My research is largely focused on questions about the structure of normativity, including the nature of central normative concepts like reasons, ought, and requirement, and the relationships between them. Most of my work so far has defended contrastive theories of these concepts. The basic idea of a contrastive theory of a normative concept is that whether the agent ought to or is required to perform a given action, or whether some consideration is a reason for the agent to perform the action, depends on which deliberative question, conceived of as a set of alternatives, we are asking.
A newer project is to examine the relationships between pro tanto or contributory normative concepts, like reasons, and all things considered or overall normative concepts, like ought or requirement. Some central questions here involve the idea of the weight of reasons and of competition between reasons.
Here is a list of publications and works in progress. If there's no link, feel free to email me for a draft.
BookNotre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
I talked about the book on the New Books in Philosophy podcast here.
'Reasons For and Reasons Against', forthcoming in Philosophical Studies
'Time-Slice Rationality and Filling In Plans' (2017), for a symposium on Brian Hedden's Reasons Without Persons in Analysis, 77(3): 595-607
'Reasons, Oughts, and Requirements' (2016), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 11, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau (penultimate version)
'Deontic Reasoning Across Contexts' (2014), Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: DEON 2014, edited by Cariani, Grossi, Meheus, and Parent. Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 208-223
'One Ought too Many', with Stephen Finlay (2014), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89(1): 102-124
'Reason Claims and Contrastivism about Reasons' (2013), Philosophical Studies 166(2): 231-242
'Contrastive Semantics for Deontic Modals' (2012), in Contrastivism in Philosophy, edited by Martijn Blaauw. Routledge, 116-133
Encyclopedia entries, book reviews, etc.
Review of Weighing Reasons, edited by Errol Lord and Barry Maguire, Ethics, 128(1): 255-260, 2017
'Oughts and Options'
'Reasons and Practical Inquiry'
My dissertation is a precursor to my book project. I argue that several phenomena involving reasons come together to support an attractive contrastive theory of reasons. I also show that this theory has interesting upshots in normative philosophy. (Please email me for a copy.)