PY3102 Handout 9:
Internalism about Reasons: Internalism about reasons is the view that for a person to have a reason for action, that reason must be able to motivate to act. Consider the simplest version of this:
(A) A consideration C is a reason for f-ing only if f-ing would satisfy at least one of our present set of desires D.
This is what Williams calls the sub-humean model of reasons. Williams own highly influential version goes like this:
(B) A consideration C is a reason for f-ing only if f-ing would satisfy at least one of the desires that would develop from our present desire set D through a sound deliberative route.
Foot: Hypothetical Imperatives and Morality: Foot argues that moral considerations cannot give you reasons for action, unless acting in light of them satisfies a desire we already possess. Her view is then (A) above.
Her argument for this is that there are no grounds for thinking that moral obligations are any different from rules of etiquette. Both state obligations that seem unconditional: they say there are things one must do, independent of what we happen to desire. Since the latter clearly do not give us reasons for acting in accordance with them without a pre-existent desire to do so, then neither do the former.
1) Moral requirements are objective only if they give each person a reason to act in accordance with them.
2) A consideration C is a reason for f-ing only if f-ing would satisfy one of our desires.
3) Moral requirements give each person a reason to act in accordance with them only if doing so would satisfy one of her desires.
4) Often, we do not desire to act as morality tells us to.
5) Therefore, moral requirements do not give each person a reason to act in accordance with them.
6) Therefore, moral requirements are not objective.
Now, this is can be taken as a reductio. If so, then we’ll have to decide which premise to reject. Externalists about reasons would deny (2). But so would Thomas Nagel, who is an internalist. The key to his internalism is his view that though reasons are connected to desires, once we understand the role of desires in reasons, we will see no problem with accepting internalism and moral objectivity.
Nagel: Motivated vs. Unmotivated Desires:
There is a difference between the thing motivates you and your being motivated by that thing. Discussions of the relationship between reasons and motivation often confuse these things. To see why, consider desires. Is your desiring to satisfy your hunger the thing that motivates you to act, or is it the hunger that does so? Plausibly, it’s the latter- hunger motivates, your desire to then satisfy that hunger just is your being motivated by that hunger.
Suppose we accept internalism about reasons, the view that one only has a reason to f if one is motivated to f, or would do so if one where rational, etc. Even if we accept this, we still need to decide whether we have reasons because we have desires, or whether we have those desires because we have these reasons. Nagel believes that in some cases, the former is true. In others, the latter. Moral considerations are supposed to fall into this latter category. In the case of morality, it is not that we have moral reasons because we have an antecedent desire to act morally. Rather, recognizing that we have these reasons motivates rational agents to act in accordance with them, independent of any desire that is already present. When these agents do act, we can trivially say that they desired to do so. But the desire here is not the motivating fact.