Derek Ball Me, Barcelona
ArchéUniversity of St Andrews • db71 at st-andrews dot ac dot uk
I am a lecturer in the philosophy departments at the University of St Andrews. I work on topics spread widely through philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology.
"Could Women Be Analytically Oppressed?" forthcoming in Alexis Burgess, David Plunkett, and Herman Cappelen, eds., Conceptual Ethics and Conceptual Engineering, Oxford University Press.
"Semantics as Measurement" forthcoming in Brian Rabern and Derek Ball, eds., The Science of Meaning, Oxford University Press.
"Relativism, Metasemantics, and the Future" forthcoming in Inquiry, special issue edited by Henry Jackman.
"What Are We Doing When We Theorise About Context Sensitivity?" forthcoming in Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism.
"No Help on the Hard Problem" Animal Sentience 2016.149.
"Indexicality, Transparency, and Mental Files." Inquiry 58.4 (2015), pp. 353-367.
"Two-Dimensionalism and the Social Character of Meaning." Erkenntnis 79 Supplement 3 (2014), pp. 567-595.
(with Bryan Pickel) "One Dogma of Millianism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88.1 (2014), pp. 70-92.
"Critical Notice: Derk Pereboom, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism". Analytic Philosophy 55.1 (2014), pp. 118-129.
"Consciousness and Conceptual Mastery." Mind 122.486 (2013), pp. 497-508.
"Property Identities and Modal Arguments." Philosophers' Imprint 11.13 (2011).
"There Are No Phenomenal Concepts." Mind, 118.472 (2009), pp. 935-962.
Orthodoxy among contemporary philosophers of mind has it that phenomenal concepts provide the key to understanding many disputes between physicalists and their opponents. I deny that there are phenomenal concepts. My arguments exploit the sort of considerations that are typically used to motivate externalism about mental content. Although physicalists often appeal to phenomenal concepts to defend their view against the knowledge argument, I argue that this is a mistake. The knowledge argument depends on phenomenal concepts; if there are no phenomenal concepts, then the knowledge argument fails.
"Twin-Earth Externalism and Concept Possession." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85.3 (2007), pp. 457 - 472.
Review of Howard Robinson, From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance: Resurrecting the Mind, Cambridge University Press, 2016. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2016.08.37.
Review of Max Deutsch, The Myth of the Intuitive, MIT Press 2015. forthcoming in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Review of Alexis Burgess and Brett Sherman, eds., Metasemantics, OUP 2014. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2015.08.39.
"Where When Truth Gives Out Gives Out". Protosociology Reviews.
Review of Mark Richard, When Truth Gives Out, OUP 2008.
Audio and Video
"Thought Experiments as Questions", given at CSMN (Oslo), 02/2011.
"The New New Mysterianism", given at Consciousness Online 2009 (with comments by James Dow and David Papineau)
A talk on whether physicalism requires apriori entailment, given at a methodology workshop in Austin.
Philosophical Aesthetics, a blog about modern art in philosophy book covers.