 1939. Much to the disillusionment of the British public. Chamberlain and the British government were subsequently forced into taking a harder line with Hitler following this betrayal of the Czechoslovakians. A policy which culminated in the British and French guarantee to Poland which led to the Second World War.

The tone of this document is very formal and forceful. Halifax states that, “His Majesty’ s Government desire…” which implies that the content of the document is not simply his opinion but that of the government. He talks of a ‘complete repudiation of the Munich Agreement’, by which he means that the actions of Germany in annexing the regions of Bohemia and Moravia are a direct contravention of what was agreed at Munich. By using force Germany has ‘denied the spirit that was agreed… to co-operate for a peaceful settlement’. This represented a threat for the western powers for Hitler had begun to repudiate the Munich Agreement only 6 months after signing it, which made the agreement effectively worthless. Halifax goes on to ‘protest about the changes effected in Czechoslovakia by German military action, which are in their (British Government) view devoid of any legality.’ Again Halifax is citing the official view of the British Government and is referring to the fact that the Germans exploited the disgruntled Slovak separatist movement and that it was under extreme German pressure that Slovakia declared its independence on 14th March. The British view was that this was forced upon the Slovaks by illegal German military intimidation; a claim that had been levied against Hitler more than once. The tone of the document implies that the British are beginning to realise that Hitler will not be easily appeased, and phrases such as, ‘complete repudiation’ and ‘protest against’ are both forceful and aggressive.

In contrast to other documents from Halifax, this represents the government stance rather than personal opinion, and as such represents a significant piece of evidence. When placed in the context of the wider picture the document takes on greater significance for it shows that Hitler was not prepared to be appeased and that if he wanted ‘something’ then an agreement such as Munich was not enough to stop him. If the western powers had not already realised that appeasement would not work against Hitler, then here was another prime example. Hitler had again achieved what he wanted; yet the British did nothing more than tell the German Government that they ‘protested’ against what Hitler had done. The incident can be seen as another missed opportunity to halt German aggression.

The document opens by Halifax talking of France’s ‘unreal position’ in Central and Eastern Europe. He states that she claimed this position of ‘great influence’ by virtue of her alliance structure. One can see here that Halifax is alarmed by the stance the French are taking, in that Daladier is relying on the alliance structure as France’s defence. However, Halifax, in following British policy is against allying with Russia, as the French would do, against Germany. It is also dubious that French claims for an alliance could be made effective. Halifax claims that the French claims are a ‘continual irritant’ to Germany. What he is guarding against here is any unnecessary provoking of Hitler. By continually talking of these alliances, the French are antagonising Hitler by making the Germans feel encircled. Halifax states that the Munich Agreement meant a ‘drastic change’ of French policy in Central Europe and marked a need for a fresh start to Franco-German relations. Indeed, in the same correspondence, he tells Phipps that, “I should not hesitate to advise the French Government to denounce the Franco-Soviet pact…” This clearly ties in with the British policy of appeasement and the wish not to antagonise Hitler, as Halifax is again clearly wary of a perceived encirclement of Germany. By changing her policy and assuming a friendly environment with Germany, the French, according to Halifax, would then occupy a more ‘real’ position in Europe.

The obligations that Litvonov harkens to are important. He places the League of Nations Covenant at the forefront, even though it was widely recognised that this organization had become little more than a shame through its failures in Manchuria and Abyssinia and as recently as 12 March Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, inn document 57 had feared exposing the league to open humiliation. The reason for this is, as i've already commented on, the Anschluss of Germany and Austria which went directly against the Covenant. Therefore Litvonov is reminding the Allies of this fact and of their failure to uphold it by suggesting Russia is willing to fulfill her obligations.

The next obligation that Litvonov recognises is the Briand-Kellogg Pact which like the League of Nations was a grand affair which had been seen as an advance towards the pacific settlement of disputes but its ideals quickly became nugatory. Originating with the French Foreign Minister Aristade Briand in 1927 and the U.S. Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg it was a decleration which outlawed war and was eventually signed by sixty-five governments, including the U.S.S.R., France, Britain and Germany. Although Germany had not specifically gone to war with Austria the signs that war was becoming a distant reality was recognised by the Russians, as the last sentence of the document suggests.

The final obligation the Russians make reference to is that of the treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia signed in 1935. The possible reason that these are mentioned last, even though it was the only obligation that had any genuine significance at the time of writing as the other two had long since lost their validity, was that the statement was made at a press conference and the previous two had more moral weight and both directly involved the British whilst the latter connected them only through a series of possible circumstances.

The significance of the statement is comparable to Stalins speech by which he apparently opened the door to improved Nazi-Soviet relations, with one important difference the latter led to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Litvonovs statement evolved into nothing. The Allies did little to foster good relatoins with the Russians for reasons that i have already mentioned and because they never believed that Russia could fight on anybody else's side but their own and therefore saw no need to court them.

This extract is taken from Sir Horace Wilson’s notes on the Munich Conference of 29-30th September 1938. The Conference decided the fate of Czechoslovakia – the Sudetenland was to become part of the Reich with all Czechs living there to be evacuated. Perhaps the first point to notice is that these notes were written from memory a day after the conference (on 1st October) which at once throws into question the accuracy of the document as an historical source. This very short extract is almost an afterthought at the end of the document, pointing out that the Conference did not cover some fairly important issues.

In mentioning “Czech foreign policy” this presumably alludes to the alliances she had with France and the Soviet Union, in particular the one with France since they had representatives at the conference and obviously it could be significant. However the fact that France clearly were not going to take action perhaps explains why the subject was not brought up. He also points out that “nor was Russia mentioned”, again an important factor because of her treaty with Czechoslovakia. However, this point is surely related to that of France since Russia was only bound to aid the Czechs if France did. In the end, Russia actually put up very little resistance to the consequences of Munich, despite her apparent outburst against the idea earlier in the year in March. One also has to bear in mind that the idea of a German-Soviet rapprochement was being hinted at, even if it was not evident at the time. The fact that neither of these issues was brought up can also be explained by the fact that, whatever people pretended, the fate of Czechoslovakia – having to cede the Sudetenland – had already been decided and discussion at the conference was effectively limited to methods of how to do this.

This extract is from a letter from Sir Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador in Berlin, to the Foreign Secretary Halifax, on 12th August 1938. It was written in a response to a letter from Halifax a week earlier and concerns the Sudetenland crisis. The tone of the text is quite informal compared to many of the other official documents, containing opinions rather than facts as demonstrated by the language used: “personally…”; “I trust..”; and the forthright conclusion that “Czechs and Germans will never harmonise” . At this time negotiations between the Czech government and the Sudeten German Party were continuing without progress, with the latter making impossible demands (as Henlein had been instructed to do by Hitler in May).

Henderson’s statement “I trust we shall not use the definite menace of British participation in a war unless our case is morally copperbottomed” demonstrates the British reluctance to offer even the threat of war as a method of stopping Hitler’s aggression. The turn of phrase used (morally copperbottomed) implies that the reason for not taking action was a lack of clear moral basis for it, although in reality it was more a fear of war and military weakness. This document is also another example of how even well before Munich, Britain had given up on Czechoslovakia: “..we cannot permanently prevent these Sudeten Germans from coming into the Reich”. He does not really justify this opinion except with the broad claim that “Czechs and Germans will never harmonize”. Henderson also draws comparison with the situation in Austria, declaring them “absolutely the same case”. By doing this he seems almost to condone the Anschluss (which several British politicians did think anyway) and therefore to think it right to allow the Sudeten Germans to join the Reich. Although he says that he is “sorry to say” this, there is not much evidence in this extract that this is in fact the case. All this then makes a mockery of the fact that Runciman was sent out to ‘investigate’ the problem in July if in fact nobody has any faith in negotiations – an attitude prevalent in so many documents from various politicians and diplomats.

This extract is the beginning of an official telegram from 16th July 1938, from Basil Newton, the British Ambassador in Prague, to the Foreign Secretary Halifax, regarding the Sudetenland crisis and how to approach it. The crisis had already come to a head in May and now the British government could see no outcome other than for Czechoslovakia to concede, although this was not to happen until September. Newton’s tone is very pessimistic, indicating that the current policy will not work, and making the Czechs sound like the troublemakers rather than the Germans.

Newton speaks of his “French colleague” who was Lacroix, the French ambassador in Prague and of their “Anglo-French demarche of May 7”, when the two of them put pressure on the Czech President Beneš to compromise with the Sudeten Nazi leader Henlein. However (as Newton points out further on in the document), this led to increased provocation from the Sudeten Germans and culminated in the ‘May crisis’ of May 20-22 when the Czechs partially mobilised in response to (mistaken) rumours of German troop movements. Newton emphasises that “strong pressure should continue to be maintained” because there simply did not seem to be any other solution. This was typical of the British attitude during this period – only three days earlier, at a Cabinet meeting, Halifax had expressed the same opinion. Even if Newton had thought anything else could be done, it seems unlikely that it would have been considered seriously because ultimately he was just a go-between with the Czechs for Chamberlain and Halifax – as was demonstrated by the fact that Newton was not even informed of the Munich Conference until it had begun.

The content of the document is very one-sided: amid all the talk of putting pressure on Czechoslovakia there is no mention of putting pressure on the actual aggressor, that is to say Germany. It was not even considered an option. From the tone of the document one would perceive Czechoslovakia to be in the wrong. However, whatever our perceptions as to the right or wrong of this line of thought, Newton is right when he expresses doubt that their chosen policy of pressure “would have any great effect on the Czechs”. The unwillingness of the Czechs to concede was confirmed by Beneš himself when Newton spoke with him (DBFP III i/495).

This is an extract from a press statement made in Moscow by Litvinov, the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs. However, here it is presented in the form of a note to the British Foreign Secretary, Viscount Halifax, from the Soviet Ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky, making him aware of Litvinov’s statement. The statement was made on March 17th 1938 in response to the Anschluss of Austria (which had been officially proclaimed four days earlier) and aimed to draw attention to the threat now posed to Czechoslovakia and beyond.

In the extract, Litvinov calls for “collective actions” against further aggression by Germany (although in this extract he does not name Germany). Litvinov had been working towards collective security for the past five years; however by this time it was quite clear that Britain and France did not see an alliance with Russia as being of value. In fact by 1938 there were already hints of a move towards Soviet-German rapprochement, although this was not being taken seriously. The extract starts with mention of “the obligations devolving upon” the Soviet government, to justify the use of collective security: the Covenant of the League, Article 10 of which states that ‘Members undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members’. He also cites the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 which bound its signatories to renounce war as an instrument of national policy and use arms only for defence. However perhaps most significant to the Soviet Union in this case was her Franco-Soviet pact of May 1934 and pact with Czechoslovakia made the following year, which bound her to aid Czechoslovakia. However there was a mutual pact with France over Czechoslovakia so France’s actions would determine those of the Soviet Union. Litvinov also dramatically reminds everyone of the prevailing atmosphere in Europe, the fear of “the increased danger of a new world slaughter”. The “further developments of aggression” of which he speaks were to come true as the Sudetenland problem continued to grow, leading to the ‘May crisis’ and the eventual cession of the area by the Czech government in September.

Henderson begins by stating that the British Government has "always urged upon the Czechoslovak Government the importance of proper treatment of her nationals of German origin." The words "always urged" can be seen as an attempt to keep Germany happy by suggesting that Britain has constantly been acting in the best interests of Germany. The next phrase about the "importance of proper treatment of her nationals of German origin" points to the British acceptance of Hitler's argument on the basis of self-determination. Britain had already allowed Anschluss with Austria on this basis and in an attempt to avoid war, were willing to do the same with the Sudetenland. This phrase also seems to lay the blame on Czechoslovakia. By suggesting that they were improperly treating the Sudeten Germans, they could justify denying any support against Nazi aggression. By underlining the fact that Britain was "actively engaged in urging that Government [the Czech government] to go to the limit of concession," Henderson wanted to convince Germany that Britain was making important efforts to put pressure on Czechoslovakia to concede the Sudetenland to Germany. From this they wanted to persuade them that it was worth engaging in diplomatic efforts to ensure peace. The language and tone of the document is very biased. Henderson had very good relations with German leaders, particularly Goering with whom he went hunting. He has therefore been criticised for failing to see the excesses of the Nazi regime. This led him to be inclined to put all blame on Czechoslovakia, and to see little fault with Germany.

Although this source is biased, and is likely to represent Henderson's views slightly more than those of the Government, it is important to realise that this document can still be seen to a great extent as a reflection of the Cabinet's policies. Henderson was an important adviser to the Cabinet on Germany and his opinions were therefore very influential. Britain was keen to prevent war and the protection of Czechoslovakia was seen as being of little importance in relation to the preservation of peace. This belief was strengthened after the 'May crisis' when Britain became even more determined to prevent war. The document is therefore important in representing views of the British government at this time, but also in pointing out the biased nature of the information that the government was receiving from Germany and how this affected its policies.

Maisky begins the document underlining the diplomatic commitments that the Soviet Union had. "The Soviet Government being conscious of the obligations devolving it" can be seen as the Soviet Union justifying their proposed actions by saying that they have a responsibility to support Czechoslovakia. By making reference to various international agreements, this argument is supported and they underline the legality of any action. This honouring of agreements is put forward as their main motivation for seeking action. There is also an element of trying to persuade the British that they too have a legal and moral obligation to support Czechoslovakia. They propose "collective actions" which emphasises Litvinov's support of collective security and the League of Nations, but also suggests that the Soviet Union could not have stood up to Germany on its own. They also make clear that the scope of any joint action "should be decided in conjunction with the Soviet Government" which shows the strong feeling in the Soviet Union that they had been left out of previous international diplomatic efforts and felt hard done by. They were therefore determined that this would not happen again. The strong fear and dislike of Hitler is hinted at the end of the document when they point out the need to prevent "the danger of a new slaughter." The violence of the image given underlines Hitler's position as an enemy to the Soviet Union at this time and suggests that their motivation was to stop him rather than to protect the underdog, Czechoslovakia, as was suggested by the tone of the document. This is likely due to Litvinov's strong ideological stance, which led to an intense hatred of fascism.

The document has two main threads. The first concerns the relationship between Germany, Czechoslovakia, Britain and France. Wilson highlights this point through the phrase “the question of Czech foreign policy”. The word “question” implies a great degree of doubt or uncertainty over British and French attitudes towards Czechoslovakia. This doubt was justified. In the immediate aftermath of Czech mobilisation, Britain, through the Runciman mission , exerted strong pressure on the Czech government to give in to German demands. This picture sharply contrasts with the naval mobilisation undertaken by Britain and France on 28 September 1938 in the face of a European war sparked by the Czechoslovak crisis. Therefore, one has to question the motives behind British and French attitudes to Czechoslovakia. In the military sense, no help could be given to Czechoslovakia. According to British Air Staff calculations, estimates of the effective German bomber force doubled from 582 to 1,019. Britain and France would not be ready to fight in a war against Germany. This military weakness definitely governed the psychological approach of appeasing German demands in Czechoslovakia. However, the psychological reasons for this appeasement were also coloured by the attitude of British politicians. At the time of the Czechoslovak crisis, British politicians, in particular Chamberlain, were still willing to believe Hitler had limited objectives in Europe. Since Horace Wilson was a close confidant of Chamberlain, he echoed these perceptions. Therefore, Wilson is an excellent yardstick in understanding these political attitudes. In the context of British attitudes, Czechoslovakia could have no foreign policy. Therefore, Wilson is wrong when he uses the words “Czech Foreign Policy”. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe could not solve their internal problems on their own, nor through external aid from the West. They therefore had no alternative but to face Hitler. This choice was highlighted by the Vienna Award of 2 November 1938, an Axis power award which gave Hungary the southern part of Czechoslovakia and which had no Allied involvement. The sentence structure in the document is also interesting. Germany is the subject in the sentence “German representatives raise the question of Czech foreign policy”. It implies that Germany has the upper hand over both Britain and Czechoslovakia in foreign policy. In the context of previous events, this is true. It was Hitler who was proactive in foreign policy towards the Czechs, not the British. This idea was demonstrated by Hitler's determination to smash Czechoslovakia as far back as December 1937, and by Chamberlain's claims outwith his March 24 speech that Czechoslovakia was a lost cause. Therefore, the strategic initiative lay with Germany. These events explain why Hitler backed down from war and agreed to the Munich Conference in September 1938.

The second thread of Wilson's argument lies in his mention of Russian absence from the Conference. Two important ideas emerge from this. The first involves the development in British attitudes from Munich. The Conference marked the beginning of the realisation by British politicians that Hitler could not be satisfied in his territorial ambitions. On 15 March 1939, Germany invaded Bohemia and Moravia. To the British, this action implied a possible invasion of the Netherlands and Switzerland. Hitler had to be stopped. This objective could only be achieved through Russian help. Russian help, then, is the second point. The Munich Conference represented confirmation of the Russians split from Britain and France. It exacerbated the failure of collective security as seen in the Spanish Civil War. Russia, therefore, was now too mistrustful of Western motives to give help. This idea was also highlighted by disagreement between Britain, France and Russia over the political and military requirements of an alliance against Hitler. Like the Eastern European countries, Russia had realised the only way to satisfy her own ambitions was through a German alliance. Therefore, Wilson's mention of Russia highlights a decisive turning point in pre-World War Two history and a harbinger of the future. However, Wilson's perception of the events can be doubted. By mentioning the omission of Russia, he could be conveying a personal opinion. Being a close friend of Chamberlain implies he holds the same anti-Bolshevik attitude that Chamberlain holds. He may be implying that Russia is a non-entity in the negotiations. This attitude is conditioned by two factors. In the first instance, he is afraid of the potential damage Russian communism could still wreak on Europe through internal revolution. However, it is also conditioned by his willingness to consider German grievances against the Treaty of Versailles and use Fascism as a bulwark against Communism. Therefore, Wilson is ruling out an alliance with Russia. In the context of Russia's 1939 alliance with Germany, this attitude is ironic. In reality, though, Russian aid to Czechoslovakia was a non-starter. This aid would have to come through Romania and Poland, states fiercely anti-Communist. In the context of these attitudes, other documents, such as number 1221, which describe British efforts to include Russia in the Munich Conference, are duplicitous.

Henderson follows two main arguments in the document. The first focuses on the general British relationship to Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe. Henderson's argument, however, is contradictory. Henderson is convinced of the legitimacy of National-Self Determination. To make this point, he places “copper bottomed” alongside “the principal of self-determination”. “Copper bottomed” emphasises the solidness of the moral foundations of National Self Determination. Henderson implies that the Sudeten Germans are being denied this right by the Czechs. Therefore, Henderson perceives Czechoslovakian rule of the Sudetens as illegitimate. This point is illustrated by the line after the end of the extract, where Henderson compares the Czechs ruled in Austria in the former Austro-Hungarian empire to the Sudetens ruled in Czechoslovakia in the modern day. In both these cases, the ethnic mixture has caused strife. In a sense, Henderson is right. According to the theoretical principal of National-Self Determination, where each nationality commands its own nation, the Sudeten Germans should be united with Germany. This was emphasised by the reality of the situation a year before, in 1937, when Britain urged the Czechs to remedy Sudeten German grievances. However, Henderson's position as a German sympathiser means his comments must be carefully examined for bias. Arguably the last line of the extract, where he portrays Czechoslovakia as the guilty party, is not entirely correct. This point was emphasised by Benes’ willingness to grant concessions to the Czechs in the Fourth Plan. Moreover, as document 1227 shows, the Czechs had little choice in the demands made on them by the Germans at the Munich Conference. In a sense, then, Henderson's pro-German bias detracts from the effectiveness of his message. However, Henderson is also a visionary. Henderson realises Hitler cannot be stopped by using National Self Determination. . This idea is implied when Henderson writes he is “sorry” that the Sudeten Germans are to be incorporated into the Reich. The word “sorry” implies regret over this integration, and the consequences which Henderson suggests will lead to Czechoslovakia being completely swallowed up by Germany. These consequences are implied in the line “ Czechs and Germans will never harmonise”. In reality, Henderson is absolutely correct. 7 months later, on 15 March 1939, the remnants of Czechoslovakia, in the form of Bohemia and Moravia, were taken over by Germany. Henderson's ideas are also tinged with irony. National-Self-Determination was Wilsonian idealism meant to prevent this mixture of ethnic races in one country and war resulting from it. Yet it was only applied fitfully and was exploited by Hitler for territorial gain. Henderson realises this. The idea is implied in the line “The British Empire cannot set itself against the principle of Self-Determination”. Though National-Self Determination is flawed, the British government must use it to buy time for necessary British rearmament. This is Henderson's second argument, and echoed by document 837, in the previous letter from Halifax to Henderson, who stressed the delicate line between agreeing to Hitler's demands or provoking a war. This is implied by Henderson's line “the definite menace of British participation in a war”. At the time, the British perceived that Germany was military superior to her. This was illustrated by document 855, which claimed Germany could turn out 1,500 aeroplanes a month. Henderson's use of the word “definite” is important. He implies war is inevitable, and this was born out in reality. With the take over of the rest of Czechoslovakia by Germany, Chamberlain realised Hitler could not be appeased. In this context, the Polish guarantee was meant as a signal to Hitler that British policy had moved away from Appeasement.

The document has 3 main themes - British and French relations with Czechoslovakia , Czech foreign policy, and Czechoslovakia's relationship to Germany. These three themes are interlinked. The first is implied in the line “ Her Majesty's Government have always urged......the importance of proper treatment of...nationals of German origin”. The sentence structure is important. Britain is the subject of the sentence, and Czechoslovakia the object. In the context of Foreign Policy, Britain is in the driving seat. This perception was borne out by reality. British foreign policy towards Czechoslovakia had been formulated in 1937 with British insistence that Czechoslovakia resolve any Sudeten German grievances. Britain and France were therefore the motors in the relationship between them and Czechoslovakia. As document number 8 implies, this action was necessary to maintain European stability. However, one can also detect British and French attempts to distance themselves from Czech affairs. This idea is implied by the use of the word “they” when discussing British negotiations with the Czech government. It emphasises Britain's need to keep Czech interests from entangling Britain in Central and Eastern Europe. This state of affairs is highlighted in document 421, where Halifax suggested a remodelling of French and Russian obligations to Czechoslovakia. However, Czechoslovakia was still a vital link between Britain, France and Germany. This idea is implied in the phrases “to go to the limits of concession” and “reach a comprehensive and long lasting argument”. These are terms the British used in appeasing Germany. In making Czechoslovakia carry out these instructions, Britain is couching her own influence in Czech foreign policy, whilst allowing Czechoslovakia to become an extension of British influence. Moreover, Czechoslovakia's perception of her own foreign policy is omitted altogether from the document. This is implied in the “importance of proper treatment of her nationals of German origin”. To the Czechs, problems with minorities only existed after the Nazis came to power. This was borne out by the rise of the Sudeten German Heimatsfront party after 1933. The Czechs rightly saw this event as a challenge to their stability. In this light, Henderson's demand for proper treatment of the Sudeten Germans is an insult. This idea is demonstrated by Benes willingness to give in to Sudeten German concessions, and his progress towards treatment of minorities during July 1938 In addition, Britain's push for Czechoslovakia to reach “ a comprehensive and lasting agreement” with the Sudeten Germans is important. Symbolically, the line resolves the dilemma of Central and Eastern Europe in deciding whether to go with Britain and France, or to side with Germany. Czechoslovakia is being pushed towards her fate with Germany. In this light, Henderson's statement of an “agreement” with Germany is impossible. This argument is highlighted by document 613, where Henderson himself ruled out the possibility of such an agreement.

Litvinov uses two main lines of argument. The first implies a reference to Soviet-Western relations from 1920 to the present. Litvinov uses the titles “Covenant of the League” and the “Briand-Kellogg Pact”. These two titles signify Russia's integration into the Western Alliance system. Russia entered the League of Nations in 1934, in stark contrast to her pariah status in Europe in 1919. By entering the League of Nations, Russia was attempting to find security for herself in Europe. This idea is emphasised by Litvinov's use of the “Briand-Kellogg Pact”. The Kellogg Pact was a Western Pact which renunciated war, and was mirrored in the East by the Litvinov Protocol signed by Russia, Poland, Rumania, Latvia and Lithuania in 1929. Through these two examples, Litvinov highlights Russian efforts to pursue a policy of collective security. This idea is encapsulated in the words “obligations” and “conscious”. However, “conscious” carries another connotation, and is demonstrated by reference to the 1935 mutual assistance Pact signed by Russia, France and Czechoslovakia. Litvinov is questioning France and Britain's willingness to stand by Czechoslovakia against Hitler. In the context of the Munich Conference, and Germany's later annexation of Bohemia and Moravia, Litvinov's doubts are absolutely justified. However, Litvinov is also emphasising the ambivalence in attitudes in Britain towards Russia. Litvinov is testing British and French mistrust towards Russia, and analysing their possible effectiveness as allies. This idea is underlined by Litvinov's insistence that all collective security actions be discussed with the Soviet Union. In essence, Litvinov typifies Russian perceptions of the West. Willingness to cooperate with Britain and France was underlined by political expediency. In the context of the Spanish Civil War, where Russia first questioned British and French attitudes to collective security, Litvinov's actions are justified. Moreover, the attitudes in this document compare well with other documents, notably number 1227, which describes Russia's absence from the Munich Conference, and number 1214 which shows Soviet efforts to broker an international conference with American help.

The Munich Conference involved Chamberlain, Hitler, Daladier and Mussolini and resulted in the cessation of the Sudetenland to Germany. What is noteworthy, and is the focus of the document is that neither the Russians nor the Czechs were consulted over the issue. The document states that it “interested us that at no point did the German representatives raise the question of Czech foreign policy nor was Russia mentioned.” This is interesting because it shows that the British did not raise the issues either. The consequences of this are critical. It neatly tied in with the British and French appeasement policies whilst it also provided Germany with the land that she craved. However, as the Czechs were not consulted, it led to great resentment towards the west, her supposed allies and left her feeling vulnerable and isolated in the face of any attack. In the case of Russia, as with the Treaty of Versailles, she felt betrayed and ‘left out’ and it further raised the suspicions of Stalin of the west. It also placed Stalin in a difficult position as it left him in a quandary as to who to ‘side with’. The threat of Germany moving eastwards had to be weighed up against the thinking that the west was pushing Hitler eastwards. The tone of the document is one of surprise for it appears that the British were expecting the issues to be raised by the Germans. It also implies that they felt that it should have been the Germans who raised and dealt with the problems arising rather than the other powers present.

The way in which the document opens implies that Henderson wishes that Britain should not use her ‘menace of war unless our case is morally copper-bottomed.’ Indeed, this reinforces the appeasement policy and anti-war sentiment at home at the time, although Henderson always felt the western powers would win a war – it was just not over this issue that war should be fought. He then goes on to state that Britain cannot refuse the idea of ‘self determination’, for it is one of the key components of the League of Nations. As such, if the Sudetens wish to have their autonomy, ‘we’ should not stand in their way. He reiterates that there is nothing Britain can do if “they wish it, and undoubtedly the majority today do so.” This owed much to the perceived success of the Nazi regime, in the sense of bringing Germany back to world power status, but also the ethnicity of the region for the majority of those living in the Sudetenland were of German descent. Further to this, he states that the Sudetens are, “today ruled, as they have never been before, by Czechs.” Again he is highlighting the ethnic issue, in that it is the Sudeten’s right to be autonomous from the Czechs. An interesting comparison with the Austrian question is also raised. Henderson compares the situations identically except that, “at least the Austrians governed themselves.” In a sense, he is almost encouraging the Sudetens to join the Reich and sympathising with their plight. To emphasise this he finishes in a sharp, forceful tone by saying, “the Czechs and Germans will never harmonize.”

Maisky and Litvinov were both anti-Germany and both sought an alliance with Britain and France in the face of the growing threat that Nazism posed. This is certainly evident in the document. It opens by talking about the fact that the Soviets are aware of their obligations through the Kellogg-Briand Pact and their role in the League of Nations. It then talks of her ‘mutual assistance treaties’ with France and Czechoslovakia. By these the Soviets committed to collective resistance against Nazi aggression and expansionism by providing military support in the event of an attack, although this was conditional upon France doing the same as they also had an agreement with the Czechs. It clearly shows Soviet political thinking prevalent at the time. It then goes on to state, crucially, “…in conjunction with the Soviet Government…” This is direct reference to the fact that Russia was excluded from the Treaty of Versailles negotiations and initially the League of Nations. If the Soviets were to provide the west with support against Nazism, then it would be on her terms. The document concludes by stating that Russia will “participate in collective actions…aiming to stop aggression and the danger of a new world slaughter.” This is very vociferously worded and spells out the idea that the Soviets were strongly prepared to take a stance against this ‘new world slaughter’ that was Nazism.

This extract is a from a press interview by Voroshilov, USSR Commissar for War, on the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations that had been broken. The intended audience is both Russian people and the governments of Europe. The interview was published on 27 August 1939, four days after the Nazi-Soviet Pact had been signed and four days before Germany invaded Poland. The Pact had been in negotiation since April 1939 and the Germans had made considerable concessions to the Soviet Union in order to have it signed by time of the Polish invasion.

The military negotiations with England and France followed a belated realisation by the west that they needed to have the USSR on side if their guarantees to Poland were to be meaningful. It is not true, however, to suggest that the talks with the western allies failed and then the Nazi-Soviet Pact was concluded. The Soviet Union negotiated wit each party concurrently and then stalled the alliance talks.

The non-aggression pact with Germany, although an unlikely union, was in the immediate interests of the USSR. The Soviet Union did not have the resources to fight both the Japanese and the Germans at the same. The Germans also promised to create spheres of influence in the east by allowing the Soviet Union to take part of Poland. A mark of the German rush to have the pact signed as soon as possible is seen by the fact that Ribbentrop flew to Moscow to sign the Pact with less than two days notice.

Voroshilov talks of ‘deadlock’ and ‘insuperable difficulties’ in relation to the western alliance talks. The deadlock to which he refers revolves around the refusal of the allies to agree to Russian demands that they be allowed to protect the Baltic States from ‘indirect aggression’. They feared would create a private eastern sphere of influence for the Soviet Union – precisely what the Germans had offered.

This extract is taken from a note from Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London to Viscount Halifax, British Foreign Secretary, on the Soviet policy regarding its pact over Czechoslovakia. The note was also reproduced in Pravda on 14 October 1939 and so its intended readership was not just the British Government but also the other governments, including the Germans. The note is dated 11 October 1939 and is intended to refute a claim in the English press that the USSR was unable to honour its promises over Czechoslovakia. The note was written a day after Czechoslovakia had completed the evacuation of the Sudetenland and two weeks after the Munich Conference.

Maisky refers to Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, and to ‘obligations’ arising from the Soviet pact with Czechoslovakia. These obligations were the result of the pact, signed into 1935 with Czechoslovakia, that the USSR would come to the defence of Czechoslovakia if it was attacked and if France also came to her aid. If Soviet troops were to deploy to Czechoslovakia, then they would need to pass through Poland, a fact that disturbed Britain and Poland. Czechoslovakia herself feared that the result would mean that she would become a client state of Russia.

France realised that, despite the Mutual Assistance Pact, she was in no position to go to war, especially given her severe air inferiority. France was also diplomatically isolated given that Britain preferred to appease Germany. French public opinion was also set against France entering a war on behalf of Czechoslovakia and therefore joined Britain in the appeasement approach rather than the Soviet Union’s collective security approach.

The phrase ‘all available means’ is a robust phrase and probably reflects Russian anger that she was left out of Munich discussions. The phrase is a public and direct refutation of claims in the English newspapers that Russia was unable to fight a war. It also reflects the USSR’s determination that Germany should not be given a free hand in the east as it appeared it had, especially at the Soviet Union’s expense.

The chance of a counter attack by the allies and therefore the likelihood of general war was the main factor in persuading Mussolini and Ciano, the Foreign Minister, to inform Hitler that it was not ready to enter into war. The rhetoric coming from London and Paris was having more effect on Mussolini than Hitler, and a conversation between Ciano and the German Finance Minister on 23 August 1939 confirms this. Britain and France both knew of Mussolini’s view and so devoted resources, including an appeal by President Roosevelt, to play on Italian fears of general warfare. The Anglo-Polish alliance treaty subsequently proved Mussolini rather than Hitler right on the allies intentions.

Mussolini decided ‘not to take the initiative in military operations’. The phrase is couched in diplomatic language and designed to say that Italy are delaying their entry into war rather than ruling it out. Hitler had previously been keen that Mussolini should launch an attack on Yugoslavia to run parallel with a German attack on Poland. A previous document shows that even two days before this extract was written, the Italians were considering this parallel plan seriously. However, this plan appeared to hinge on a localised war rather than a general war with Britain and France.

Mussolini refers to the ‘present state of Italian war preparations’ and implies that Italy needed materials from Germany in order to be war-ready. Mussolini may be proffering this lesser reason as the main explanation in order to satisfy Hitler and avoid accusations of betrayal. However, it was true that Italian operations in Ethiopia, Albania and Spain over four years had exhausted resources and League of Nations sanctions, although half-hearted, had an effect on Italy.

The Soviets were obligated to Czechoslovakia under the terms of the Soviet/Czech mutual assistance Treaty (1935). As a declaration of intent, not a binding military commitment, it was intended to protect the Soviets from a possible German attack. The terms stated treaty obligations such as the Locarno Pact could not be violated. France would have to obtain approval from the Locarno powers (most importantly Britain) before acting. To aid Czechoslovakia, Soviet troops would have to pass through Poland and Romania but the pact did not indicate how this would be accomplished. Assistance was also conditional upon France simultaneously fulfilling its aid obligations. Throughout the crisis the Soviets urged the Czechs to stand firm whilst making it clear they would fulfil their promise of assistance if France did the same. Unsure of how committed the western powers were, the Soviets were reluctant to take action first, fearful of being left alone to fight Germany.

The pact with Czechoslovakia was part of the Soviet Union’s policy of collective security. This policy was pursued during 1934-39 as a means by which to resist German aggression. It was viewed that if Hitler was faced by a united front of great powers he would back down.

Following Anschluss, the Soviets urged France to convince Romania and Poland to permit Soviet troops passage through their territory but they consistently refused. On 2 September ‘38 Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Foreign Minister, clarified the Soviet position. Stating his determination to assist the Czechs he also declared Polish and Romanian intransigence could be overcome if the League of Nations became involved. He further proposed joint Franco/Soviet/Czech military staff talks and revived the idea of a conference. On 23 Sept. ‘38 Litvinov reiterated the Soviet position.

The significance of this extract is that the Soviet Union made pious declarations but were careful to avoid explaining how they would actually aid Czechoslovakia. Conditions were added to the promises they did make because Stalin had no intention of sending aid. In August 1938 Litvinov informed Berlin he viewed the Sudeten question an internal affair of Czechoslovakia and not a matter of concern to the Soviets. Exclusion from Munich confirmed doubts over collective security but they were quick to defend their position following Winterton’s remarks stating that the Soviet Union were the only power truly committed to collective security. The Soviets were keeping their options open.

The annexation of Austria by Germany on 13 March ‘38 was not a surprise to the Soviet Union but it constituted a threat to neighbouring Czechoslovakia. Between 1934-39 the Soviet Union pursued a policy of collective security against German aggression. In 1935 they secured a treaty of mutual assistance with both France and Czechoslovakia. Soviet aid was conditional upon France simultaneously taking action. The pacts were purely a declaration of intent and were more significant politically than militarily. Following Anschluss, the Soviets indicated they were willing to participate in a conference with the western powers to discuss joint action against German aggression but this was turned down.

German expansionism was seen as a threat to Soviet security therefore Litvinov was eager to strengthen ties with the western powers. On 12 May Litvinov assured Bonnet, French Foreign Minister, that in the event of a German/Czech conflict, if France fulfilled her obligations the Soviets would do likewise. The May crisis followed and highlighted the reluctance of the western powers to involve themselves in standing up to Germany. Litvinov was convinced that if Hitler was faced with a united front he would back down.

Apart from clearly stating the position of the Soviet Union, Litvinov’s speech on 23 June highlighted German expansionist aims and their historic bid for domination over central Europe. He referred to the German dream of mitteleuropa (German domination over central Europe) which had been attempted through German/Prussian expansionist aims during the late nineteenth century. Litvinov hoped to shake the western powers into intervening in Czechoslovakia.

The Nazi/Soviet pact was a shock to the Japanese government. The feeling of betrayal and deceit led to the resignation of the Hiranuma cabinet. The pact constituted a violation of the German/Japanese secret protocol within the Anti-Comintern Pact (25 Nov. ‘37). This stated that neither country would conclude an agreement without the other. Hitler knew Japan would protest but thought that if Russia and Germany could come together then so too could Japan with Russia. Hitler tried to calm the reaction by stressing hopes that the pact may help to improve Soviet/Japanese relations.

Negotiations with Japan had begun 1934-5 with a military tripartite alliance (Germany/Italy/Japan) pursued from summer 1938. Talks had reached a deadlock and thoughts of an alliance were abandoned in May 1939 because Germany wanted the alliance directed at all powers whilst Japan only wanted it directed against the Soviet Union. During August 1939 Japan and the Soviet Union were virtually at war on the Mongolian/Manchurian border. Hitler believed closer ties with Japan were essential in a war against Britain as Japan would be a threat to Britain’s colonial empire. There was a strong faction in the Japanese government against concluding an alliance. This was encouraged by Britain and America who warned them of the dangers and disadvantages a pact of this nature would bring.

Mussolini’s decision not to become embroiled in a war against the western powers rested upon the fact, despite the Nazi/Soviet pact, he was convinced Britain and France would fight alongside Poland then launch an attack on Italy. Mussolini was also aware of Hitler’s alliance offer to Britain. Hitler stated his willingness to defend the British Empire against other powers. Mussolini thought this may include Italy which constituted a threat to security.

Despite the Pact of Steel (22 May ‘39) stipulating full aid in the event of war, Mussolini was uncertain about joining Germany in a conflict. He wavered over whether or not the attack on Poland would be localised. At 3.30pm on 25 Aug. Mussolini had assured Mackensen, German Ambassador, Italy, of Italy’s unconditional assistance. By 5.30pm, Ciano, Mussolini’s son-in-law and foreign minister, certain a general war was imminent, had persuaded Mussolini to stay out of the conflict.

Hitler was informed that the war was much earlier than expected. When the Pact of Steel was signed Mussolini was told not to expect war for several years. He did not possess the raw materials necessary to fight. After 4 yrs. of fighting in Abyssinia and Spain, Italy’s resources were exhausted. At Hitler’s request Mussolini detailed the materials he required, it was a long list and impossible for Hitler to fulfil. Unable to participate in military operations but determined to avoid war, Mussolini proposed a conference (31 Aug. ‘39) to seek a negotiated peace agreement. He acted as a mediator between the western powers and Germany but terms for the conference could not be agreed.

Ribbentrop is using ‘past experience’ of dealing with the allied countries to persuade Molotov and Stalin that a Nazi-Soviet Pact is in the interests of the USSR. Ribbentrop is referring to the anti-Communist rhetoric that both Britain and America had employed since they excluded the USSR from the Paris Peace Conference after the end of the First World War. In particular, the British-French Russian talks were stalling because Britain refused to allow the Soviet Union to enter Poland without its permission in response to the expected German attack on Poland.

Ribbentrop has used the phrase ‘National Socialist’ to create an image of brotherhood between the two states just as ‘capitalistic Western democracies’ is designed to illustrate the western ideological gulf. Germany was particularly keen to secure a quick Pact between the two countries because Hitler had already put into motion the plan to launch a faked attack on a German radio station in Poland as a cover for invading Poland and rescuing its German ethnic minority. Hitler had effectively committed himself to invading Poland in two weeks time but needed the USSR safely on his side since if they came to Poland’s aid, Germany would probably have been defeated.

Soviet Russia was facing a stark choice at the time of writing as Ribbentrop was well aware. Russia could not afford to fight both Germany and Japan at the same time. Together with this, the Germans were offering a non-aggression Pact, part of Poland, a guarantee on the Soviet Union’s Baltic States and had agreed an economic pact. Although Britain and France could offer help against further German eastward Stalin had already demonstrated his rejection of collective security by installing Molotov as his Foreign Minister three months previously.

In many ways what Voroshilov says is simply semantics. He claims that the talks with Britain and France were not ‘broken off’ because of the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact but were simply stopped because of the signing of that agreement meant that those talks were no longer viable. He further states that a deadlock had been reached in negotiations with Britain and France and that the Nazi-Soviet pact was concluded because it could be done, and done in quick time. This hides the fact that by this stage the Soviets clearly wanted to conclude an agreement with someone and the German delegation were prepared to go quicker and offer more than their British and French counterparts. The excuse given for the failure of the negotiations between Britain and France was that an agreement could not be reached on fact that Soviet troops, in order to attack Germany in the event of a German attack on France or Britain would need to go through Poland – this was the stumbling block. The talks with Britain and France may not have been broken off because of the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, but they were not seriously going anywhere any way. In reality the Soviets got a much better deal (in the short term at least) from the Germans anyway. The Pact allowed for the acquisition of territory, virtually without bloodshed, furthermore it did not commit the Soviets to fighting against Britain and France in the event of a war with Germany. The Soviets appeared to gain all round and lose very little. The British and the French were basically offering a war, never a pleasant prospect; they were heading for conflict with Germany and wanted an ally in the East to support them. The Soviets did not stand to gain very much and potentially stood to lose a lot. That the British and French were dragging their heels over the negotiations did not endear them to the Soviets at all.

His reference the ‘realisation of the plan’ and Mitteleuropa refers to Hitler’s plans for Lebensraum in the East. Hitler had laid out his Lebensraum plans in Mein Kampf, however nobody appeared to pay much attention to them until the reality was upon them in September 1939. The extract is not so much anti-Nazi or anti-Hitler but anti-Germany as a whole. Litvinov portrays the Germans as territorial monsters, whose desire for territory in the east is not motivated by the government in place at the time but by the fact that it is inherent in the society itself. He goes further to say that this is not phenomenon that has emerged since the end of the First World War but has been part of the German mindset for many years. This is in many ways a very racist statement, which is in fact the point of the whole speech. The speech is merely propaganda; it is unlikely that Litvinov, himself a highly cultured, intelligent and well-travelled man actually believes this. However it instantly provides a focal point of the population to rally around – an enemy who can be blamed for the ills of the Soviet system. By producing an external enemy it means the population will rally to the cause, furthermore it gives a basis and justification for the purges – to clear out the German spies. It must be borne in mind that at this time the Soviet Union was incredibly isolated. Newspapers controlled by the government censor, who simply printed what they were told to about world affairs, conveyed international news. It was the era of indoctrination in the Soviet Union, whereby Communism was the only acceptable political force and capitalism was an evil that exploited the ordinary man. In the same way as the hate of communism was about the only thing that unified all the western states and many in Eastern Europe to, so the hate of capitalism unified the Russian people. By making Germany seem a threat that unification of the people was enhanced.

The extract uses the example of Poland attacking Germany, a most unlikely course of events, as Poland was unlikely to want to antagonise Germany and give her an excuse for invasion. It was however the only scenario that was a direct act of war on Germany herself rather than the other way round and so in reality the only scenario in which Italy was bound by her alliance to help Germany. Mussolini does not want to take the initiative in Military operation of any kind; in fact by this stage he would rather not be involved at all. Italian military rearmament was due to peak in 1942 and only then did Mussolini believe that he would be able to sustain a full-scale continental war. His bargaining chip with Hitler was that if he supplied the necessary materiel then Italy would fight. This was proposed, sure in the knowledge that Hitler would not do this. However Hitler, increasingly desperate for support by this stage, replied to this letter asking what exactly Mussolini required and he would see whether he could supply it. Hitler took this letter to mean that Mussolini would enter a conflict on his side if there was materiel available, whereas Mussolini was simply trying to back out of a conflict.

The Germans attempted to cite ideology as the only difference between Germany and Russia, they acknowledge the ideological conflict between the two systems but imply that this should be put aside, immense hypocrisy when one considers the Nazis took a much harder line on Communism than vice versa. The transmission is motivated by a fear that in the event of a German invasion of Poland, the British and French would actually react and attack Germany. This view was only taken up at the beginning of August, prior to that Britain and France were seen as too weak to stand up to Germany. This is the reason why jargon such as ‘capitalistic Western Democracies’ is used and reference is made to past experiences with them. Ribbentrop is attempting to distance Germany from the Western powers and to convince Molotov/Stalin that they have much more in common. It is motivated by Hitler’s desperate impatience to annex Poland and the belief that he needs either Britain and France, on his side or Russia. His reference to the past experiences goes back to the First World War – which Germany lost – and to the western intervention in the Russian Civil War on the side of the white forces. This is not to mention the hostile attitude taken by the western powers towards the Soviet Government in the inter-war period. Hitler labels the West as enemies, implacable ones – i.e. they won’t stop until both German and Russian Governments fall.

Military negotiations with Britain and France had begun on 12th August, having been agreed to in principle by the Western democracies several weeks beforehand. The delayed arrival of the Anglo-French delegations in Moscow, and their rather undistinguished composition, did not set an optimistic tone for the conversations, which were to last less than a week. By the 18th it had become clear to the Russians that the British and the French could not fulfil the necessary criteria on which a satisfactory agreement from the Soviet point of view would have to be based.

The main sticking point was the Russian insistence that under the terms of any treaty in which they were to act against German aggression their troops would be allowed to pass through Poland and Romania. The British and French representatives contacted their respective governments to instruct them to persuade the Polish and Romanian governments to accept the passage of the Red Army through their territory in case of German aggression. Such pressure was applied but to no avail. The Poles and Romanians both held a deep-seated mistrust of Russian intentions, largely due to historical experiences. Thus the Russians' main demand could not be granted and the projected alliance became increasingly distant.

The demise of the Anglo-French-Soviet discussions was matched correspondingly by rapid improvements in German-Soviet relations. On 14th August, whilst the British and French were still desperately trying to fulfil Voroshilov's demands, Molotov received notice of Ribbentrop's willingness to travel to Moscow in order to conclude an alliance. A few days later, as the negotiations with the British and French were still officially continuing, Hitler wrote to Stalin and asked that Ribbentrop be received on 22nd. The Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact was signed the day after this.

In 1935 the Soviet Union had concluded an alliance with Czechoslovakia, which fitted in with its policy of 'collective security' against German expansion in Europe. By October 1938 Austria had been incorporated into the Reich and a four-power conference, excluding the Russians, had decided that the Sudetenland should suffer a similar fate. As Russia had pledged to uphold Czech security she now felt it necessary to reiterate her commitment to her ally, whose independence was directly threatened by Germany.

France had signed a treaty with Czechoslovakia in 1925 and had also formed an alliance with the Soviet Union a decade later. Litvinov emphasised joint action with France in 1938, as this latter treaty only obliged Russia to go to Czechoslovakia's aid if the French moved first. Maisky had expressed the opinion in August 1938 that France would not fight for Czechoslovakia. Franco-Soviet relations at that time were muddled at best and a concerted effort to improve cooperation was not made until spring of 1939, after the German army had already overrun Czechoslovakia. Thus neither the Russians nor the French were ultimately prepared to honour their treaties with Czechoslovakia.

It would, however, have been logistically very difficult for the Soviet Union to help Czechoslovakia. Neither Poland nor Romania would tolerate Russian troops on their territory and thus even if the French had acted the Russians would have been unable to offer any direct assistance. Litvinov therefore left the promises of aid to Czechoslovakia suitably vague, as he was well aware of how restricted the means available to the Soviet Union were.

The conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact was announced on 22nd August and sent shock waves around the world. Negotiations had been secretly in progress since the spring and an economic agreement had already been signed. The Non-Aggression Pact was specifically designed to deal with the contingency of German aggression against Poland and therefore was not to be invalidated if either party attacked a third power. Added to it was a secret protocol providing for the partitioning of Poland along pre-determined lines.

Negotiations had likewise been ongoing between German, Italian and Japanese representatives, although the Italians' presence was fairly ineffectual. Ribbentrop had conceived the idea of effecting a reconciliation between the Soviet Union and Japan in order to form a tripartite military alliance against the West. With the signing of the Pact of Steel between Germany and Italy in May such hopes were dashed and Hitler was much more realistic about the chances of Japan making a firm commitment to the Axis powers in the near future. But negotiations continued in a desultory fashion through the summer, when Japan became involved in serious border incidents with Russia. The Japanese were therefore eager for an alliance against Russia.

Such an attitude induced a warning from Berlin, although not an explicit one, that if it continued it would induce them to sign a pact with the Soviet Union themselves. Once the German government realised that the Japanese would not agree to an alliance against the West, at least in time for the projected attack on Poland, they lost interest in the negotiations. The Japanese were ignorant of Hitler's plans and in any case did not believe that the founder of the Anti-Commintern Pact would sign a deal with Russia. Thus the assumption that Germany would remain a threat to the Soviet Union in Europe lay behind Japanese strategic calculations.

The prospect, and eventual reality, of a Nazi-Soviet Pact therefore greatly alarmed the Japanese, as it would provide Russia with both political reassurance in Europe and critical machine tools that Germany had declined to provide to Japan. In the context of rapidly deteriorating Japanese-Soviet relations this was a major concern to the Japanese. For their part, the Nazi government were much more attracted by the positive signals they received from Moscow. Strategically, if they could not secure Japan's full support, they need not fear the possibility of her enmity and hence the ending of negotiations did not duly worry them.

The fact that such meetings were taking place suggests that the Western democracies, Britain and France, were not the 'implacable enemies' of the Soviet Union. Certainly the formers adherence to capitalism put them at the opposite end of the ideological spectrum to Bolshevist Russia, but that was also the case with National Socialist Germany. France was the more antagonistic of the two towards Germany and thus was more concerned about reaching a possible agreement with Russia in order to prevent further German expansion. Britain had conversely been very accommodating towards Germany, almost granting her a free hand in Eastern Europe, and nothing more than apathetic towards the Soviet Union.

Thus there existed a tangible historical mistrust between France and Germany which stemmed largely from World War I. France would have no doubt adopted a much more strident policy towards Nazi Germany had it not been for Britain's reluctance to do anything more than protest verbally at each stage of German expansion. The Anglo-German naval agreement, concluded in 1935, had opened up the possibility of a more concrete alliance between the two countries. But the British guarantee to Poland issued in March 1939 had placed a barrier in the way of Hitler's next intended victim and had therefore increased the potential for an Anglo-German conflict. Ribbentrop was keen to exploit this in order to convince the Soviets of Germany's desire for an alliance.

Hitler had planned the invasion of Poland to take place on 25th August and thus the German government was extremely keen to conclude both economic and political agreements with Russia. It was decided on 14th itself that Ribbentrop would travel to Moscow to fulfil this task. On the same day Hitler addressed his senior Wehrmacht officers and assured them that Russia would stand aside when Germany attacked Poland as he planned to work out a division of spheres of interest with her. These comments show Hitler's concept of the planned trip by his Foreign Minister to Moscow.

This extract is taken from a brief signal from Baron von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, to Hitler (who was travelling to Memel on the battleship Deutschland) informing him of the signing of a treaty with Lithuania. The signal dated in the early hours of 23 March 1939, a few hours after the treaty, which gave Germany control of the Memel territory occupied by ethnic Germans. The timing of the treaty alarmed the Polish who had become worried by the threat of a German invasion to both Danzig and the main country and partly caused the issuing of a guarantee to Poland by Britain and France.

The treaty was signed after the Lithuania Foreign Minister had been summoned to Berlin on 20 March and issued with an ultimatum by Ribbentrop that Memel had to be handed over to Germany. Using similar tactics to the Sudeten Germans, Germany had used the local Nazis under Dr Neumann to provoke unrest so that it could be claimed that the majority of the territory wished to cede to Germany. The tactic also uncomfortably fitted in with western liberal ideas of national self-determination.

The active dispute over the Memel territory had been a relatively lengthy one. The territory had been ceded by Germany in the Versailles Treaty and was particularly useful because of its access to the Baltic. Activities by German activists in Memel in the 1930s had been suppressed by Lithuania, which had led to economic and diplomatic conflict between the two countries. Lithuania had made concessions to end the conflict and a trade agreement had followed with Germany. There were still minor disputes over land between the Memel Germans and Lithuanians and Hitler had refused to sign a non-aggression pact with the Lithuanians.

This extract is taken from a memorandum circulated by Baron von Neurath, German Foreign Minister. The memorandum concerns a meeting between Hitler, the Polish Foreign Minster M. Beck, the Polish Ambassador Lipski and Neurath. It was one of a series of meetings partly to discuss the status of free city of Danzig and was an attempt to reposition German-Polish relations although it also touched on minorities, Czechoslovakia and Bolshevism. The meeting was held on 14 January 1938, and was followed with a speech on the excellent nature of German-Polish relations on 20 February 1928. It should also be noted that Neurath was replaced by von Ribbentrop as Foreign Minister on 4 February, marking a speeding up of German foreign and defence policy.

In the extract Neurath summarises the version of German policy that Hitler wished Beck to hear. The phrase ‘an improvement in the treatment of the German minority’ refers to the three million Sudeten Germans who resided in the Sudentenland part of Czechoslovakia and some were represented by its own political party the SdP – partly funded by Hitler – though it had little political influence. Although the Sudeten Germans enjoyed the best treatment of any minority group in Europe by far, they had real grievances over the discrimination of government officials and awarding of Government contracts. Hitler probably calculated that mentioning the grievances of the Sudeten Germans would appeal to the Polish who had raised concerns over Polish minorities in Germany.

When the memorandum mentions the ‘structure of the Czech State’ it refers to the Czechoslovak democratic constitution which gave power to political parties organised along national lines. The Germans could therefore always be outvoted since there were no parties that transcended nationalities. However, the Czechs had begun to respond to the pleas of those – such as the ‘Activists’ – who wished to alter the system, though change was too slow for either the Germans or the German Sudetens.

The ‘mistaken policy of the Czechs in Central Europe’ which would lead to a ‘hotbed of Bolshevism’ is probably designed to appeal to Poland’s designs on Czechoslovak territory, particularly on Tesin which lay between the two countries. Beck was counting on the disintegration of Czechoslovakia to provide Poland with more territory and a common border with Hungary. The reference to Bolshevism is well placed because it played to Polish fears of the USSR and identified Germany as a refuge from communism.

Germany signed an economic agreement with the Soviet Union on 24 Dec. ‘36 and economic talks continued, although intermittently, through to Feb.‘39 before finally breaking down. Stalin’s speech to the 18th Party Congress (10 Mar. ‘39) attacked western appeasement policies and although not proven, it is thought Germany perceived this as a signal that Moscow were willing to resume negotiations. Hitler, aware of the proposed triple alliance, aimed to prevent it because he wanted Soviet neutrality in the event of a German/Polish war. Hitler omitted his usual anti-Soviet tirade from his Reichstag speech (28 April ‘39) hoping to renew contact. The replacement of Litvinov with Molotov was taken as evidence that the Soviets were ready to talk.

Schulenburg met with Molotov (20 May ‘39) to propose a new credit treaty. Molotov was non committal suggesting political bases needed to be constructed first. Schulenburg understood Molotov was playing for time. Indeed, Anglo/Soviet conversations were slowing in early May, the Soviets were thus keeping their options wide open. On 24 May ‘39 Chamberlain (British Prime Minister) announced an understanding had been reached with the Soviets but 3 days later Anglo/French proposals were rejected.

Germany, aware Molotov was speaking (31 May ‘39) to the Supreme Soviet, hoped he would openly indicate Soviet intentions. Molotov welcomed the possibility of an alliance with the west and denounced recent German approaches but although conducting negotiations with Britain and France, he did not discount resuming talks with Germany. Despite German approaches 6 weeks passed before the Soviets responded by which time talks had political undertones.

On 6 Oct. ‘38 the Slovaks were granted autonomy and from Feb. ‘39 the Slovak German Nazi Party helped by German propaganda agitated and put forward demands for independence. Tiso was against stirring up trouble afraid of renewing Hungarian demands on Slovak territory. On 10 March Prague, afraid of a pro-German coup, dismissed the Tiso government and appointed Karol Sidor as successor. His government was considered more sympathetic to Prague. The Nazi’s, unable to persuade Sidor to proclaim independence, appealed to Hitler for help.

On 13 March Tiso was virtually kidnapped and taken to Berlin. Hitler informed him of his plans to crush Czechoslovakia and unless Tiso declared Slovak independence he would not be responsible for their fate (Hitler had already told Hungary they were free to occupy Ruthenia). This was a veiled threat to leave the Slovaks at the mercy of the Hungarians. Ribbentrop reinforced the point by stating that Hungarian troop movements were reported on the Slovak frontier. The Declaration of Independence had already been drafted by Ribbentrop and given to Tiso already translated into Slovak. Tiso was also handed a draft telegram requesting protection and was under orders to send it to Hitler the following day, once independence had been officially declared. Hitler then had his excuse to march into Czechoslovakia on the grounds he was protecting the right of self determination.

The Memel population consisted largely of Germans. Taken from Germany and placed under Allied control in 1918 it was seized by Lithuanian troops in 1923. The Memel statute (8 May 1924) signed by Britain, France, Italy and Japan made Memel an autonomous region within the Lithuanian state. German agitation was suppressed until 1933 at which time the revisionist cause was taken up by the Memel Nazi’s led by Dr Ernst Neumann.

At Munich Hitler stated he would not interfere in Memel but Poland and Lithuania were forging closer relations which Hitler feared could lead to the Polish encirclement of East Prussia. Neumann, imprisoned in 1935 but released in 1938, continued to agitate but Hitler was afraid tensions would push Lithuania further towards Poland or more importantly dissuade Poland from conceding Danzig. Ribbentrop was ordered to inform Neumann to impose strict measures on those who provoked incidents.

Germany regarded elections on 11 Dec. ‘38 as a plebiscite. The Memel German Party received 87% of the vote proving the people’s desire to be incorporated into the Reich. Like Austria and Czechoslovakia this was to be viewed as a case of self determination. Hitler did not annex Memel in December, instead he waited, not wanting to cause tensions with Poland, for the Lithuanian government to agree willingly.

Germany could have taken Memel at anytime but it was taken in March following the invasion of Prague to alarm Poland. On 20 March ‘38 the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Juozas Urbsys was given an ultimatum to cede Memel within 48 hours. Hoping this would frighten the Poles, Ribbentrp (21 March ‘38) pressed Poland again to concede Danzig, they refused.

Urbsys, like Hacha, was ceremoniously received in Berlin (22 Mar.‘39), by the time Hitler had boarded the Deutschland he knew the Lithuanian government had agreed to his terms. The extract merely confirmed to Hitler the signing of the agreement afterwhich Hitler drew up a law to this effect. Those who supposedly countersigned the decree, apart from Reich Minister Lammers, were not even on board ship (Frich, Goring, Ribbentrop).

The Memel population consisted largely of Germans. Taken from Germany and placed under Allied control in 1918 it was seized by Lithuanian troops in 1923. The Memel statute (8 May 1924) signed by Britain, France, Italy and Japan made Memel an autonomous region within the Lithuanian state. German agitation was suppressed until 1933 at which time the revisionist cause was taken up by the Memel Nazi’s led by Dr Ernst Neumann.

At Munich Hitler stated he would not interfere in Memel but Poland and Lithuania were forging closer relations which Hitler feared could lead to the Polish encirclement of East Prussia. Neumann, imprisoned in 1935 but released in 1938, continued to agitate but Hitler was afraid tensions would push Lithuania further towards Poland or more importantly dissuade Poland from conceding Danzig. Ribbentrop was ordered to inform Neumann to impose strict measures on those who provoked incidents.

Germany regarded elections on 11 Dec. ‘38 as a plebiscite. The Memel German Party received 87% of the vote proving the people’s desire to be incorporated into the Reich. Like Austria and Czechoslovakia this was to be viewed as a case of self determination. Hitler did not annex Memel in December, instead he waited, not wanting to cause tensions with Poland, for the Lithuanian government to agree willingly.

Germany could have taken Memel at anytime but it was taken in March following the invasion of Prague to alarm Poland. On 20 March ‘38 the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Juozas Urbsys was given an ultimatum to cede Memel within 48 hours. Hoping this would frighten the Poles, Ribbentrp (21 March ‘38) pressed Poland again to concede Danzig, they refused.

Urbsys, like Hacha, was ceremoniously received in Berlin (22 Mar.‘39), by the time Hitler had boarded the Deutschland he knew the Lithuanian government had agreed to his terms. The extract merely confirmed to Hitler the signing of the agreement afterwhich Hitler drew up a law to this effect. Those who supposedly countersigned the decree, apart from Reich Minister Lammers, were not even on board ship (Frich, Goring, Ribbentrop).

On 2 Nov. ‘38 a German/Italian court of arbitration at the Belvedere Palace, Vienna settled Hungarian claims. This was in breach of the Munich Agreement which had stipulated such claims had to be settled by four power agreement involving Britain and France. On 14 Oct. ‘38 Daranyi met with Hitler and was persuaded to accept 2 power arbitration. Daranyi thought that this would bring Hungary more concessions. Britain and France did not protest because armed clashes between Slovak and Hungarian troops had escalated during Oct. ‘38, they were not willing to risk war by giving assistance to the Czechs. In reality they could do little anyway because at Munich they had only guaranteed new frontiers and not existing borders.

Since the loss of territory through the Treaty of Trianon (1919) a large number of Hungarians supported revisionism. Hitler thus recognised Hungary as a natural ally and played on aspirations to lure them into the Axis but did not always support their cause. Following Anschluss Hitler refused to cede Burgenland (Hungarian territory pre 1918) to Hungary. He also refused to bow to the Hungarian request to guarantee neutrality to Yugoslavia. The Vienna Award did not give Hungary all she wanted either. They were given a broad strip of southern Slovakia and Ruthenia but Slovakia retained important centres with large Jewish populations such as Bratislava and Nitra. Later, (20 Nov. ‘38) Hungarians staged a coup for the planned occupation of Carpatho Ukraine, Hitler vetoed this action.

The phrase ‘full trust in you’ hides a chain of events orchestrated by Berlin rather than Slovakian initiative. Tiso was forced by Hitler to co-operate in the German takeover of Czechoslovakia when Hitler exploited the Slovak independence movement. The declaration of independence by Tiso was issued under a German threat of Hungarian occupation. It is possible that Tiso believed that by co-operating with Hitler he could secure better terms for a Slovakian state, especially after the negotiated mutilation of Slovakia by Hungary.

The ‘Slovak State’ refers to the increasing autonomy that Slovakia had achieved since the Munich Settlement several months previously. Germany was keen for Slovakia to have a status independent of the Prague government whilst remaining within Czechoslovakia so that it was available to Berlin. Negotiations on territorial adjustment between Slovakia and Hungary finished in Vienna on 2 November 1938 and saw Hungary gaining considerable Slovakian land. Small pieces of land also went to Germany and Poland. Since Slovakia had negotiated on its own behalf though, there was a perception that it had become autonomous within Czechoslovakia. The reference to Germany’s ‘protection’ of Slovakia has more to do with Germany’s de facto power within the region. The overall result of the territory negotiations was to demonstrate Germany’s absolute power in forcing through its will in Eastern Europe. This was partly because it had restricted the role of Italy and entirely excluded Britain and France from any participation. Slovakia had little choice but to hope that Germany would not carve up the country any further. A ‘treaty of protection’ was signed with Germany at the time of the German occupation of Prague which ensured the permanent occupation and effective control by Germany.

Molotov stated that he was concerned that the trade negotiations begun by Germany with the Soviet Union were motivated by political reasons and unless these were brought into the open he would feel uncomfortable continuing in that vein. When pressed by Schulenburg on exactly what he meant, Molotov refused to be led into commenting. The results so far of the trade negotiations and of Molotov’s Conversations with Schulenburg were therefore minimal. The Germans seem to be at a loss as to exactly what the Russian were thinking and had no other option but to wait and see whether they would open up or not. Schulenburg hoped that a speech Molotov was scheduled to make at a session of the Supreme Soviet, would throw some light on the issue. Schulenburg urged caution on this whole issue, as he felt that any hasty proposals that were made by the Germans to the Soviets could be used, by them, to apply pressure to the British and French, in their ongoing negotiations over the possibility of an alliance. The Germans were acutely aware of the fact that Britain and France were courting the Soviets for a treaty of alliance. However they were doing so with a degree of lethargy, as though by doing so it meant that there was no possibility of the Soviets starting negotiations with the Germans. They saw the ideological differences between Nazism and Communism as too great a chasm to bridge. At this stage it is unlikely that the Germans had fully taken on board the change in policy in the Kremlin that was personified by the replacement of Litvinov with Molotov, collective security had come to an end and the Germans now stood a chance of securing the allegiance of the Soviets. For his part Molotov was playing a game. He viewed his meeting with Schulenburg as the offering of bait to the Germans for renewed trade talks but on more defined lines.

The telegram is at the same time sad and predictable. It comes in the wake of the annexation of Czechoslovakia by Hitler on the 15th of March. The whole destruction of Czechoslovakia by Hitler was the most barbaric act, short of actual war that he could have inflicted on the country. There is no doubt that there was disruption in Czechoslovakia before Hitler became involved. The union of the country had never been totally harmonious especially between the Czechs and the Slovaks. However, Hitler seized upon this and forced the issue as an excuse to dominate the country. He intentionally stirred up the Slovaks in an attempt to drive them towards a declaration of independence. There was no real motive for Hitler except a lust for conquest and sheer bloody mindedness, certainly not the often-used excuse of national self-determination. Hitler pushed the Slovaks into a corner. He made it clear to the Slovak nationalist Tuka in February that if the Slovaks did not come to him for ‘protection’ he would simply allow Slovakia to be divided between Poland and Hungary. One of the amazing things in run up to the War was that Eastern European states were all out for territorial gains – they fought over every opportunity like children over chocolate. This was in the face of the obvious danger that Germany posed to them all. It is more than likely that Poland and Hungary might have taken the opportunity to divide up Slovakia. However the notion that the Slovaks would put their ‘full trust’ in Hitler is wrong. The telegram was spoon-fed to the Slovaks and they had little choice but to agree in the end. They did in fact declare independence on the 14th of March but they did not request any involvement from Germany. The word protection in the telegram was heavily contested by the Slovaks but insisted upon by the Germans. It ensured that Slovakia could become a protectorate of Germany and to do that required troops on Slovak soil.

The extract focuses on Czechoslovakia and Hitler states his desire to see improvement in the treatment of the German Minority there. That, he claims, is his first desire, according to Neurath, he does not appear to elaborate as to what his second might be! He admits to the minority status of the German population and yet hopes to secure concessions towards them. In view of their minority status it they should have been subject to Czechoslovak rule and law. If they become a majority only then should the Germans have the right to dictate those laws, yet Hitler still wished to make an issue of it. Furthermore this conversation occurred before there was any real crisis over the Sudeten German Minority in Czechoslovakia. At the time there had not been a call to Germany for help, Hitler was ‘jumping the gun’. The reference to the structure of the Czech state alludes to the fact that Czechoslovakia was in fact a nation created artificially from the remanents of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. There were three fairly distinct groups, the Czechs, the Slovaks and the Ruthenians. The Czechs were the dominant partners in the relation and there was evidence that even at this stage this was a cause of friction between the three. Hitler goes on to say that this friction made the perfect entry point for Bolshevism into Czechoslovakia. Bolshevism was like a dirty word in pre 1939 Europe. It was about the only thing that could rally all nations – against it. There was a general fear of Bolshevism as it was seen as a threat against the governments in place in all countries of Europe.

The ‘treaty’ signed by the Lithuanians stated that they were handing Memel over to the Germans in recognition of the fact that it had been taken from them at Versailles. Indeed the city did have a predominantly ethnic German population. However the German in the city enjoyed autonomy under a League of Nations Statute with a directorate, the President of which was appointed by the Lithuanian Government. Until the rise o Nazism this system had satisfied the German residents however in 1935, fearful of Nazism the Lithuanians had moved to stamp out Nazism, in doing so showing a disregard for justice more typical of the Nazis themselves. Despite this Lithuania was in an ongoing quarrel with Poland, so much so that German battle plans were drawn up in March 1938 to cater for the taking of Memel in the event of a Polish-Lithuanian conflict, which seemed eminently possible. After Munich the Lithuanians started to ‘mend bridges’ with Germany. Despite this the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Joseph Urbsys was hauled in front of Hitler on 20th March 1939, and subjected to the same treatment (a tirade and threats of invasion unless he complied) as Dr. Hacha the Czechoslovak Prime Minister had received the week before. Under threat of aerial bombing the Lithuanians did not tell the world the pressure they were under to complete the deal with Hitler. On the 22nd March Hitler left Ribbentrop to finalize the details and set sail for Memel and his victorious entry into the city.

This was the last time that Hitler could play the card of national self-determination. It was true that Memel had a largely German population and it had been severed from the Germany at Versailles. However the barbaric manner in which he went about taking the territory back, leaves room for concern. He effectively threatened the Lithuanians into accepting his terms, as he had done with the Czechoslovaks the week before and at Munich too. This trend demonstrates the danger Hitler posed to all European powers and yet Britain and France did not react, citing the concept of national self-determination and thus sealing once and for all the fate of the Versailles treaty. The British offered their guarantee to Poland soon after but this was motivated by the invasion of Czechoslovakia rather than that of Memel. Perhaps most remarkable is the fact that the Eastern European states continued to bicker amongst themselves, vying fro each other’s territory, in the face of the increasingly obvious threat from Germany.

The phrase ‘on basis of the results so far’ refers to the talks that had been taking place since the previous month. The results had largely revolved around such mutual economic assistance. For example, the Soviets requested deliveries from the Skoda arms works whilst Germany needed foodstuffs. After the appointment of Molotov on 3 May 1939, the German Government became friendlier towards the Soviets and instructed the German Press to cease attacks on the Soviet Union and the Skoda request was granted.

Molotov was appointed to take charge of foreign affairs on 3 May as replacement for Litvinov. It is likely that Molotov’s appointment was a deliberate symbol of Stalin’s rejection of collective security as a basis for Soviet Foreign Policy and he had calculated that he should not be dragged into a European war, especially against Germany whilst Japan remained a threat to the USSR’s eastern border. Therefore Molotov’s appointment – and the action he has taken in this extract – was an invitation to Hitler to move political talks forward. Litvinov had been the public face of collective security, especially in Geneva, and he therefore was Jewish – therefore unsuitable for the execution of the new foreign policy.

Weizsacker has decided to instruct Schulenburg to keep tight lipped and see what Molotov has to say - this typifies Germany’s leisurely response. However, it is clear by his attention that Weizsacker has realised that it is in Germany’s interests to co-operate with the USSR politically. By April, Hitler had realised that negotiations with Poland for a peaceful German entry had failed. However, an invasion could only be guaranteed success if the USSR agreed not to challenge the invasion. If the USSR joined Britain and France in guaranteeing Poland’s borders then the invasion could fail.

Throughout May 1939 relations between Germany and the Soviet Union were on the mend. The German press was even ordered to cease all polemics against Russia and Bolshevism. Then, on 17th, the Soviet charge in Berlin, Astakhov, asserted that there were no quarrels between Germany and the Soviet Union, that sure measures could be found to remove the distrust of Germany still existing in Moscow, and that the Anglo-Soviet negotiations were not likely to lead to the result England desired. The following day Ribbentrop instructed Schulenburg in Berlin that he was to travel immediately to Moscow and suggest to Molotov that economic negotiations be resumed in the hope of reaching a new trade agreement.

Molotov responded in a friendly manner to Schulenburg's enquiries, very much unlike his reception of approaches from London or Paris. However, he insisted that 'political bases' were a prerequisite for any resumed economic talks. He also refused to explain this response when asked. The Russians were clearly awaiting signs from Germany of a real desire for cooperation and thus they deliberately turned down the new and confident Anglo-French proposal they received on 27th May, not yet wishing to bind themselves in either direction.

The state of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations had played a role in the German internal deliberations over Molotov's response. They feared that the latter would exploit German eagerness to bargain with the Soviet Union as a means of pressing Britain and France into full alliance on Russian terms and thus urged reticence on the German representatives in Moscow. The signing of the Pact of Steel on 22nd May, however, would have been an indirect but important sign that the Soviet Union was no longer Germany's principal enemy. It was not a tripartite pact with Japan and thus Germany was clearly unwilling to subordinate her designs on Poland and against England and France to Japan's hopes for an alliance against Russia.

Tiso was summoned to Berlin on 13th March and ordered to issue an immediate declaration of Slovak independence. If he failed to do so, Ribbentrop threatened that Germany would take part of Slovakia, with the rest being divided between Poland and Hungary. He also handed Tiso the draft text of the Slovak declaration of independence. The subsequent request for German protection was produced in the face of similar pressure. The Slovakian Diet adopted them both on 14th March.

In the interim, however, the control that Germany exercised over Prague made it expedient to keep Slovakia at least nominally a part of Czechoslovakia. Hitler had previously been willing to hand the territory over to Hungary but had since changed his mind and decided to keep Slovakia available for future disposition by Berlin. To this end German vetoes had prevented Hungarian military invasions of the neighbouring Carpatho-Ukraine in November 1938 and February 1939. But, on 12th March, when the time was right, Hitler actually instructed Hungary to seize the area, presumably to apply even more pressure on Slovakia to tow the German line.

Thus, whilst they acquired direct control of Bohemia and Moravia, the Germans maintained indirect but fully effective control of Slovakia. The latter was reduced to vassal status by a treaty that was euphemistically termed a 'protective relationship' with the Reich. The Germans had already shown their ambivalent attitude towards Slovakia in the Vienna Award, which, in November 1938, had granted the southern part to Hungary. Tiso was therefore presented, in effect, with a fait accompli and had no choice but to sign his country's fate away.

Germany's policy towards Slovakia was initially determined by the plans for the invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. As soon as they assumed control, however, it became a pawn in their chess-like diplomacy with Hungary and Poland. Hitler had again demonstrated that, by entirely excluding the other two Munich powers, Britain and France, his will would determine the fate of those in the area.

The Memel territory had been taken from Germany in 1919 under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and the town provided the only port for the newly independent state of Lithuania. Hitler was determined to reverse this move and his public renunciation of any further territorial claims in September 1938 did not change his private aims. Memel town was culturally and linguistically German but the population of its hinterland was mainly Lithuanian. The treaty concluded with Lithuania meant that Memel was ceded to Germany and therefore reincorporated into the Reich. The military evacuation of the territory was to be completed by 7am that morning, although Lithuania was promised a free-port zone.

It had been widely anticipated that this takeover would occur the previous December, after the Lithuanian relaxation of restrictions had led to the full nazification of the territory and elections. Hitler, however, decided to bide his time. He told Ernst Neumann, the leader of the Memel National Socialists, that the question would be settled by annexation at the end of March 1939 and that he wanted no acute crisis before this time.

When the time came, German tactics were of a familiarly aggressive nature. On 20 March, Ribbentrop told the Lithuanian Foreign Minister that the Memel region must be restored to Germany at once. The latter's government was given forty-eight hours to agree, otherwise German armed forces would invade the territory and there could be no guarantee as to where they would stop. The Lithuanians were powerless in the face of such pressure.

Ever since the Treaty of Trianon, the Hungarian government had pursued a revisionist policy aimed at retrieving lost territories. One of the most sought after was the Carpatho-Ukraine, or Ruthenia, a goal that became all the more realistic after Hitler insistence at Munich that Czechoslovakia settled its outstanding territorial issues with Poland and Hungary. However, the subsequent negotiations between the Czech government and Budapest in October 1938 did not bring about the prompt compromise that Berlin hoped for. Hitler therefore insisted on a peaceful solution and arranged for a joint German-Italian arbitration procedure that culminated in the Vienna Award, on 2nd November.

At their meeting on 14th October, Hitler had told Daranyi that a new border would have to be found between Hungary on the one hand and Slovakia and Ruthenia on the other, but, as in the Sudetenland question, on a supposedly ethnographic basis. Whilst there was a Magyar community in Ruthenia, the majority of the population was Ukrainian. Thus, although the region had formerly belonged to Hungary, it is highly debatable whether their 'cause' could be considered 'just' when judged on the basis of national self-determination.

Hitler's support of Hungarian claims was certainly not motivated by a sense of moral duty. His attitude towards the issue had in fact changed depending on Germany's needs and the Vienna Award had by no means given Hungary all that she sought. Prior to Daranyi's visit it October, Hitler would have supported a Hungarian move on Ruthenia and even Slovakia. However, as the Budapest government adopted a more cautious approach, he decided that German support would be more limited. Pressure exerted on Italy forced them to reduce their support for Hungary and thus after the Award there still existed an autonomous Slovakia within the nominal bounds of a Czecho-Slovak state. Germany also annexed a small but strategically important piece of Slovak territory, which enabled them to dominate the capital, Pressburg-Bratislava.

This extract is from the memorandum of a conversation between Herr von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister, and Georges Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister during Ribbentrop’s visit to Paris. The visit had been the finale of ‘friendly’ talks between the two Governments since the conclusion of the Munich Settlement two months previously. The culmination of the visit was the signature of the Franco-German Declaration of friendship.

The ‘Reich Minister’s stay in Paris’ was possibly designed to lull the French into a false sense of complacency and encourage their optimism founded in the Munich Conference. Bonnet was a strong advocate of giving concessions to the Germans – as the British Ambassador in Paris commented on – and Ribbentrop would be keen to capitalise on this atmosphere. The Declaration itself contains only three clauses with little of any tangible substance other than a promise to keep in close communication.

When Bonnet talked about ‘future developments in the Mediterranean’, he was referring mostly to Italian expansionism. Mussolini was soon to renounce the Rome Agreements of January 1935; he wanted control of the port and railway at Djibouti, new management of the Suez Canal Company and a revision of the status of Italians in Tunisia. The situation was not helped by public demands in the Italian streets for Nice and Corsica. It was also clear that Mussolini was interested in obtaining Albania, therefore giving a huge naval advantage in the Mediterranean.

The author indicates that Italian expansionism was ‘the principal matter’ which occupied the French government. The government had already made attempts with the British to persuade Mussolini to stay away from French interests without success. The British had also been strongly urging the French government to speed up its rearmament programme in the light of Italian aggression. There may also be a split within the government on how to deal with the Italians. Bonnet was more pro-appeasement than Daladier, the French Prime Minister.

This extract is taken from a memorandum on a conversation between Herr von Ribbentrop, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Count Ciano, his Italian counterpart. The conversation took place while Ribbentrop was on a two day visit to Rome to present a draft treaty to the Italian Government that included Germany, Italy and Japan. This conversation reflects Ribbentrop’s efforts to convince Ciano of its merits and outline the German view that a European war was inevitable. It should be noted that at the time Hitler was also trying to persuade the Polish to sign the Anti-Comitern Pact.

Ribbentrop predicts a European war highly likely in ‘4 to 5 year’s’ time’. This statement reflects the thinking outlined by Hitler at the Hossbach Conference a year previously that European war was desirable by 1943 when western democracies would have to be confronted over German expansionism but on German terms. However, it is likely that Hitler’s timing had been brought forward after the Munich Settlement – as Hitler had explained to Mussolini at the Munich Conference in September.

The alliance proposed is described as ‘purely defensive’ and against ‘unprovoked aggression’. It is likely that this language was used to reassure the Italians that they were not over-committing themselves too soon. The negotiations for a tripartite had been ongoing in different forms since February 1938. The alliance was likely to be defensive in that one purpose was to act as a deterrent to any robust talk that the British might give. However, the fact that Hitler was still pursuing the alliance after the Munich Settlement infers that a major showdown would happen in the near future and therefore the Treaty would be offensive.

The mention of Japan in the conversation was a deliberate tactic by Ribbentrop to reassure the Italians. However Japan’s involvement was not clear-cut. It was Japan that had provided a major stumbling block to the treaty in August 1938 when it insisted that it did not apply against the USSR where Germany was adamant that the USSR should be included. Ribbentrop here infers that Japan was definitely in favour of the agreement and also that Japanese involvement was critical as in the alliance.

The document twists the situation to make it look like the Germans are the saviours of the Czechs, which is indeed the line they stuck to, and the justification for the subsequent invasion. Allegedly Germany intervened to help calm the problems being experienced in Czechoslovakia at the time between the Czechs and the Slovaks. The fact that these problems had been stirred up and almost created by Germany is irrelevant, seemingly in this document. There is no doubt that there were inherent problems between Czechs and Slovaks – witness the situation today – however Hitler simply exacerbated them for his own gain. The memo goes on to say that due to the unrest in the Czechoslovakia Germany is compelled to d something about it. Essential this is twisting the reality of the situation to make the unrest look like a threat to Germany. The final sentence referring to the interview with Dr. Hacha is simply untrue. Hacha was an old man and extremely infirm. He had no wish to go to Berlin and was probably fully aware that he was being hauled in to sign the death warrant of his country. In the meeting, which Hitler did not convene until 1:30am on the morning of the 15th March (the ides of March as Neville Henderson, the British Ambassador, was wont to refer to it), He harangued Hacha on what fate awaited his country before forcing him to sign a declaration effectively giving the Czech areas of Czechoslovakia to Hitler. This, Hacha signed, but not before fainting and having to be revived by Hitler’s physician.

Ribbentrop and Bonnet had a long discussion following the signing of the Declaration. French notes of the conversation differ from German notes. Some misunderstanding may have occurred as Ribbentrop spoke French during several parts of the conversation. Bonnet stated he said nothing to contradict France’s official position with her allies. Ribbentrop on the other hand states that Bonnet agreed to regard Czechoslovakia as being within the German sphere of influence. There were two further meetings between these men, one at the Hotel Crillen and another during a visit to the Louvre. Conversations from these meetings were not recorded.

Italy had declared an interest in obtaining French territory around the Mediterranean. In Italy on 30 November ‘38 at a staged demonstration in the Italian Chamber, demands were made for France to cede Corsica, Tunisia and Nice. France were adamant that they would not yield or compromise over these demands. France hoped that through the Franco/German Declaration, Germany would be able to persuade Italy to abandon their claims. Ribbentrop however made it clear in Paris that matters to do with the Mediterranean were outside the scope of German interest.

Negotiations regarding a tri-partite military alliance had reached a deadlock in August 1938. Germany wanted the alliance to be directed against all powers, Japan wanted an alliance only to be directed against the Soviet Union. Reorganisation within the Japanese government meant that new ambassadors had since been placed in Italy and Germany. Both were pro-German and both were eager to reach an agreement. During the third week in October Ribbentrop had been strongly urging the Italians to abandon their interest in Hungarian affairs. He wanted them to fall in line with German policy but changed his tone on 23 October ‘38. He invited himself to Rome on a brief and unofficial visit. The Italians were wary as this was Ribbentrop’s fourth attempt to sell the Italians a military agreement. Hitler wanted to clarify the point that a war with Britain and France was a certainty.

Ribbentrop believed Italian support would be important in a war against France but viewed Japanese support as critical in a war against Britain. Mussolini viewed the proposed alliance as an offensive alliance and only approved it in principle. He refused to sign. The new Japanese ambassadors had little influence within their government. A strong faction against an alliance existed in the Japanese government and was supported by warnings of danger and disadvantages of such an agreement from both Britain and the United States. An agreement could not be made on extending the alliance to cover other countries other than the Soviet Union and they too did not sign. A cultural agreement was signed between Germany and Japan on 25 November 1938 to celebrate the anniversary of the Anti- Cominten Pact.

Hitler believed as he had stated at the Hossbach Conference (5 November 1937) that war was inevitable within 4 - 5 years and therefore believed joint preparations should begin as soon as possible. It was presumed Japan would quickly gain control of China, the alliance would then be able to deter the ‘W’ Powers from halting German expansionism whilst encouraging American isolationism.

The significance of this extract is that it is evidence of Germany’s determination to secure a military pact which would counterbalance the combined strength of Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union. Mussolini did not want to commit himself at this stage because he wanted to secure the Anglo/Italian treaty (signed 16 Nov’38). During December, Ribbentrop persisted in his efforts to secure an alliance and persuaded Oshima Hiroshi, Japanese Ambassador, Berlin to visit Rome. Mussolini agreed to secure an alliance in January 1939 but stated Italy would not commit to any joint activities with Germany before 1942. This change of direction was mainly due to increased Franco/Italian tensions and in spite of German reassurances Mussolini feared Germany may have been seeking a rapprochement with France. The Japanese still only agreed to join the military alliance if it was directed only against the Soviets. The tri-partite agreement was abandoned and in May 1939 Germany and Italy signed the Pact of Steel.

Litvinov believed that the Czechs did not want war and therefore they would not provoke Germany into an attack. He also felt that if Germany did attack without provocation France would almost certainly aid the Czechs, Britain would follow and he stated that the Soviet Union would also fulfil her Treaty (1935) obligation to the Czechs. The Soviet Union would only aid however if France did so first. What would save the Czechs according to Litvinov was a collective stand against German aggression.

Germany, Litvinov believed, was building its foreign policy on unlimited aggression. Power politics through intimidation and terror would ensure Germany would eventually achieve their goal of taking Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union would avoid explaining how they would aid the Czechs and were careful not to fully commit themselves to action which would involve military force.

The Soviets had not been responsible for the Versailles Treaty nor the economic considerations which had dictated the boundaries of the Czech state. Fear of an expanding National Socialist Germany and the threat this posed to Soviet security was a concern. It was therefore necessary to make a public stand against German aggression. The pacts (1935) with France and Czechoslovakia were only intended to protect the Soviet Union and were not intended as a definite commitment to these countries. In fact the Soviets would be able to do little to help the Czech’s. The Soviet Union did not have a common border with Czechoslovakia and therefore this presented a logistical problem. In order to aid the Czechs Soviet troops would have to transit through Poland and Rumania. These countries were venemously opposed to the Soviets entering their territory. In addition the Red Army was depleted because of the purges and there was the problem of border clashes with the Japanese in Manchuria to contend with.

Britain were not prepared to enter into war over the’ Czech problem’ because it seemed clear that the Sudeten German claim to the right of self-determination was legitimate. Henlein’s, (Sudeten German Party leader) Karlsbad speech for autonomy was considered to be the basis for an agreement. British policy proceeded along the lines that it was best if the Czech government could be persuaded to make the necessary concessions in order to maintain peace. From March to December 1938 both Britain and France consistently urged Prague to make concessions. As a result of the May Crisis this pressure intensified. Two weakly worded warnings which lacked conviction were sent to Germany in which Britain stated, because of political necessity they may have to be involved in possible future hostilities. Britain had no intention of being involved. Indeed, the French were informed that these warnings were emergency measures to save the situation and that Britain would continue to urge Prague to comply.

In Britain throughout May statements and press articles indicated a British reluctance to enter into hostilities over Czechoslovakia. Kirkpatrick, First Secretary, British Embassy, Berlin informed German envoy, Prince Bismark that Britain were willing to come to an agreement on German terms providing it was reasonable and peaceful. Viscount Halifax, British Foreign Secretary, in a letter (13 May ‘38) to Herr von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Secretary and in a meeting with Dirksen (23 May ‘38) established that Britain wanted a peaceful settlement and would use their influence to bring the Czechs to agreement. This was in order to enable Britain and Germany to come to terms. Henderson, British Ambassador, Berlin was central to this issue. On several occasions he indicated Britain’s desire to improve Anglo/German relations. In a meeting with Weizsacker (28 May ‘38) he stipulated that in the case of extreme provocation Britain would withhold support for the Czechs.

Sir R. Vansittart (Chief Diplomatic Advisor to the Foreign Office) pressured Henlein, with the approval of Halifax, to come to an agreement. At the same time Halifax was encouraging Prague to meet demands. On 30 May ‘38, Halifax informed Mr Newton, British Minister in Prague to press Benes, Czechoslovak Prime Minister, to accept Henlein’s conditions as the basis for discussion. Britain also consistently pushed the French to push and almost blackmail the Czechs into agreement by threatening to break their alliance (1935) if they refused to comply.

The conversation between Bonnet and Ribbentrop is interesting in that it was simply an exchange of views on largely unrelated questions of Foreign Policy. Ribbentrop is said to have harangues Bonnet in much the same way as Hitler was wont to do and Bonnet only managed a lengthy interjection on the Subject of Franco-Italian relations. This might well have been the reason that the Germans came to the conclusion that this was the principal matter engrossing French Politicians at the time in that it was the only time Bonnet was allowed a word. It does however come in the wake of demands from Italian deputies, made on the 30th November 1938, for the cession of Nice, Corsica and Tunis to the Italians. French foreign policy, similarly to that of Britain, was still an imperial one. Unlike Germany France had many interests outside of Europe and especially valued her niche in the Mediterranean. France controlled much of North Africa and valued countries such as Yugoslavia and Romania as her traditional trading partners. The threats from Italy concerned France, as she perceived the Mediterranean as her traditional sphere of influence. With the Italians having invaded Abyssinia, giving a perfect route in to Egypt and dominance of the Suez Canal, and the overtures they were making to Yugoslavia, the French were feeling their traditional predominance in this area to be under threat. This might well have been the reason that during this conversation Bonnet, according to the German version of the memorandum, declares Eastern Europe a German sphere of influence in which France will not become involved. It is possible that he hoped in return to be given assurances of French dominance of the Mediterranean. In the event this was not forthcoming and Bonnet denied ever having said anything of the sort.

Four days previously, the Czechoslovak President, Emil Hacha, had dismissed the Slovak government in order to halt a developing movement to secure independence for Slovakia. This move greatly angered the German government, who had, since the Munich Agreement, been trying to balance Polish and Hungarian claims on that area. Germany had been responsible, however, for encouraging Slovakian independence. Anti-Czech propaganda had been directed to Slovakia from Vienna radio and on 13th the German press adopted its usual crisis style by denouncing a supposedly new Czech campaign of repression against Germans. Father Tiso, the Slovak leader, obeyed a summons to Berlin where he was ordered to declare Slovak independence, which he did the next day.

On 14th March, Hacha was likewise summoned to Berlin. Thus, the claim that he was arriving 'at his own request' was false. The memorandum of the meeting that took place between Hacha and Hitler, at which Weizsacker was present, relates the Fuhrer's regret at having to require the President to make the journey to Germany. Hacha was informed, on the night of his arrival that German troops were invading Czechoslovakia.

The invasion of the rump state of Czechoslovakia had been outlined in a directive issued as early as 17th December 1938. Whereas Hitler had previously believed that he would have to wait for Czech provocation, the new directive contained no mention of a Czech casus belli. Therefore, on 14th March, Hacha was informed of the invasion of his country, ordered to ask for German protection and told that any Czech resistance would lead to the immediate bombing of Prague. The following day, Hungary followed Germany's lead by invading Slovakia, having been given a free hand by Hitler.

What is significant about this document is the fact that it was intended for public consumption and therefore covered up what was really happening. In a similar vein to the Anschluss, Hitler had wanted to maintain a veneer of legality in his dealings with Czechoslovakia. Thus Weizsacker uses euphemistic and even false words to describe to describe the harsh reality of Germany's subjugation of Czechoslovakia.

Bonnet also raised concerns about events that had taken place on 30th November in the Italian Chamber of Deputies. During a speech by Count Ciano, in the presence of Mussolini, a number of deputies had openly demanded that France cede its territories of Nice, Corsica and Tunis. The latter was probably the most worrying for the French government, especially in light of recent events. Italians made up the majority of the non-indigenous population in Tunis and the Italian demands focused on their preservation as Italian citizens. The French ambassador in Rome, referring to the Munich Agreement, suggested that Italian propaganda was trying to make the Italians of Tunis the Sudetens of Italy.

The Italian government played down the importance of what had happened. Chamberlain assured the French that the Anglo-Italian agreement provided for the status quo in the Mediterranean and covered Tunis, Corsica and Nice. Yet the fears of the French government would not be allayed. Relations with Italy had been strained ever since the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Mussolini had made minimal attempts to disguise his aid to Franco, which greatly antagonised the anti-fascist Popular Front government of the time. In November 1938, the Daladier government despatched Francois-Poncet as a new ambassador to Rome, in order to end this hostility. The events in the Italian chamber, so soon after his arrival, would have therefore proved that bit more controversial.

Daladier was incensed and informed Chamberlain, who was on his way to talks with Mussolini, that the French would not grant any concessions to France. He soon visited Corsica and North Africa, announcing that he would not cede an acre of the French Empire. At a time when the rest of Europe were more concerned with German aggression in the East and Britain was attempting to forge closer links with Mussolini, France was certainly preoccupied with Italian pretensions in the Mediterranean.

Litvinov was correct in his assumption that Britain and France, 'the powers', would not initiate a major European conflict on behalf of Czechoslovakia per se. France had guaranteed to come to Czechoslovakia's aid in case of German aggression but this was in order to prevent further German expansion rather than ensure Czech independence. Britain would not guarantee Czechoslovakia but, if France honoured her pledge, Britain would have to join her in a war. British interests would have been severely jeopardised by a German victory over France.

Litvinov then implied that the Soviet Union was unlikely to interfere in a question that they regarded as an internal matter. As Russia had not been represented during the formation of the Versailles Peace Treaty, in 1919, she had not had a say in the carving up of Eastern Europe. This had included the 'creation and composition' of states such as Czechoslovakia, in which peoples of various antagonistic nationalities were expected to live in harmony. The German nationals in the Sudetenland were one such group who demanded self-determination. The Soviet Union therefore saw itself as having no responsibility to guarantee the existing Czech borders or ethnic make-up. The implication is that Russia would not go to war to prevent the secession of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia.

However, Russia could not countenance any increase in German power. Thus, while the settling of the Sudeten German question did not concern the Soviet Union directly, any assault on Czechoslovakia as a whole was a different matter. Russia was pledged to support France if she went to war over an incident of German aggression toward the Czech state. Litvinov was only too well aware that Hitler's plans were based on the ultimate subjugation of not only Czechoslovakia but also Russia itself. He saw the Nazi state as inherently expansionist and realised that if Czechoslovakia were overrun, the immediate threat to Russia would be greatly increased.

This rather vague statement of Russian policy was perhaps designed to perplex the German government. The latter did not want to provoke a war with the Soviet Union and must have been pleased by Russian apathy to the Sudetenland issue. However, Litvinov's statement to the effect that the Soviet Union would keep her word and support Czechoslovakia, whatever her reasons for doing so, must have given cause for concern.

After the Anschluss with Austria, British policy had been based on the avoidance of a war through granting concessions to Germany. At a Foreign Policy Committee meeting in March, Halifax had advocated that Germany would object to any interference on the part of other powers in the German-Czech question and that Britain would risk war in trying to deter Germany from imposing its own solution. Inskip, the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, likewise asserted that Germany could easily conquer Czechoslovakia and only a long war would eject Germany once it had achieved this. Thus Chamberlain and Halifax had military justification for their previously formulated policy of not guaranteeing Czechoslovakia or supporting France if she took action in accordance with her treaty with the threatened state. Even when war had seemed a probability between 20th and 22nd May, Halifax wanted the British press to report that Czech exaggeration and over-reaction had manufactured the 'crisis'.

At the end of April, the recently formed Daladier government had visited London. The British wanted Daladier and Bonnet to gain concessions from the Czechs by threatening to withhold French support in case of German aggression rather than encouraging Czech resistance. The latter approach would risk a European war in which Britain would have to intervene in order to prevent a French defeat. British diplomats also began to put pressure on Benes, the Czech President, Hodza, the Prime Minister, and Krofta, the Foreign Minister, to reach agreement with the Sudeten German Party by offering concessions to the latter's demands.

This pressure was accompanied by the clear message that there was no question of any British support for Czechoslovakian independence until agreement had been reached with the Sudeten Germans. Since the latters' demands, as laid out by Henlein at Karlsbad, were so extensive, there was never much chance that the Czech government would agree to them and therefore little chance that an agreement could be reached. The British assumed that Benes was obstructing a peaceful solution and became increasingly disillusioned at their failure to press him to make concessions.

Schulenburg brings up the issue of a major European war in the extract. The Germans are fearful that any action on their behalf against Czechoslovakia will exert an armed response from the other major powers of Europe. He is sounding out Litvinov to see what his reaction is. The Soviets are motivated by a dislike of national socialism seeing it as a direct opposite to their own system and enemy – largely perhaps because Hitler never tried to hide his contempt for communism and the Soviet Union, viewing them as arch enemies. The Russians viewed any advances eastwards by the Germans as dangerous to them, indeed when it came to the crunch the Russian were the only people who were prepared to stand up to Hitler, however the Romanians refused them access to Czechoslovakia across their territory. Russian Foreign Policy at this time was one of ‘collective security’ and it was championed by Litvinov. This was essentially the ‘ganging-up’ on and encirclement of Germany by the other European powers. There were no written agreements as such but Litvinov hoped that the European Nations could act as one against Germany. The Soviets were greatly disheartened by the seeming disinterest of the Western powers in the fate of Czechoslovakia and this cast the first doubts over the policy of collective security. This is what Litvinov means by ‘power politics’. Essentially it is prioritising; if the west view the Czechs as a high enough priority and they think there is something in it for them they will act if not then they will stand aside. The Russians were in fact the only ones that ever made a stand for the very reason that an advance east by Hitler threatened them, however they never actually did anything when they realised that they had no support form the other powers.

The British Activity in this affair was limited. This period was the height of appeasement and the British were concerned that they might get involved in a war in which they had no interest. This state of affairs was emphasised by the seeming French lust to hit Hitler hard over this. On the face of it, it looked like the western powers would not give in to Hitler, France announced that she would ‘provide the utmost help’ to the Czechs and Britain announced that she could not be counted on to remain outside any conflict that ensued. However behind the scenes it had already been decided on the 29th April that pressure would be brought to bear on Benes to settle the Sudeten question. France wished to be finished with the dilemma of having to fight (which she did not want to do) or to lose face and Britain viewed the whole issue as an inconvenience that hampered her relations with Germany which she in reality whished to develop on a commercial basis. In fact the contempt that the British in particular treated the Czechs is remarkable particularly in view of the eventual outcome. London’s so-called mediation in this affair was not what one would traditionally call mediation. As Christopher Thorne says it is difficult not to use the word servility when discussing the British dealings with the Germans over this affair. Halifax the British Foreign Minister, is said to have declared that the ‘greatest possible pressure’ was applied to Benes in order to get him to accommodate the Germans wishes. The mediation by London was in fact a sham with the British trying simply to keep the Germans happy with little interest in the Czechs opinions. The Germans measured the success of this method of exerting influence by whether or not they got the Sudetenland. One might say that despite the best efforts of the British to try to get the Czechs to give in it ultimately was a failure in May/June as the Czechs held out against the German.

This extract forms part of a document written by Baron Ernst von Wiezacker, State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry and sent to Dr Herbert Dirkson, German ambassador in London. The document notes that Germany believes in Britain’s good intentions in Prague but doubts British methods for achieving her aims. The document was written just after Hitler had decided to change the German plan to attack Czechoslovakia and a week before the Sudeten Germans presented their demands to the Czechoslovakian Government.

It should be noted that Dr Dirksen had only just taken up his position in London the month before and so he was still receiving a large amount of guidance from Berlin. Wiezacker refers to ‘British activity in the Czech affair’. By the time that the document was written the British were thoroughly convinced that they should side with the Sudeten Germans. Only the previous month their leader Henlein had made another visit to Britain to cultivate British contacts and the British Ambassador in Berlin had told the Germans that Britain was pushing for a settlement. Britain had warned Hitler on 21 May not invade Czechoslovakia but then backtracked fearing that its language was too direct.

Wiezacker notes that he is ‘convinced of British disinclination for a European war’. It is not suprising that the Germans realised this since the British had made little attempt to hide their position. Wiezacker is correct in his statement, the British made sure that the Czech situation would not trigger a European war when Halifax told France on 22 May that it could not count on British support if it supported the Czechoslovakian Government militarily. Halifax also outlined his vision to the Czech Minister in London of a ‘Swiss model’ of autonomy. Britain was also in no situation to fight a European war as even British opponents of appeasement realised.

The author doubts the effectiveness of the ‘British method of exerting influence in Prague’. This was a combination of mediation and bullying the Czech President Dr Benes into being more flexible. Chamberlain had not fully made up his mind over which course to take in May 1938. During the 20-22 May Crisis, Halifax warned Germany that Britain could become involved if they invaded Czechoslovakia. Yet on the other hand, Halifax accused Czechoslovakia of exagerating the German threat. The only point that remained constant was that the British Government thoroughly believed Henlein’s motives as genuine.

This extract is taken from a document from Count Frederich Schulenburg, the German ambassador in Moscow, to Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Minister for Foreign Affairs. The document recalls a conversation between Schulenburg and Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, when Schulenburg asked the latter whether there would be a European war and whether the Soviet Union would join in. The document is dated 26 August 1938, whilst the Czechoslovak talks were going on and a few days before the ‘Third Plan’ was proposed by the Prague Government.

The meaning of the extract revolves around the ‘questions of power politics’. Litvinov means that the USSR has an interest in keeping its options open and not allowing either the Anglo-French alliance or the German-Italian axis to become too big. The USSR still had a treaty promising to come to France’s aid if she defended Czechoslovakia. It is possible that the Russians were offended by the British coldness in not involving them more in negotiating the fate of the Sudentenland. A year later the USSR had no hesitation in abruptly switching sides to sign the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

Litvinov points out that the USSR has no responsibilities to Czechoslovakia, a composite state borne out of the Versailles Settlement, especially as they were not part of the League of Nations. Litvinov makes a crucial point in that the ‘new’ states had no real outside protection from attack. The reference to Versailles is to demonstrate to the Germans that the USSR is a free agent of both alliances. However, it may be a sidetrack when Litvinov knows well that the real issue is that the USSR would cause an explosive situation if they defended Czechoslovakia because they would have pas through either Poland or Rumania.

Litvinov is careful to underline the other side of his thinking by stressing that the USSR must ‘combat any increase in power of National Socialist Germany’. This would prevent Schulenburg going away to Berlin thinking that Germany was safe from Russian intervention. Although the USSR had no common borders with Germany, it had no desire to see German expansionism stretch to Poland. The opaque Soviet position is stark contrast to the activities of Lord Runciman who had done his best to meet all the German conditions for peace in Czechoslovakia.

Neurath mentions the issue of changing the ‘status quo’ and says that this came from Halifax. This is a reasonably accurate statement in that Halifax’s view was that some territorial readjustment was necessary, but it should seen in the context of a meeting with Hitler who refused to concede anything and hinted at war if Britain would not co-operate. Halifax’s view – one very much with Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister – was based on a feeling that the Versailles Settlement was unjust and unenforceable together with approach of realpolitik. There is no specific mention of Hitler’s philosophy that the East of Europe was a matter for Germany alone without British interference and they could keep the British Empire. This indicates that the talks with Hitler were reasonably vague in nature. Since Britain had promised to protect ‘independence of nationality’ it was not in Hitler’s interests to be specific. The general futures of ‘Danzig, Austria and Czechoslovakia’ were mentioned in the talks. All three of these territories were covered, albeit vaguely under the Versailles Settlement. Danzig had been removed from German control, Germany and Austria were banned from uniting and Czechoslovakia was a union of different nationalities, a result of the First World War. It is therefore not suprising that it was these countries which Hitler specifically raised when discussing change. Hitler had already voiced his view that Britain had given up on Czechoslovakia at the Hossbach Conference and this was an excellent opportunity to find out. ‘By peaceful development’ is a very ambiguous phrase and probably had different meanings to both sides. To Halifax it probably meant by mutual negotiation, and to Hitler it probably meant being allowed to take over territory without conceding anything in return. It is possible to see how Hitler could develop the idea that Britain was not prepared to go to war over Eastern Europe from such discussions.

The extract, which shows Hitler speaking throughout, mentions ‘our attacks on the Czechs and Austria’. The language has an air of inevitability about the two countries’ fate. The invasions of both countries are seen as short term gains for improving Germany’s military and political situation rather than part of a long-term solution to Germany’s lack of space. Both countries are needed by Hitler to increase the breathing space he has to provide land assets and room for military training. Neither countries are ends in themselves. Hitler points to an ‘Anglo-French-Italian war’ and connects the timing of those countries reactions to his expansion which points to the conclusion that he was an opportunist whose plans were subject to the behaviour of his enemies. Hitler seems to be confident that attacks on Austria and Czechoslovakia would not automatically spark the involvement of the western countries – seen in the last sentence – and this is a factor in his plans. Hitler also seem certain that at some point he must provoke Britain and France into war b