The Explanatory Problem [EP]: For us to have reason to believe anything exists independently of us, we must be able to be in causal contact with it. This means that it must be able to figure in causal explanations of our perceptions, beliefs, or actions. If we are to believe that anything plays this role, then the best explanation of some sensation, belief, or action must be that it was caused by that thing. But in the case of morality, all of our “perceptions,” beliefs, and actions are better explained as being caused by our psychologies and social backgrounds rather than by any moral facts.
Railton’s paper is usefully read as a response to the EP. Like Boyd, he denies that moral facts are intrinsically action-guiding. Also, like Boyd he identifies moral facts with natural facts. In a move similar to Boyd’s he identifies them with facts about our objective interests. He claims that these facts can causal explain both individual and collective action. More on this below:
Railton buys the instrumental theory of reasons. On this view, we only have a reason to do something if it will achieve one of our goals. Since we may not have the goal of acting in a way that is morally justified, we may not have any reason to act this way. This is why our moral beliefs are not intrinsically action-guiding.
Non-Moral Goodness and Moral Norms:
Non-Moral Goodness/Value:
Relational Properties: Consider sweetness. The fact that a candy tastes sweet to me is explained by the fact that there are qualities in the candy that cause certain experiences in me given my sensory system. As such, sweetness is a relational property. Sweetness is a matter of the relationship between objects and my senses. If we focus only on the properties of the object that cause my reactions, and on those properties of mine that allow me to be affected by it, these together constitute the reduction basis of sweetness. Many think that relational properties are not metaphysically basic. Instead, the basic properties in the world are properties of particular things and properties “produced” by the interaction of those particulars. Thus, if we want to reduce a relational property to non-relational properties, we do it by determining its reduction base.
Subjective Interest: What an agent A happens to want. This is a relational property, in that it involves a relation between objects and the wants its causes.
Objectified Subjective Interest: Define A+ as A if she had full rationality and information. A’s objectified subjective interest is what A+ would want A to want in A’s circumstances. In other words, it is what Ideal-A would desire that the present, Non-Ideal A desire. (It is not what Ideal-A would desire for Ideal-A, since this might not be very good for poor, Non-Ideal A.) This is also a relational property, in that it consists in a relationship between objects and the fact that A+ would want that A want them.
Objective Interest: This is the reduction base of objectified subjective interests. This is the want Ideal-Me would want me to have, as well as those things that Ideal-Me would want me to want.
The Role of Objective Interests/Goodness in the Explanation of Action: As we learn more about our environment and ourselves, and as we increase in reflective power, our wants more and more closely approximate our objective interests. Since our objective interests are what is good for us, this means that our wants more and more closely approximate what is good for us. This is what Railton calls the want/interest mechanism. If this mechanism exists, and NMG is true, then facts about goodness can explain what we come to want and, ultimately, to do. This is the beginning of a reply to the EP.
Moral Norms: Ought statements justified from the point of view of everyone. This point of view is impartial, in the sense that it takes equally the objective interests of all. If our interactions are consistent with these norms, then our society is rational. Otherwise, it is irrational.
The Role of Moral Norms in the Explanation of Action: The further a society departs from the ideal where each person’s interests are treated equally, the more likely it is that those whose interests are being sacrificed will dissent and rebel. This will put pressure on the society to reach some sort of equilibrium where interests are treated more equally than before. But the process is likely to repeat itself until the society is as it ought to be, and so is socially rational. Railton believes that this mechanism explains the moral progress of societies. Thus, the fact that a society is not as it ought to be causes it to become more like it should be. Here we here the rest of the reply to EP. Moral facts do causal explanatory work.