1.14 Dependent institutio is that which depends on an act of use, for example, $A$ may be instituted to signify the first thing to be proposed (p. 38) by me. One rule given for dependent institutio is this:

Dependent institutio should only be admitted on condition

and in this way many sophisms are solved.

1.15 Suppose $A$ signifies the first thing to be proposed by me. This is possible, because $A$ can signify that I am sitting, and this can be the first thing proposed by me. Given this institutio, I first propose: $A$ is false, and I ask whether $A$ is false or true. If true, then the first thing proposed by me is true and this is that $A$ is false. So it is true that $A$ is false, so $A$ is false. Hence from the beginning, if $A$ is true, $A$ is false. But on the contrary, if $A$ is false, then it is true that $A$ is false, so the first thing proposed by me is true, and $A$ is the first thing proposed by me, so $A$ is true. So if $A$ is false, $A$ is true.

1.16 Solution: this expression ‘$A$ is instituted to signify the first thing to be proposed by me’ should be admitted on this condition, that what is first proposed is something which $A$ can signify. But it is the case that $A$ cannot signify that $A$ is false.

1.17 Another sophism: let $A$ be a name of you if the first thing proposed is true, and the name of someone else if the first thing proposed is false. Then this is proposed: You are not $A$. Then it is asked whether you are $A$ or not $A$. If you are $A$, then the first thing proposed by me is false, so $A$ is not a name of you, so you are not $A$. Hence, if you are $A$, you are not $A$. But on the contrary, if you are not $A$, then the first thing proposed by me is true, so $A$ is a name of you, so you are $A$. Hence, if you are not $A$, you are $A$.

1.18 Solution: the institutio should be admitted only on condition that ‘$A$ is a name of you’ may stand with what is first proposed. But these cannot stand together: ‘$A$ is a name of you’ and ‘You are not $A$’.
1.19 Another similar sophism: let A be the first moment in which a falsehood is proposed. Then this is proposed: It is A. Either you grant it or you deny it. If you grant it, and A is that moment in which a falsehood is proposed, then 'It is A is false, so it is not A. Hence, if you grant that it is A, you should grant that it is not A. If you say that it is not A, then 'It is A’ was false when it was proposed, but when a falsehood is proposed, then it is A. So, if it is not A, it is A. And the question can always be posed for the time of utterance.

1.20 Solution: the institutio should be admitted on the condition that ‘It is not A’ may stand with what is first proposed, but these cannot stand together: ‘It is A’ and ‘It is not A’.

1.21 Another sophism about the act of appollating: let A appelleate every utterance which is similar to the opposite of the antecedent of the first conditional to be proposed by me. Then I construct this inference: if A is true, something is true. And I ask whether A is true or not. If A is true, then something similar to the opposite of the antecedent of the conditional made by me is true, so the opposite of the antecedent of the conditional made by me is true, and this is: A is not true. So A is not true. Hence, if A is true, A is not true. If A is not true, then something similar to the opposite of the antecedent of the conditional made by me is not true, so the opposite of the antecedent is not true. So the antecedent is true, and the antecedent is: A is true. So ‘A is true’ is true, so A is true. Hence, if A is not true, A is true.

1.22 The solution is the same as before.

[Of Synonyms]

1.23 Another difficulty is where many names are imposed on the same thing, as happens in synonyms. For example: let ‘Mark’ and ‘Tully’ be names of the same person, and this you doubt, and do not know whose name is ‘Mark’, and you know that he is running, and you know whose name is ‘Tully’. Then you know Mark is running, and Mark is Tully, so you know Tully is running. And further, then you know who is called ‘Tully’. But it was posited that you (p. 40) do not know it.

1.24 Solution: ‘You know Tully is running’ is multiplex, because either it signifies that you know de dicto that Tully is running, and that is false, nor does the inference made hold. Or it signifies that you know of him who is Tully that he is running, and this can be true even though you do not know what is signified by this term ‘Tully’, just as an
ordinary person knows that a man is running but does not know what is signified by this name ‘homo’.

1.25 This clarifies the solution of this: You know that Tully is called ‘Mark’, so you know that Mark is called ‘Tully’. For if it means that you know de dicto that Tully is called ‘Mark’, then the inference holds, supposing that you know these to convert: ‘Mark is called “Tully”’ and ‘Tully is called “Mark”’. But if it means that you know de re of Tully, that he is called ‘Mark’, then it does not follow: you know Tully is called ‘Mark’, so you know that Mark is called ‘Tully’. Similarly, it does not follow: you know Tully is Tully, so you know Tully is called by this name ‘Tully’. Similarly, it does not always follow: A is called B, so B is called A. Counterexample: some man is called ‘Mark’, so Mark is called ‘some man’, in that the verb ‘called’ requires a proper name after it.

1.26 Again, let ‘Mark’ and ‘Tully’ be names of the same person, and this you doubt, and it is proposed: Mark is called ‘Tully’ or something doubtful is proposed to you. Either you grant it or you deny it or you respond doubtfully. If you grant it, and not the disjunct ‘Mark is called “Tully”’, then this disjunct ‘something doubtful is proposed to you’, so you grant something doubtful, not being obliged to, so badly. If you deny it, you have to deny that Mark is called ‘Tully’, because whoever denies a disjunction has to deny each of its parts, and thus you deny something doubtful to you, so badly. If you respond doubtfully, then this is true: ‘something doubtful is proposed to you’. So the disjunction is true, and this you know well, so you respond doubtfully to a truth known to be true, so badly. (p. 41)

1.27 Solution: it must be responded doubtfully to this disjunction, nor is this valid: you respond doubtfully to this disjunction, so you respond doubtfully to a truth known to be true.

…
Now we come to conjunctive position. Conjunctive position is positing many things together or positing a conjunctive proposition. But if no position of this sort is simple, it is, however, simple in its genus, whence it receives a differentia like this: of conjunctive positiones some are simple and some are composite. It is called simple when what is posited is a conjunction each of whose parts is simple.

For example, let this conjunction be posited: you grant that you respond badly and no obligation is put to you. Then, ‘You respond badly’ [is proposed]. It is false, and it does not seem to follow, so it should be denied. Then ‘You grant that you respond badly’ [is proposed]. (3.111) That follows from the positum, so it should be granted. Then, ‘You respond well’ [is proposed]. That follows because if you grant that you respond badly, and do not respond badly, then you respond well. Then, ‘No obligation is put to you’ [is proposed]. This follows from the positum, so it should be granted. Then, ‘You respond badly’ [is proposed]. If you grant it, you have granted and denied the same thing, so badly. If you deny it, you deny what follows, because it follows: you grant that you respond badly, you respond well, and no obligation is put to you, so it is true that you respond badly, so you respond badly.

Solution: some say that ‘You respond badly’ when first proposed must be granted, because it follows. This is proved because if (p. 69) no obligation is put to you, and you grant that you respond badly, either you respond well or badly. If badly, we have what was proposed. If well, then you have responded badly. This is proved because if you grant that you respond badly, no obligation having been put to you, and you respond well, then it is true that you respond badly.

Against this it is argued: it is proved that it does not follow: you grant it, and you respond well, and no obligation is put to you, so it is true. For let it be posited that A is ‘You respond negatively’. It does not follow: you grant A, responding well, and no obligation is put to you, so A is true. But the opposite follows, for if you grant A, responding well, you respond affirmatively, so it is not true that you respond negatively, so A is not true.
3.114 One should reply otherwise, having admitted the *positum*, by denying ‘You respond badly’ when it is proposed, [for] it does not follow: you grant that you respond badly, and respond well, no obligation having been put to you, so it is true that you respond badly. So it does not follow: you grant something, no obligation having been put to you, and you respond well, so it is true. Also this is not valid: you grant a truth known to be true, and no obligation is put to you, so you respond well. Nor is it valid: you deny A, responding well, and no obligation is put to you, so A is false. Nor is it valid: you grant a falsehood known to be false, no obligation having been put to you, so you respond badly. Nor is it valid: you deny a falsehood known to be false, and no obligation is put to you, so you respond well. Nor is it valid: you grant A, no obligation having been put to you, and you respond badly, so A is false.

3.115 In each of these we must add: ‘known to be such’ for the instant for which you grant or deny.

3.116 Objection to the first argument: suppose you have granted ‘You are an ass’, then, if you see you have responded badly, and if ‘You respond badly’ were proposed to you, then you should grant it. Then let C be the instant when you grant it, and let B be the instant of its utterance. Then I argue thus: at C you grant that you respond badly, and you respond well, yet at C it is false that you respond badly. But (p. 70) it is true at the instant at which it is granted, namely, at B.

3.117 So it is manifest that when the premises are true at some instant at which the conclusion is not true, the inference is not valid.

3.118 Objection to the second argument: at C you grant this utterance, ‘You respond badly’. At C it is true, and at C it is true that no obligation is put to you, but at C it is false that you respond badly, in that every response is for the time of the judgement, and the judgement for the time of utterance. And so every response is for the time of utterance.

3.119 Another sophism: suppose this conjunction is posited: ‘That you are running is posited and you are not running’. And suppose in fact that you are not running is the *positum*. Then, let it be proposed that ‘You are not running’ is the *positum*. This should be granted, because it is true and irrelevant. Then it should be granted that you are not running, for it follows and so it should be granted. Then, ‘That you are running is the *positum’ [is proposed]. It follows from what was posited, so it should be granted. Then, ‘That you are not running is inconsistent with the *positum’ [is
proposed]. This follows, so it should be granted. Then, ‘That you are not running should be denied’ [is proposed]. It follows, since what is inconsistent with the positum should be denied. Then ‘That you are not running should not be granted’ [is proposed]. If you grant it, you grant opposites. If you deny it, you deny what follows, because it follows: that you are not running should be denied, so that you are not running should not be granted.

3.120 Solution: let everything be granted up to this: ‘That you are not running should not be granted’. This should be denied, nor is this valid: that you are not running should be denied, so that you are not running should not be granted. But what does follow is: that you are not running should be denied, so that you are not running should not be granted by him by whom it has been denied, as is manifest in similar cases. [For] it does not follow: he is a son, so he is not a father. But what does follow is: he is a son, so he is not the father of him whose son he is.

3.121 Sometimes a composite conjunction is posited. A conjunction is called composite when it does not have simply atomic parts, but is composed of two molecular propositions, or of one atomic and one molecular. And whenever a conjunction is posited, whether simple or composite, it must be seen whether some part of this conjunction is impossible, and then such positio should only be admitted (p. 71) in impossible positio. But if each part is possible, it must be seen whether they are compossible or not compossible. And if incompatible, the positio should not be admitted in this [kind of] positio. But if the parts are possible and compossible, any such positio should be admitted. In this way, the solution of this sophism is manifest:

3.122 Let A be that I am running and that you respond to a falsehood, and B be that I am speaking with you and you only respond to A. Now let it be posited that A and B are true. Then, ‘A is true’ [is proposed]. That follows so it should be granted. Then, ‘You respond to a falsehood’ [is proposed]. That similarly follows. Then, ‘You only respond to A’ [is proposed]. That also follows from what is posited. Then, ‘A is false’ [is proposed]. If you grant it, you grant opposites. If you deny it, you deny what follows, for it follows: you respond to a falsehood, and you only respond to A, so A is false.

3.123 Another sophism where a simple conjunction is posited: let A be that you respond to a falsehood, and B be that you only respond to A. And let it be posited that A and B are true. Once this is posited, it follows that A is true and A is false, as is manifest.

1 See §§3.179 ff.
The solution of each is that neither positio should be admitted because the parts of each conjunction are incompatible.

Another sophism: let A be that Socrates is healthy or that you should grant that Socrates is healthy. And let B be that Socrates is sick or that you should grant a falsehood. Let it be posited that A and B are true. Then, ‘You are only obliged by A and B’ [is proposed]. This is true and irrelevant, so it should be granted. Then, ‘You are only obliged by a truth’ [is proposed]. That follows from the positum with what has been granted. Then, ‘You are not obliged by some falsehood’ [is proposed]. That follows in the same way. Then, ‘You should not grant a falsehood’ [is proposed]. That follows because if you are not obliged by a falsehood, you should not grant a falsehood. Then, ‘Socrates is sick’ [is proposed]. That follows because if one part of a disjunction is denied it is necessary to grant the other. Then, ‘You should grant a falsehood’ [is proposed]. (p. 72) If you grant it, you grant opposites. If you deny it, you deny what follows because it follows: Socrates is not healthy and you should grant that Socrates is healthy, so you should grant a falsehood.

Some say that ‘You are only obliged by A and by B’ should be denied, because it is inconsistent, since from this and the positum something inconsistent with the positum follows. For it follows: A and B are true, and you are only obliged by A and by B, so you are only obliged by truths, and so you should not grant a falsehood. But the opposite of this follows from the positum.

One should reply otherwise, by denying ‘You should not grant something false’ when it is proposed, for it does not follow: you are not obliged by a falsehood, so you should not grant a falsehood; because you can grant a falsehood even if no obligation has been made to you and yet respond well, as was manifest above.

Now we come to indeterminate positio. Indeterminate positio is of two kinds, either when an expression is posited disjunctly, or when either part is posited disjunctly. When a disjunction is posited, then it is positio of a disjunction, but when either part of a disjunction is posited, then it is disjunction of positio.

And first we should see how to respond when a disjunction is posited. Now if a disjunction is posited, we should see whether each part is necessary, and then each part should be granted whenever it is proposed; or whether each part is impossible, and then it should be admitted only in impossible positio. But if one part is possible
and the other impossible, the possible part should be granted whenever it is proposed, and in this way the solution of this sophism is manifest:

3.130 Let this disjunction, ‘You are running or you are an ass’, be posited. Then, ‘You are running’ is proposed. This seems to be false and irrelevant, so it should be denied. Then, ‘You are an ass’ [is proposed]. If you grant it, you grant what is impossible, in a possible positio. If you deny it, you deny what follows from the positum and (p. 73) the opposite of what has been properly denied, because it follows: you are running or you are an ass, but you are not running, so you are an ass.

3.131 The solution is manifest, for since ‘You are an ass’ is impossible, ‘You are running’ should be granted whenever it is proposed, unless the contrary is sought.

3.132 But if the parts are possible, then either they are [mutually] relevant or irrelevant. If relevant, so that one part follows from the other, the one that follows should be granted whenever it is proposed, because if what follows is denied, it is necessary to deny what implies it, and so it would be necessary to deny the disjunction which is posited. In this way the solution of this sophism is manifest:

3.133 Suppose ‘You respond badly or the decision has gone against you’ is posited. And ‘You respond badly’ is proposed. This seems to be false and does not follow, so it should be denied. Once denied, ‘The decision has gone against you’ is proposed. This follows from the positum and the opposite of what has been denied. Then, ‘You respond badly’ [is proposed]. If you grant it, you have granted and denied the same thing, so badly. If you deny it, you deny what follows, because it follows: the decision has gone against you, so you respond badly.

3.134 The solution is manifest, for ‘You respond badly’ should be granted when it is proposed, since it follows: the decision has gone against you, so you respond badly.

3.135 Similarly, if it is posited that you are a bishop or a priest, and ‘You are a priest’ is proposed, it must be granted because, if it were denied, it would be necessary to deny that you are a bishop, and so it would be necessary to deny the positum.

3.136 But if the parts are [mutually] irrelevant, either each is true, or each is false, or one is true and the other false. If each is true, each when first proposed should be granted; if each is false, each when first proposed should be denied. If one is true and the other false, the true part should be granted and the false part should be denied. If each part is doubted by you, you should respond doubtfully to each. If one part is true and the other doubtful, the true part should be granted and you should respond
doubtfully to the doubtful part. If one part is doubtful and the other false, you should respond doubtfully to the doubtful part when first proposed, and later, if the false part is proposed, it should be denied. And then if the doubtful part is proposed, you should respond (p. 74) affirmatively to it, because it follows.

3.137 For example, if it is posited that the king is sitting or you are running, and it is proposed that the king is sitting, you should respond doubtfully. And then if it is proposed that you are running, it should be denied. And if later it is proposed that the king is sitting, it should be granted.²

3.138 From what has been said, the solution of this sophism is manifest: let it be posited that you are running or you should grant that you are running. Then, ‘You should grant that you are running’ [is proposed]. If you grant it, you grant what is false and does not follow, because it does not follow: you are running or you should grant that you are running, so you should grant that you are running. If you deny it, let the time be up: you have denied a truth which is not inconsistent, because it was true that you are running follows from the positum and the opposite of what was properly denied, and every such should be granted, so it was true that you should grant that you are running.

3.139 Solution: ‘You should grant that you are running’ should be denied when it is first proposed. But it was true after my response. Yet you have not denied a truth, for it does not follow: you have denied this, and this is true, so you have denied a truth. For all responses are for the time of judgement and the judgement for the time of utterance, so the response is for the time of utterance, and for the time of utterance of ‘You should grant that you are running’, it was not true.

3.140 Some say that it does not follow: you have denied a truth which is not inconsistent, so badly. But it must be added: you have denied what was true for the time for which it was true or at which it was true. And we know that this is false, because it was denied for a time preceding my response, and at that time it was not true, because then ‘You are running’ was false and irrelevant. And so it was then false that you should grant that you are running.

3.141 But in the case of a disjunction of positio, either the parts are [mutually] relevant or they are irrelevant. If irrelevant, either each is true, and then each should be granted; or each is false, and then each should be responded to doubtfully; neither can be

² Cf. Kilvington’s disputational meta-argument, where once doubted, always doubted.
denied, since it is in doubt whether that disjunct was posited, nor granted, since it is false and it is not known that you are obliged [to grant that disjunct]. If one part is true and the other false, the true part should be granted, and the false irrelevant one should be responded to doubtfully. If (p. 75) one or other part is doubtful or both, one should respond doubtfully to any doubtful irrelevant one, whichever it is.

3.142 But in the case of disjunction of positio where the parts are [mutually] relevant, then either the parts are incompatible or are related so that one implies the other. If they are incompatible, one should respond doubtfully to each; but neither can be denied, because then that might be to deny the positum, nor can they be granted, because, if one part were granted, it would be necessary to deny the other and so that might be to deny the positum. If one part follows from the other, the part which follows should always be granted, because either it was posited or it follows from the positum.

3.143 From what has been said, the solution of this sophism is manifest: let it be posited that you know the stars to be even or odd. And suppose there is disjunction of positio so that one part is determinately posited, but indeterminate to you [which]. Then, ‘You know the stars to be even’ is proposed. If you grant it, let the time be up: you have granted a falsehood which does not follow, so badly. If you deny it, you deny the positum—I choose that this be the positum. If you respond doubtfully, you have responded doubtfully to a falsehood known to be false when not obliged to, so badly, because I choose that the other part be the positum.

3.144 Solution: it must be said that this reasoning does not hold: you have responded doubtfully to a falsehood known to be false, when not obliged to, so you have responded badly. For it is doubtful whether you are obliged or not. Hence, ‘You know yourself not to be obliged’ must be included in the premises, and it is false.

3.145 In order to prove every impossible proposition true one may use this trick: you make a disjunction from the proposition which you wish to prove to be true with this proposition: ‘Nothing posited is true’, and you posit this disjunction, and you propose the same one, and then you say, ‘Let the time be up’; and then you ask whether the positum was true or nothing posited was true, and you will prove that proposition to be true which you intended to be proved.

3.146 For example, posit this: ‘A man is an ass or nothing posited is true’. Then propose the same proposition. Once this is granted, say ‘Let the time be up’, and ask whether ‘The positum is true’ was true at the time of the positio, or ‘Nothing posited is true’. If (p. 76) the former be given, argue like this: ‘The positum was true’ is true and not its
part 'Nothing posited is true', so the part 'A man is an ass', and so this was true. If [instead] it is given that 'Nothing posited was true' is true, then the disjunction which was proposed was true. From this it follows that 'What was posited was true' was true. But what was posited was not true for the part, 'Nothing posited was true', so it was true for the part, 'A man is an ass', so this was true.

3.147 Solution: ‘Nothing posited is true’ was true and similarly the disjunction, ‘A man is an ass or nothing posited is true’. But it does not follow: this disjunction was true and it was then posited, so what was posited was true. For the subject of ‘What was posited is true’ cannot supposit for this disjunction, ‘A man is an ass or nothing posited is true’.

[Dependent Positio]

3.148 Dependent positio is when something is posited on some condition, and is done like this: if you respond affirmatively to what is first proposed, let ‘You are running’ be the positum, and not otherwise. And let ‘You are not running’ be proposed. Once this is denied, argue like this: nothing was posited to you, because you did not respond affirmatively. So you denied what was true, not obliged to, so badly. If ‘You are not running’ is granted, let ‘You are running’ be proposed. If you deny it, you deny the positum. If you grant it, you grant opposites.

3.149 Solution: ‘You are not running’ should be granted, and it should be denied that you granted the opposite of the positum. Nor is this valid: you granted its opposite, and it was the positum, so you granted the opposite of the positum. Just as it does not follow: you saw Robert and Robert was a bishop, so you saw a bishop. But this must be added: you granted its opposite which was the positum for the time for which it was the positum, so you granted the opposite of the positum. But this is false, because you granted it for the time of utterance, and not for the time when it was the positum.

3.150 Put it this way: suppose the time is up, and when it is argued: you responded (p. 77) affirmatively, so ‘You are running’ was the positum and you granted its opposite, so badly; I say that it does not follow, but this must be added: ‘you granted it at the time for which it was the positum’. But this is false. For if ‘You are not running’ is granted,

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3 So the positio is not the positum, but the positing of the positum, in this case, conditional positing depending on some condition.
‘You are running’ must in no way whatever be granted, and it does not follow: you granted the opposite, so badly, because you granted the opposite for a different time.

3.151 Another sophism: let ‘You are running’ be posited for the moment when you grant something, and let ‘You are not running’ be proposed. If you deny it, then ‘You are running’ was not the positum, nor is anything else obliged, so you deny the truth when not obliged. If you grant it, then ‘You are running’ was the positum at the time of your granting, so you grant the opposite of the positum at the time of positing, so you respond badly.

3.152 Similarly: let ‘You are standing’ be posited for the time for which something is proposed, and let ‘You are not standing’ be proposed. One asks whether what was proposed should be granted at A or not. Let A be the moment of utterance of what was proposed. What was proposed should not be granted at A since ‘You are standing’ was posited at A, so ‘You are not standing’ is the opposite of the positum at A, so ‘You are not standing’ should not be granted at A, and that was proposed, so what was proposed should not be granted at A. Hence, if what was proposed should be granted at A, it should not be granted at A. If what was proposed should not be granted at A, then ‘You are standing’ was not the positum at A, nor was anything else obliged, and ‘You are not standing’ is a truth known to be true, and nothing is obliged at A, so ‘You are not standing’ should be granted at A, and ‘You are not standing’ is what was proposed, so what was proposed should be granted at A. So if it should not be granted at A, it should be granted at A.

3.153 Solution: neither positio should be admitted. Not the first when it is said, ‘Let ‘You are running’ be the positum for the moment when you grant something’. Nothing was posited before something was granted, but the time for which something is granted is earlier than (the time) at which something is granted. So it is posited that ‘You are running’ is the positum before there was a positum, (which is absurd). In the same way to the second or another, that this positio should only be admitted on the condition that the opposite of the positum is not proposed. (p. 78)

3.154 Similarly: let A be some contingent statement, but you do not know what it is, and if you are going to respond doubtfully to what is first proposed, let A be the positum, otherwise not. And let ‘A is true’ be proposed. If you respond other than doubtfully, then you are not obliged, so you respond to something doubtful other than doubtfully, when not obliged to, so badly. If you respond doubtfully, then earlier you
were going to respond doubtfully to what was first proposed, so A was the *positum*. So you have responded doubtfully to a *positum* known to be the *positum*, so badly.

3.155 Solution: nothing was the *positum* before the response, and so ‘A is true’ should be responded to doubtfully. Nor is this valid: you responded doubtfully to the *positum*, so badly. But it is necessary to add: you responded doubtfully to the *positum* known to be the *positum* at the time of the positio. It follows that you responded badly. But A was not the *positum* at the time you responded.

3.156 It should be noted that *propositions* like these should be distinguished: ‘Suppose it is posited that Socrates is white if what is first proposed is a falsehood’, or ‘(Suppose it is posited that Socrates is white) if what is first proposed should be granted’. For the condition can include the *positum*, in which case, it is not dependent positio, because then what is posited is itself conditional. Or the condition can exclude the positio, so that the condition is concomitant with the positio, and then it is dependent positio, because something is not posited absolutely, but only on condition.

3.157 A rule: dependent *positio* where the possibility of the *positio* depends on a future act should only be admitted on condition. And in this way this sophism is solved:

3.158 Suppose it is posited that Socrates is white if what is first proposed is true. Then, ‘That Socrates is white is not the *positum*’ is proposed. Let the time be up, and ask whether what was first proposed was true or not. If it was, that Socrates is white was the *positum*, and if so, ‘That Socrates is white is not the *positum*’ is false. But this is what was first proposed, so what was first proposed is false. Hence, if what was first proposed is true, what was first proposed is false. But on the contrary, if what was first proposed is false, that Socrates is white is not the *positum* and if so, ‘That Socrates is white is not the *positum*’ is true, and this is what was first proposed, so what was first proposed is true. So if it is false, it is true. (p. 79)

3.159 Solution: the *positio* should only be admitted on condition, namely, that what is proposed is not inconsistent with ‘That Socrates is white is the *positum*’.

3.160 Similarly, suppose Socrates is black. Posit that Socrates is white if what is first proposed should not be denied. Then ‘Socrates is black’ is proposed. If you grant it, then what is proposed is not something that should be denied, so the *positum* is retained, so you grant the opposite of the *positum*, retaining the *positum*. If you deny ‘Socrates is black’, then what is posited is something that should be denied, so the *positum* is not retained, so you deny a truth when not obliged to.
3.161 Solution: the *positio* should only be admitted on the condition that nothing incompatible with the *positum* is proposed. For if a truth incompatible with the *positum* is proposed, it is posited that if 'Socrates is black' should be granted, it should not be granted.

[Terminating *Positio*]

3.162 Terminating *positio* is a kind of dependent *positio*, because wherever there is terminating *positio*, there is dependent *positio*, but not vice versa. Terminating *positio* is when some sentence ceases to be the *positum* for another reason than when 'Let the time be up' is said, and so in this *positio* it is superfluous to say 'Let the time be up'.

3.163 The rule posited earlier should be retained(?) here, namely, that *positio* whose possibility depends on the future should only be admitted on condition. And in this way, this sophism is solved:

3.164 Suppose that Socrates is black. Suppose it is posited that Socrates is white until what is proposed should be denied. Then, 'Socrates is black' is proposed. If you grant it, then what is proposed is not something that should be denied, so the *positum* is retained. So you grant the opposite of the *positum*, retaining the *positum*, so badly. If you deny that Socrates is black, then what is proposed is something that should be denied, so the *positum* is not retained, so you deny a truth when not obliged to, so badly.

3.165 Solution: 'until' should be distinguished, in that it can be taken inclusively or exclusively. If it is taken inclusively, then the *positio* does not terminate earlier than the completion of the utterance of some act of denial, and (p. 80) thus the *positio* should be accepted, and it should be denied that Socrates is black. And when it is said, 'You deny a truth when not obliged to', it must be said that I am obliged at the time when I respond, because I respond at the time of utterance, and at the time of the utterance of 'Socrates is black', the *positum* is retained. If 'until' is taken exclusively, the *positio* only persists as long as something that should be denied is not proposed, and then the *positio* should only be admitted on condition, namely, that a truth incompatible with the *positum* is not proposed. Because, if a truth incompatible with the *positum* is proposed, it is the same as if it were said: if the *positum* terminates in its utterance, the *positum* is retained in its utterance, and vice versa. Because, if the *positum* terminates, that Socrates is black should be granted, so what is proposed is not something that should be denied; and if the *positum* is
retained, that Socrates is black should be denied, so what is proposed is something that should be denied, so the *positum* is not retained, and so if the *positum* is retained, the *positum* is not retained.

[Renascent *Positio*]

3.166 To this last kind of *positio* can be reduced renascent *positio*, for all renascent *positio* is terminating, and each is dependent, for it cannot be renascent unless it is terminating, which happens like this: let the *positum* be ‘You respond negatively’, as long as it is true, and suddenly it is false, let it terminate, and when it is true again, it is again the *positum*. And let ‘You respond negatively’ be proposed. If you grant it, then ‘You respond negatively’ is false, and so it is not the *positum*, so you grant something false when not obliged to. If you deny that you respond negatively, then ‘You respond negatively’ is true, so it is the *positum*, so you deny the *positum* during the time of the *positio*.

3.167 Solution: it should be denied that you respond negatively, and when you deny that you respond negatively, ‘You respond negatively’ is the *positum*, because, since you deny it at the time of utterance, and at the time of utterance it is not the *positum*, you do not deny the *positum* during the time of the *positio*.

3.168 Another sophism: let A be some contingent sentence, and let B be ‘Only A is the *positum*’, and as long as B is true, let B be the *positum*, (p. 81) which suddenly is false, let it terminate, and when it is true again, let it again be the *positum*. Now ask whether B is true or false. If true, then it is the *positum*, so ‘Only A is the *positum*’ is false, and this is B, so B is false. If B is false, then it is not the *positum*, and A is the *positum* and nothing else, so only A is the *positum*, so ‘Only A is the *positum*’ is true, and this is B, so B is true. So if B is false, B is true.

3.169 Solution: the *positio* should not be admitted, because it is posited that B is at the same time true and the *positum*, which is impossible. For if B is true, only A is the *positum*, and if so, B is not the *positum*.

[Vicarious *Positio*]

3.170 Now we come to vicarious *positio*, and vicarious *positio* has many types. One type is when a person is obliged on behalf of another, another when a proposition is posited on behalf of another, and third when a proposition is posited at one time for one person and at another time for another.
3.171 An example of the first type: suppose ‘You are at Rome’ is posited to you, and you respond on behalf of Brunellus and to any proposition just as Brunellus would respond, if he knew how to speak and could. And suppose ‘You are an ass’ is proposed. If you grant it, you grant the impossible, and Brunellus would not grant an impossibility, if he could speak, so you respond badly. If you deny it, let the time be up. If ‘You are an ass’ were proposed to Brunellus, Brunellus would grant it, if he knew how to speak, and you do not grant it, so [you respond] badly, because you should respond wholly as Brunellus would respond.

3.172 Solution: ‘You are an ass’ should be denied, if it is directed to you, nor would Brunellus grant it. But if it were directed to Brunellus, he would grant it. The sentence ‘You are an ass’ has a different signification if it is directed to Brunellus than if it is directed to you.

3.173 Sometimes, one sentence is posited for another, as in this sophism: suppose ‘Socrates is running’ is posited for ‘Plato is running’, and let each be false. Then ‘Socrates is running’ is proposed. If you deny it, you deny the positum, because from the fact that ‘Socrates is running’ is posited for another, it follows that ‘Socrates (p. 82) is running’ is the positum. But if it granted, let the time be up: you have granted something false and irrelevant, because to posit ‘Socrates is running’ for ‘Plato is running’ is nothing other than to oblige [you] to respond to ‘Socrates is running’ in the same way as ‘Plato is running’, but it does not follow from this that you should grant that Socrates is running.

3.174 Similarly, retaining the positum, suppose ‘Plato is running’ is proposed. If it is granted, something false which does not follow is granted. If it is denied, let the time be up: that Socrates is running was granted, and only because it is posited that Plato is running, so that Plato is running should be granted.

3.175 Solution: that Socrates is running should be granted when it is proposed, because it is the positum. For it follows: if it is the positum for another, then it is the positum. And this should be struck out(?), that for ‘Socrates is running’ to be what is posited for ‘Plato is running’ is nothing other than to respond to the one as to the other. Now ‘Plato is running’ should be denied, nor is this valid: this is posited for that, so one should respond to this as to that. Or [like this]: so it should be granted, because one of opposites can be posited for another, but the opposite of the positum should not be granted, for if ‘You are running’ is posited for ‘You are not running’, that you are not running should not be granted.
Sometimes one proposition is posited at one time for itself, at another time for another, as in this sophism: suppose it was posited that Socrates was running yesterday, and wish that you respond to ‘Socrates is running’ today as you responded yesterday. Now ‘Socrates is running’ is proposed. If you grant it, you grant what is false when not obliged to. For even if that Socrates was running was posited yesterday, it is, however, not now the *positum*. But if you deny it, let the time be up: yesterday you would have granted that Socrates was running if it was proposed to you, and you should respond just as yesterday you would have responded, so you deny it badly.

Solution: ‘Socrates is running’ should be granted, and when it is said, ‘You grant what is false when not obliged to’, this should be struck out, because I am obliged. For saying ‘You should respond to “Socrates is running” just as you responded yesterday’, supposing that Socrates was running yesterday was the *positum*, creates now an obligation to respond just as yesterday, and thus that Socrates is running is now the *positum* just as it was yesterday, so it should be granted. (p. 83)

Note that in this [type of] *positio* one may grant the impossible when the *positum* is possible. Nor is this valid: you grant what is impossible when the *positum* was possible, so badly. But it is necessary to add that you retain your own opinion, as is manifest: suppose it is posited that you are at Rome, and that you should respond to anything proposed to you just as Zeno would respond. Then, ‘Nothing moves’ is proposed to you. You should grant this, because Zeno would grant it. But it is impossible. Nor, indeed, do you respond badly, because you do not retain your own opinion.

[Impossible *Positio*]

Now we come to impossible *positio*. Impossible *positio* is when an impossible proposition is posited. So, in this type of *positio*, only something impossible may be posited. But not just anything impossible may be posited, for something impossible formally containing opposites may not be posited here. For if something inconsistent with the *positum* were then posited, it would have to be granted, since something inconsistent with the *positum* would be a consequence of the *positum*. So only what is impossible but does not formally contain opposites may be posited here. Indeed, some say that only conceivable impossibility may be posited here.

It must be realised that in this type of *positio* the rules ‘from the impossible anything follows’ and ‘the necessary follows from anything’ may not be employed. Nor may
one in this type of *positio* employ an infinite consequence, because if an infinite consequence were used with an impossible *positum*, anything whatever would have to be granted because it is a consequence, and anything whatever would have to be denied because it is inconsistent, for if everything follows, everything is inconsistent, and so it would be both granted and denied. Moreover, nothing would be irrelevant to the *positum*. So here only natural consequence should be used, and not just any, but only that which is so obvious that its opposite cannot be believed. For example: if this is a whole, it has parts; or if this is a whole, it is greater than its part.

3.181 A rule: if a conceivable impossibility has been posited, an inconceivable impossibility should not be granted, just as if a possibility has been posited, an impossibility should not be (p. 84) granted.

3.182 But it seems that if something conceivable has been posited, something inconceivable must be granted. For ‘A man is not an animal’ is conceivable, so it may be posited. Then let ‘An animal is not an animal’ be proposed. If you grant it, you grant something inconceivable, something conceivable having been proposed. If you deny it, let the time be up, you deny what follows, because this follows in a natural consequence: a man is not an animal, so an animal is not an animal, as is manifest from its opposite.

3.183 Solution: ‘An animal is not an animal’ should be denied because, when something impossible has been posited, something more impossible should not be granted. Nor is it valid to infer: you deny what follows, so you respond badly. For not every natural consequence should be employed here, but only that which is obvious to anyone, and this consequence: a man is not an animal, so an animal is not an animal, is not of this sort.

3.184 Another rule is: if something impossible *per accidens* has been posited, something impossible *per se* should not be granted, nor should anything necessary *per se* be denied.

3.185 But on the contrary, suppose it is posited that Caesar was not a man, and then ‘Caesar was an animal’ is proposed. This should be granted because it is true and irrelevant. Then: ‘Caesar was an irrational animal’. This should be granted because it is a consequence, but it is impossible *per se*. That it is a consequence is manifest, for it follows: Caesar was an animal, and he was not a man, so he was an irrational animal.
The solution: ‘Caesar was an animal’ should be denied, because it is impossible that Caesar was an animal and was not a man.

[Green p. 87 (Kretzmann and Stump p. 408)]

[Conjunctive depositio]

4.17 Depositio has the same multifarious varieties as positio, because some is simple and some composite. Depositio is composite (p. 88) when a molecular proposition is deposited, and this can be either because a conjunction is deposited or because a disjunction is deposited.

4.18 If a conjunction is deposited, either each part is necessary, and then the depositio should only be admitted in impossible depositio; or each part, or only one, is impossible, and then it is not necessary to deposit such a conjunction since it is manifestly false; or one part is impossible and the other possible, and then the possible part should be granted and the impossible part should be denied. But it is not necessary to deposit such a conjunction.

4.19 Otherwise, each part is possible, and then either the parts are relevant or irrelevant. If irrelevant, either each part is true, and then the part first proposed should be granted and the other part denied; or each part is false, and then each should be denied; or one is true and the other false, and then the true part should be granted and the false part should be denied. But if the parts are relevant, so that one follows from the other, that part which implies the other should never be granted, because, granting it would require granting what it implies, and so it would be necessary to grant the depositum.

[Disjunctive depositio]

4.20 But if a disjunction is deposited, if either part is necessary, the depositio should not be admitted because, if a disjunction is deposited, it is necessary to deny each of its parts, since what implies the depositum must be denied. Hence, briefly, a disjunction should be deposited in possible depositio only if each part can be at the same time false, and so the truth of this rule is manifest:

4.21 One should never admit a depositio embracing a disjunction in which one proposition is disjoined with another which it implies, because the opposite of the first cannot be false at the same time as the one it implies. In this way this sophism is solved:
4.22 Suppose ‘Some man is literate or that there is a God is not granted by a literate person’ is deposited. ‘Some man is literate’ is proposed. If it is granted, something implying the depositum is granted. (p. 89) If it is denied, ‘That there is a God is not granted by a literate person’ is proposed. If it is granted, something implying the depositum is granted. If it is denied, what is denied follows from the opposite of something denied, because this follows: no man is literate, so that there is a God is not granted by a literate person, as is manifest from its opposite.

4.23 The solution is manifest, for a depositio should not be admitted in which a disjunction is deposited in which a proposition is disjoined with the opposite of one which implies it.

4.24 Another sophism: take some disguised conditional whose antecedent is true and deposit the consequent, and then propose the antecedent. For example, let A be this disjunction: ‘You respond badly or you should deny that you respond badly’, and deposit A. Then, ‘A is deposited to you’ is proposed. This is true and does not imply the depositum, so it should be granted. Then, ‘You should deny A’ [is proposed]. This follows because, if A is deposited to you, you should deny A. Then, ‘You should deny that you respond badly’ [is proposed]. If you grant it, you grant something which implies the depositum. If you deny it, you deny something which follows from what you have correctly granted, because it follows: you should deny A, so you should deny each of its parts, and so, you should deny that you respond badly. The conditional behind this sophism is: if A is deposited to you, A is true.

4.25 Solution: ‘A is deposited to you’ should be denied in that it implies the depositum, because it follows: A is deposited to you, so you should deny A, and moreover, then you should deny that you respond badly, whence indeed either you respond badly or you should deny that you respond badly, and that was the depositum.

…

[Green p. 92 (Kretzmann and Stump p. 412)]

[Of similars and dissimilars]

5.14 It should be noted that if it is doubted that some things are similar, having granted or denied one, one should respond doubtfully to the other because having granted or denied both, it is necessary to grant the dubitatum, and having granted one and denied the other, it is necessary to grant the opposite of the dubitatum.
5.15 One should respond in the same way if it is doubted that some things are dissimilar, because once each is granted or denied, it is necessary to grant the opposite of the _dubitatum_; and if one has been granted and the other denied, it is necessary to grant the _dubitatum_. So whenever it is doubted that some things are similar or dissimilar, when one has been granted or denied, one should respond doubtfully to the other.

5.16 Similarly, if what follows and the opposite of what implies it are doubted to be similar, neither should be denied because, if not is denied, it is necessary to grant the other, and so it is necessary to grant the opposite of the _dubitatum_. For if what is implied is denied, it is necessary to deny what implies it and grant its opposite. Similarly, if the opposite of what implies is denied, it is necessary to grant what implies and so necessary to grant what is implied.

5.17 Similarly, if what implies and the opposite of what is implied are doubted to be similar, both should be granted because, if one is granted, it is necessary to deny the other. For if what implies is granted, it is necessary to grant what is implied, and consequently to deny the opposite of what is implied.

5.18 Similarly, if what implies and what is implied are doubted to be similar, what is implied should never be denied because, if what is implied is denied, it is necessary to deny what implies, and so it is necessary to grant the _dubitatum_. Similarly, if what implies is granted, it is necessary to grant what is implied, and so it is necessary to grant what implies and what is implied to be similar, and so the _dubitatum_ would be granted.

[Conjunctive Dubitatio]

5.19 This [type of] obligation is divided just like the others, because some _dubitatio_ is simple, some composite: simple what applies to atomic [propositions], composite what applies to molecular ones, e.g., conjunctions and disjunctions.

5.20 It should be known that, if a _dubitatio_ embraces a conjunctive [proposition], neither part of the conjunction should be denied because, if one part of a conjunction is denied, it is necessary to deny the whole conjunction. But if a conjunction is doubted, it is not necessary to respond doubtfully to each part, because we can doubt a conjunction even if we do not doubt each of its parts. But if a part of a conjunction is proposed in the first place to be true, it is necessary to grant it and one should respond doubtfully to the other part. (p. 94)
[Disjunctive Dubitatio]

5.21 But if a *dubitatio* embraces a disjunction, neither part should be granted because, if one part is granted, it is necessary to grant the whole disjunction. But if a disjunction is doubted, it is not necessary to doubt either part of the disjunction. But if a part is proposed in the first place to be false, it should be denied, and one should respond doubtfully to the other part. Now if a part is proposed in the first place to be true, one should respond doubtfully to it, because it implies the *dubitatum*, if it is true, one should respond doubtfully, since what implies the *dubitatum* should not be granted. From this the solution of this sophism is manifest:

5.22 Let this be doubted: ‘You are sitting or you should not grant that you are sitting’. Let this be proposed: ‘You are sitting’. One should respond doubtfully to this, since it is true and implies the *dubitatum*. Then, ‘You are sitting implies the *dubitatum*’ [is proposed]. That should be granted, since it is true and known to be true, and so it is seen to be necessary since any true conditional is seen to be necessary. Then, ‘you should not grant that you are sitting’ [is proposed]. If you grant it, you grant something which implies the *dubitatum*. If you deny it, let the time be up, you deny what follows, because that you are sitting implies the *dubitatum*, so you should not grant that you are sitting.

5.23 Solution: one should respond doubtfully to ‘That you are sitting implies the *dubitatum*’, for you should not deny it since it is true and known to be true, nor grant it, since it implies the *dubitatum*. And since it is said that it is necessary, it should be struck out. For even if ‘That you are sitting should be doubted’ implies the disjunction, which is the *dubitatum*, it is, however, not necessary that it implies the *dubitatum* because it is not necessary that the disjunction is the *dubitatum*.

[Let it be true]

6.01 We now come to this type of obligation in which a sentence creates an obligation in as much as it relates to the mind. And this [type of] obligation is *sit verum* (let it be true). So it is usually said that *sit verum* creates an obligation on a state of mind, and since states of mind are of three kinds, namely, [p. 95) the state of knowledge, of doubt and of ignorance, this obligation is of three kinds, either through a verb of knowing, or through a verb of doubting, or through a verb if ignorance. For example, ‘Let it be true that you know you are running’, or ‘Let it be true that you doubt you are running’.
6.02 And by this it is manifest how this [type of] obligation differs from other types of obligation. For those [types of] obligation immediately apply to the sentence which is obligated, as is manifest here: suppose it is posited that Socrates is white, and let it be deposited that Socrates is white. But obligation made through *sit verum* does not immediately apply to the sentence which is obligated, but mediately by a verb of knowing, doubting or being ignorant, e.g., ‘Let it be true that you know you are running’. And it is the same to say ‘Let it be true that you know you are running’ and to say ‘You should respond to “You are running” as if you were in a state of knowledge that it is true’. And this is how it should be analysed: you should respond as if you knew it to be true that you are running when you were under no obligation. And then ‘You are running’ should be granted and everything which follows from it.

6.03 For this [type of] obligation differs from *positio* since, in contrast, *positio* applies immediately to the sentence which is obligated, and this [type of] obligation does not. But in contrast, *positio* only obliges [one] to maintain, while this obligation obliges to doubt, e.g., if it is said, ‘Let it be true that you doubt you are running’, then you are obliged to doubt that you are running.

6.04 According to this kind of sophistry, I thus seek that you do only respond doubtfully to something if you doubt something of that sort, and you deny something only if its falsity is known to you. I choose that Socrates is not, and this you well know. Let it be true that you know Socrates to be white. ‘Socrates is not coloured’ is proposed. If you respond doubtfully, you respond doubtfully to something about whose quality you have no doubt, so badly. If you deny it, let the time be up: you deny something whose falsity is not known to you. If you grant that Socrates is not coloured, you grant what is inconsistent with the *obligatum*.

6.05 Solution: if the *petitio* is admitted, the obligation made by *sit verum* should not be admitted, because *petitio* obliges one to grant that Socrates is not coloured, and the obligation made by *sit verum* (p. 96) obliges one to deny it. So some say that the obligation made by *sit verum* cannot admit another obligation beyond itself if the second obligation obliges one [to maintain] the opposite of what the first obligation obliges, which was made by the *sit verum*. Alternatively, others say that it’s not impossible to grant opposites if there is not only one obligation but many different ones.

7.01 Here ends the treatise on obligations given by Master Walter Burley in the year 1302.