Patrick Greenough

Senior Lecturer in Logic and Metaphysics

Department of Philosophy, University of St. Andrews



Patrick is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy and Associate Fellow of the Arché Research Centre. For 2007-2008 he was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow for the Epistemic Warrant Project in the Philosophy Programme, RSSS, at The Australian National University. From September 2009 to August 2011, he will be a Research Fellow at the Centre for Time, University of Sydney. He received his PhD from St. Andrews in 2002. His main research interests are in the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of language, and epistemology. He has a particular interest in vagueness, the liar paradox, indeterminacy, contextualism, relativism, minimalism, realism, truth, anti-luck epistemology, self-knowledge, basic knowledge, discrimination, assertion, belief, representation, and, the nature of time.



Department of Philosophy, The Scores, University of St. Andrews,

St. Andrews, KY16 9AL, Scotland, UK

Email: ‘pmg2’ followed by ‘@’ followed by ‘’

Tel (international): 44 1334 462481

Tel (from UK): 01334 462481


Published and forthcoming papers: (comments welcome)

'Relativism, Assertion, and Belief' to appear in Assertion, edited by J. Brown and H. Cappelen, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Draft).

'Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox ', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming 2009. (Final draft)

'Hold the Context Fixed, Vagueness Still Remains' (with Jonas Åkerman), in Dietz and Moruzzi (eds) Cuts and Clouds: New Essays on Vagueness, forthcoming 2009. (Final draft)

'Vagueness and Non-Indexical Contextualism' (with Jonas Åkerman), in New Waves in the Philosophy of Language, edited by S. Sawyer, Aldershot: Ashgate, forthcoming 2008/2009. (Draft.)

'Indeterminate Truth', in Truth and Its Deformities, edited by Peter French, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, September 2008. (Final draft. The published article can be found here.)

'On what it is to be in a quandary', Synthese, 2008 (SpringerLink).

'Contextualism about Vagueness and Higher-Order Vagueness', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 2005 (Blackwells Synergy).

'Vagueness: A Minimal Theory', Mind, Volume 112, Issue 446, March 2003 (Ingenta Link, Oxford Journals).

'Free Assumptions and the Liar Paradox', American Philosophical Quarterly, 2001, 38: 2 (pdf).


Edited collections:

Williamson on Knowledge, (co-edited with Duncan Pritchard), Oxford: OUP, forthcoming, Sept 2009.

Truth and Realism, (co-edited with Michael P Lynch), Oxford: OUP, 2006.


Under review or in progress: (Comments welcome)

'Our Cognitive Homes' (Draft).

'The Open Future' (ms available on request).

'Deflationism and Indeterminacy', to appear in New Waves in the Philosophy of Truth, edited by Nikolaj Pedersen and Cory Wright, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009/10. (In progress)

'Observational Properties and Observational Knowledge' (ms available on request)

Truthmaker Gluts’, forthcoming in N. Pedersen and Cory D. Wright Truth and pluralism, Oxford: OUP. (In progress.)

‘How to be a Neo-Cartesian’, D. Stoljar and D. Smithies (eds), forthcoming.

'Contextualist Theories of Vagueness: a Critical Survey' (with Jonas Åkerman), Philosophy Compass, Blackwells, (In progress).




·          Truthmaker Gluts’, Conference on Truth and Pluralism, University of Connecticut, May 2009

·          ‘Relativism, Assertion, and Belief’, Workshop for The Pragmatic Foundations of Language Project, University of Sydney, Jan 21st 2009.

·          ‘Testing for Vagueness’, Workshop on The Psychology and Philosophy of Vagueness, November 21st-22nd 2008.

·          ‘Our Cognitive Homes’, SIFA, Bergamo, September 2008.

·          ‘Our Cognitive Homes’, Australasian Association of Philosophy Annual Conference, July 2008.

·          ‘Assertion’, Epistemology Workshop, ANU Kioloa Campus, NSW, Australia, 16th February 2008.

·          ‘The Open Future’, Australasian Association of Philosophy Annual Conference, New Zealand Division, Auckland, November 2007.

·          ‘Contextualist Theories of Vagueness’, Pamplona Workshop on Vagueness, Navarre, Spain, June 2007.

·          ‘Knowledge, Assertion, and Future Contingency’, Bled Conference on Epistemology, May 2007.

·          ‘The Future’, The Edinburgh Philosophy Society, 15th February 2007.

·          ‘Knowledge and Certainty: Reply to Stanley’, First Arché Basic Knowledge Workshop, 24th-25th November 2006.

·          ‘The Open Future’, Logic and Language Seminar,  University of Stockholm, 5th October 2006.

·          ‘Contextualist Theories of Vagueness’, Final Arché Workshop on Vagueness, 3-4th Nov 2006.

·          ‘The Open Future’, main speaker at Reasoning about Probability and Vagueness, Prague, Sept. 5th-8th 2006.

·          ‘The Open Future’, Joint Session of the Mind and Aristotelian Society, 7th-9th July 2006.

·          ‘The Open Future’, Scots Philosophical Club Annual Meeting, 6th May 2006.

·          ‘Truth-Maker Gaps’, Fifth European Congress for Analytic Philosophy, Lisbon, 27th–31st August 2005.

·          ‘Higher-order Vagueness’, Joint Session of the Mind and Aristotelian Society, 10th July 2005.

·          ‘Is Life a Lottery?’, Epistemology Workshop, University of Connecticut, 28th February 2005.

·          ‘Safety, Luck, and Lotteries’, Epistemology Seminar, Brown University, 25th February 2005.

·          ‘Truth-Maker Gaps’, Truth Seminar, University of Connecticut, February 16th, 2005.

·          ‘Truth-Maker Gaps’, The ad hoc Seminar, Free University of Berlin, January 23rd, 2005.

·          ‘Contextualism about Vagueness', Free University of Berlin, January 22nd 2005.

·          ‘Truth-Maker Gaps’, Conference on Metaphysics and Paradox, University of Leeds, 13th November 2004.

·          Commentator at Epistemological Contextualism, University of Stirling, 20th–21st March 2004.

·          ‘The Bearable Lightness of Knowing’, DeRose Workshop on Epistemology, Stirling, 15th March 2004.

·          ‘From Modalism to Fallibilism’, Pre-conference for Modalism and Mentalism, Denmark, 27-28th Jan 2004.

·          ‘From Mentalism to Fallibilism’, Pre-conference for Modalism and Mentalism, Denmark, 27-28th Jan 2004.

·          ‘Looks’, Workshop on Vagueness, Institute of Philosophy, University of Bologna, January 2004.

·          ‘Are We all Externalists Now? ’, NAMICONA workshop on epistemology, Kolding, Denmark, 5-7th December 2003.

·          ‘Why is the (Phenomenal) Sorites so Seductive?’, First Arché Workshop on Vagueness, 1st-2nd Sept 2003.

·          ‘Logic for Liars’, Recent Thoughts about the Liar, SUNY/Buffalo, 19th October 2002.

·          ‘Minimal Epistemology, Gettier cases, and Lucky Knowledge', The Limits of Knowledge, Berlin, 9th–10th July 2002. 

·          ‘The Minimal Theory of Vagueness’, Fourth European Congress for Analytic Philosophy, Sweden, June 2002.

·          ‘The Minimal Theory of Vagueness’, Workshop on Vagueness, University of Bologna, 22nd–24th November 2001.

·          ‘Margins for Error’, St. Andrews Reading Party, Raasay, Scotland, 25–27th May 2001.

·          ‘Minimal Margins for Error’, symposium on Tim Williamson’s Knowledge and Its Limits, given at the conference The Limits of Warrant, University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 18th–20th May 2001.

·          ‘Free Assumptions’, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Poland, 20-26th August, 1999.

·          ‘Anti-Realism and the Liar Paradox’, Logica ’99, Liblice, Czech Republic, 22-25th June, 1999.


Invited departmental presentations:


·          ‘Relativism, Assertion and Belief’, Institute for Philosophy, London, February 12th 2009.

·          ‘Relativism, Assertion and Belief’, ANU, January 13th 2009.

·          ‘Our Cognitive Homes’, University of Nottingham, 19th November 2008.

·          ‘Our Cognitive Homes’, University of Leeds, 30th October 2008.

·          ‘Relativism, Assertion, and Knowledge’, University of Sydney, August 5th 2008.

·          ‘The Open Future’, University of Sydney, March 2008.

·          ‘Our Cognitive Homes’, PhilSoc, RSSS, ANU, 29th January 2008.

·          ‘The Open Future’, Philosophy Seminar at RSSS, ANU, 20th September 2007.

·          ‘The Open Future’ Logos Seminar Series, University of Barcelona, May 2007.

·          Fallibilism’, University of Stockholm, December 2006.

·          ‘The Open Future’, Central European University, November 2006.

·          ‘The Open Future’, University of Sheffield, 3rd November 2006.

·          ‘Phenomenal Continua’, NYU, 4th March 2005.

·          ‘Phenomenal Continua’, Ohio State University, February 2005.

·          ‘Phenomenal Continua’, University of Connecticut, February 2005.

·          ‘Knowledge: A Minimal Theory’, University of Leeds, 11th March, 2004.

·          ‘Phenomenal Continua’, University of Bristol, 5th March 2004.

·          ‘Looks’, University of Stirling, 19th February 2004.

·          ‘Phenomenal Continua’, University of Edinburgh, 13th February 2004.

·          ‘Phenomenal Continua’, University of Glasgow, 21st October 2003.

·          ‘The Title of this Paper is Not Meaningful’, University of Aberdeen, 12th December 2002.

·          ‘Minimal Epistemology’, University of Bristol, 14th November 2001.