The SDG Web PageMy PictureMy e-mail addressMITPY5102: CURRENT ISSUES (Epistemology)

Semester 2: February 2004 - May 2004.

Number of students: 15.


Course Organiser and Lecturer: Patrick Greenough

Seminar instructor: Patrick Greenough.


ESSAY DEADLINE: Tuesday 4th May (the Tuesday of week 11).


LECTURES

Session 1. Knowledge, Fallibilism, and False Evidence. (Week 1)

Session 2. Causal Connections and Evidence One Does Not Possess. (Week 1)

Session 3. Thermometers, Barometers, and Truth-tracking: Reliabilism from Russell to Nozick. (Week 2)

Session 4. Relevant and Irrelevant alternatives: the Reliabilist Response to the Sceptic. (Week 3)

Session 5. From Old Reliabilism to New Reliabilism: Better Safe than Sensitive. (Week 4)

Session 6. Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: Anti-Anti-Luck Epistemology. (Week 5)

Session 7. Ignorance in the Epistemology Seminar: the Case for Contextualism. (Week 6)


LECTURES/SEMINARS: TIME AND PLACE

Day: Tuesdays.

Time: 3pm-5pm

Place: Room 104

Please Note: There will be a change of room on Tuesday March 2nd (the Tuesday of week 4). New room: 1st Floor Seminar Room, St. Katherine's West (Department of Management). The subsequent weeks we will be back in 104.


READING

Session One (Week 1): Knowledge, Fallibilism, and False Evidence.

Basic Reading:

Additional Reading:

Session One (week 1): Causal Connections and Evidence One Does Not Possess.

Basic Reading:

Additional Reading:

Session Two. (Week 2): Thermometers, Barometers, and Truth-tracking: Reliabilism from Russell to Nozick.

Set Reading:

Additional Reading:

Talks on: (a) The Problem of Methods, (b) The Generality Problem, (c) Reliabilism as externalistic.

Session Three. (week 3): Relevant and Irrelevant Alternatives: the Reliabilist Response to the Sceptic.

Set Reading:

Talks on: (a) Meta-epistemic scepticism, (b) Arguments for/against closure, (c) Dretske on scepticism.

Session Four. (week 4): From Old Reliabilism to New Reliabilism: Better Safe than Sensitive.

Set Reading:

Talks on: (a) How does Sosa combat Meta-Epistemic Scepticism? (b) Kripke cases.

Session Five. (week 5): Good knowledge, Bad knowledge: Anti-Anti-Luck Epistemology.

Set Reading:

Talks on: (a) Epistemic and moral luck compared, (b) Hetherington on the TB conception, (c) Gradualism in epistemology

Session Six. (week 6): Ignorance in the Epistemology Seminar: the Case for Contextualism.

Set Reading:

Additional reading:

Talks on: (a) The Statability Problem, (b) The problem of epistemic descent, (c) Williamson on contextualism


THE COURSEPACK

  1. Edmund Gettier (1963): 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?', Analysis 23, pp. 121-23.
  2. Richard Feldman (1973): 'All Alleged Defect in Gettier Counterexamples', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 52, pp. 68-9.
  3. Stephen Hetherington (1996): 'False Evidence', Chapter 11 of his Knowledge Puzzles, Boulder: Westview Press.
  4. John Pollock (1986): Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, pp. 180-93.
  5. Stephen Hetherington (1996): 'Defeasibility', Chapter 9 of his Knowledge Puzzles, Boulder: Westview Press.
  6. Stephen Hetherington (1996): 'Social Defeasibility', Chapter 10 of his Knowledge Puzzles, Boulder: Westview Press.
  7. Robert Nozick (1981): 'Knowledge', from his Philosophical Explanations, pp. 172-85.
  8. Stewart Cohen (1992): 'Relevant Alternatives', in Dancy and Sosa (eds): A Companion to Epistemology, Blackwells.
  9. Alvin Goldman (1992): 'Reliabilism', in Dancy and Sosa (eds): A Companion to Epistemology, Blackwells.
  10. Robert Nozick (1981): 'Scepticism', from his Philosophical Explanations, pp.197-217.
  11. Ernest Sosa (1999): 'How to Defeat Opposition to Moore', in J. E. Tomberlin (ed.) Epistemology, Philosophical Perspectives 13, Blackwells.
  12. Stephen Hetherington (1998): 'Actually Knowing', The Philosophical Quarterly, 48, pp. 453-469.
  13. Keith DeRose (1995): 'Solving the Sceptical Problem', The Philosophical Review, 104, pp 1-7, pp. 17-52.
  14. David Lewis (1996): 'Elusive Knowledge', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, pp. 549-67


ADDITIONAL READING: SEMINAR BY SEMINAR


ADDITIONAL READING: GENERAL


ELECTRONIC RESOURCES FOR EPISTEMOLOGY

http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kd47/e-page.htm

http://www.ucs.louisiana.edu/~kak7409/EpistemologicalResearch.htm

http://www.epistemelinks.com/Main/Topics.aspx?TopiCode=Epis

http://whatisthematrix.warnerbros.com/rl_cmp/phi.html


GENERAL ELECTRONIC RESOURCES

 ENCYCLOPAEDIAS:

DICTIONARIES:

DATABASES:

(Note: no password required for local access; contact jmy@st-and.ac.uk for password for remote access.)

ON-LINE JOURNALS:

http://www-library.st-andrews.ac.uk/External/Journals/philosophy.html

VERY USEFUL WEB LINKS:


JARGON-BUSTING: CONSTRUCT YOUR OWN GLOSSARY

Accessibilism

Anti-luck epistemology

Bad knowledge

Belief

Cartesian scepticism

Causal theory of knowledge

Certainty

Closure

Conditional theory of knowledge

Contextualism

Defeasibility

Defeasibility analysis of knowledge

Defeater 

Defeater defeater

Discrimination

Dreaming scepticism

Easy knowledge

Error

Error scepticism

Evidence

Evidentialism

Externalism about knowledge

Externalism about evidence and justification

External world scepticism

Factivity of knowledge

Factivity of justification

Fallibilism about Justification

Fallibilism concerning knowledge

Foundationalism

Gettier cases

Generality problem

Good knowledge

Gradualism

Ignorance

Illusion

Incorrigibility

Indubitability

Infallibilism

Indefeasibility

Internalism about knowledge

Internalism about evidence and justification

Irrelevant alternative

Irrevisability

JTB analysis of knowledge

Justification

KK principle

Know-how

Know-that

Knowledge

Lucky knowledge

Mentalism

Meta-epistemic scepticism

Misleading evidence

Modal epistemology

Moral versus epistemic luck

No-false evidence analysis of knowledge

Omnsicience

Practical knowledge

Propositional knowledge

Reason

Relevant Alternatives theory of knowledge

Reliabilism

Reliability, local

Reliability, global

Rule of attention

Safety condition

Scepticism

Sensitivity to falisty

Sensitivity to truth

Social defeasibility

Subjunctive conditional

Telos of belief

TB analysis of knowledge

Tracking

Tripartite analysis of knowledge

Truth condition

Virtue

Virtue epistemology


© Patrick Greenough 2004.

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Philosophy at St Andrews

Last modified: 8th Feb 2004. The SDG Web PageMy PictureMy e-mail addressMIT