The Basic Knowledge Project at the Arché Research Centre at the St Andrews University will be hosting a major conference on 13-14 June. The conference theme will be contemporary perspectives on scepticism.

Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism

Philosophical sceptics have long argued for very radical claims. For instance, sometimes they argue that the evidence of our senses cannot discriminate against possible scenarios in which our surroundings are radically different from the way we believe them to be, and that this implies that our beliefs about them are not knowledgeable (and possibly even unjustified and irrational). To yield to such conclusions would clearly have dramatic implications for how one viewed science and other intellectual endeavours, as well as the nature of human rationality.

How to evaluate the best arguments for scepticism has been and remains a central question in philosophy. This is due to the fact that assessing such arguments requires one to consider pivotal issues in epistemology (e.g. the nature of evidence, the structure of justification, the relation between knowledge and inference) and in other areas of philosophy as well (e.g. the nature of sensory experience in the philosophy of perception and the external determinants of content in the philosophy of mind and language). This intertwining of sceptical arguments with fundamental philosophical issues is prominent in recent work on scepticism. Indeed, very interestingly, several views at the centre of the contemporary epistemological debate (e.g. contextualism, various forms of modal epistemology, dogmatism, knowledge-first approaches and entitlement theories) have at least in part been motivated and defended on the grounds of their ability to diagnose what is wrong with sceptical arguments, and in so doing they have advanced challenging theses about, respectively, the context sensitivity of ‘knows’, the strength of the modal connection between a knowledgeable belief and its truth, the preconditions for perceptual justification, the extent of one’s evidence and the existence of a non-evidential kind of warrant.

We are planning a major conference to investigate and assess the contribution of these and other contemporary trends to our understanding of scepticism. We will have seven talks by leading researchers of the subject. We will also have four selected talks by graduate students, thereby bringing together established figures with up-and-coming philosophers.

Keynote Speakers and Respondents

This conference is part of the AHRC funded Basic Knowledge Project.

We gratefully acknowledge the support of the Analysis Trust, the Mind Association, the Royal Society of Edinburgh and the Scots Philosophical Club.

Graduate Student Call for Papers

There will be four 30 minute talks delivered by graduate students, followed by 20 minutes for questions. Papers should address a question related to scepticism, such as (but not limited to) the following:

• What are the best arguments for scepticism?
• Are different sceptical arguments truly different, or is there a core sceptical thought underlying many or all of them?
• What is their potency?
• Do they depend on any controversial assumptions in areas of philosophy outside epistemology (e.g. assumptions about perceptual content)?
• Which contemporary theories provide the best resources for addressing scepticism?
• What consequences do specific treatments of scepticism have for other epistemological questions?

Please send us your paper via e-mail () by 15 March, 2009. Papers should be made suitable for blind refereeing and be no longer than 4,000 words. You will be notified of acceptance by 15 April.

Students whose papers are accepted will have their accommodation covered. We might also be able to cover the cost of travel, depending on budgetary details.

For further details, contact Dylan Dodd () or Elia Zardini ().