Arché, AHRC Centre for the Philosophy of Logic, Language, Mathematics and Mind
Department of Logic and Metaphysics
University of St Andrews
ez4 at st-andrews dot ac dot uk
Elia in his office (picture taken by Sònia Roca)
Welcome to my website! I am a PhD student at the University of St Andrews in the Department of Logic and Metaphysics and member of Arché. I did my undergraduate study in philosophy, mathematics and history at the Universities of Padua, Venice and Berlin (TU). I graduated from Venice with a thesis on semantic externalism under the supervision of Prof. L. Perissinotto (2003). I then came to St Andrews to do my PhD study under the supervision of Prof. C. Wright.
My main interests lie in theoretical philosophy. In particular, I work in formal and philosophical logic, philosophy of language, epistemology and metaphysics. I'm also interested in philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science and history of logic and philosophy (west and east). My PhD dissertation will be on Vagueness: Its Nature, Source and Logic.
For more information on my academic career, please see my CV. For some nice pictures of me and friends, please see here.
• ‘Two Diamonds Are More Than One. Transitivity and the Factivity of Feasible Knowability’, forthcoming in Keiff, L., Marion, M., Rahman, S. (eds), Anti-Realism in the Abstract Sciences, Springer, Berlin.
• (with D. López de Sa) ‘Truthmakers, Knowledge, and Paradox’, forthcoming in Analysis.
• 2007, Review of Stefano Predelli’s Contexts, 2R 5, pp. 1–17.
• 2007 (with S. Moruzzi), ‘Conseguenza logica’, in Coliva, A. (ed.), Filosofia analitica. Temi e problemi, Carocci, Roma, pp. 157–94.
• 2006, ‘Higher-Order Vagueness and Paradox: The Glory and Misery of S4 Definiteness’, in Paradox: Logical, Cognitive and Communicative Aspects. Proceedings of the First International Symposium of Cognition, Logic and Communication. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, Vol. 1 (eds. Skilters J., Eklund M., Jónsson Ó.P., Wiegand, O.K.), University of Latvia Press, Riga, pp. 203–20.
• 2006, ‘Squeezing and Stretching: How Vagueness Can Outrun Borderlineness’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106, pp. 421–8.
• 2006, (with D. López de Sa), ‘Does This Sentence Have No Truth Maker?’, Analysis 66, pp. 154–7.
• ‘From Vagueness to Response-Dependence and Back Again’.
• ‘A Paradox of Higher-Order Vagueness’.
• ‘Red and Orange’.
• ‘Seconde Naïveté’.
• ‘A Model of Tolerance ’.
• ‘Tolerant Logics ’.
• ‘Following-from and Transitivity’.
• ‘Forced March in the Penumbra’.
• ‘Black Boxes: The Semantics and Logic of Obliterative Modalities’.
• ‘Truth, Demonstration, and Knowledge. A Solution to the Paradox of Knowability’.
• ‘Reflecting on Bradley’s Regress’.
• ‘Everything You Say Is False!’.
• ‘Quantifiers without Domain’.
• ‘Logical Consequence and the Preservation of Truth’.
• ‘Bradwardine's Theorem in a Relevant Framework’.
• ‘Knowledge-How, True Indexical Belief, and Action’.
• ‘A Counterexample to Sphere Semantics for Subjunctive Conditionals’.
• ‘Some (Constructive) Reflections on (Higher-Order) Vagueness, Borderlineness, and Definiteness’, GAP 6 on Philosophy: Foundations and Applications, Free University of Berlin 13/09/2006.
• ‘Models of Tolerance’, Prague International Colloquium on Uncertainty: Reasoning about Probability and Vagueness, University of Prague, 08/09/2006.
• ‘Black Boxes: The Semantics and Logic of Obliterative Modalities’, Studia Logica International Conference Trends in Logic IV: Towards Mathematical Philosophy, University of Torun, 03/09/2006.
• ‘Truth and What Is Said’, Joint Session 2006 of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, University of Southampton, 09/07/2006.
• ‘Black Boxes: The Semantics and Logic of Obliterative Modalities’, International Colloquium on (Anti-)Realisms, Logic and Metaphysics, University of Nancy 2, 01/07/2006.
• ‘A Paradox of Higher-Order Vagueness’, Workshop on Vagueness, University of Freibourg, Ovronnaz 26/06/2006.
• ‘Truth and What Is Said’, Graduate Philosophy Conference on Thoughts, Words, Objects, University of Texas at Austin, 15/04/2006.
• ‘Truth and What Is Said’, Intermountain West Student Philosophy Conference, University of Utah, 01/04/2006.
• ‘If Every (True) Proposition Is Knowable, Then Every Believed (Decidable) Proposition Is True, or the Incompleteness of the Intuitionistic Solution to the Paradox of Knowability’, Graduate Student Conference in Epistemology, University of Miami, 21/01/2006
• ‘Some (Constructive) Reflections on (Higher-Order) Vagueness, Borderlineness, and Definiteness’, The First International Symposium of Cognition, Logic and Communication on Paradox: Logical, Cognitive and Communicative Aspects, Latvia University, 04/11/2005.
• ‘From Vagueness to Response-Dependence and Back Again’, ECAP 2005, Lisbon University, 31/08/2005.
• ‘A Paradox of Higher-Order Vagueness’, NPAPC 2005, York University, 15/07/2005.
• ‘Squeezing and Stretching: How Vagueness Can Outrun Borderlineness’, Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Manchester University, 09/07/2005.
• ‘From Vagueness to Response-Dependence and Back Again’, Workshop on Response-Dependence, Turku University, 16/05/2005.
• ‘Squeezing and Stretching. Some Reflections on Vagueness, Definiteness and Borderlineness’, SEFA Conference, Murcia University, 16/12/2004.
• ‘Some Reflections on Vagueness, Definiteness and Borderlineness’, SIFA Conference on Analytic Philosophy and European Culture, Genoa University, 24/09/2004.
Last update: August 7, 2007