This topic will be taught partly by class and partly by tutorial. Reading for classes is very important. One of the main uses of class time is to orient your material. And that's a complete waste of time if you turn up without any material to orient. So please come along well-prepared.
It had become commonplace, by the Sixties, for philosophers of an analytic turn to take it for granted that knowledge is a matter of justified true belief, full stop, and that this fact was best expressed as an analysis into necessary and sufficient conditions along the standard model:
X knows that P iff
And debate had settled down on the nature of the precise account of justification . For an example, you can consult the first two chapters of
A. J. Ayer
The Problem of Knowledge , Penguin, 1990.
But then in 1963, Edmund L. Gettier published a little article in Analysis which rather set the cat amongst the pigeons. You should read it. Not because it is a good article (which it is not: the examples he chose to illustrate his thesis are thoroughly confusing and wrong-footed further research for many years), but because all later literature refers back to it. And that is a lot of literature: we have been in the Gettier Salt Mines for forty years. Read, and commit to memory the exmples given in
Edmund L. Gettier
“Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Analysis vol. 23 (1963)
Now until recently, there had been three main lines of attack on the Gettier problem. All sought to produce a further condition to rule out the Gettier cases.
These are sometimes known as Good Reason Theories (or sometimes Conclusive Reason Theories, or, in a more recent technical development, as Defeasibility Theories). The idea is that the missing fourth condition is something along the lines of
4a. X has made no false step in his reasoning.
You need to be aware of how this line of thought might develop. Try chapters 7-10 ofGilbert Harman
Thought , Princeton University Press, 1973 & 1974.
These argue instead for a causal connection between the fact which makes a belief true, and the formation of the belief itself. Something along the lines of:
4b. X's belief that P is appropriately caused by the fact that P.
Alvin Goldman has made this area all his own, so you should be aware of the arguments presented in
Alvin Goldman
“A Causal Theory of Knowing”, J.Phil. vol.64 (1967).
These argue that the appropriate fourth condition is that the knowing subject should have a counterfactual connection with the fact that makes the belief true. He should also be locking on to true belief in other, nearby, possible worlds. In slogan form
4c. X's belief that P tracks the truth
The main exponent here is Robert Nozick. You need to be very clear on the position expounded in Nozick's Great American Novel. Indeed, you will not even know what is meant by [4c] if you don't read him very carefully. If short of time, restrict yourselves to pp. 172-8 and 197-210.
Robert Nozick
Philosophical Explanations , Clarendon and Harvard University Press, 1981
You need to know the major arguments for, and the major problems with each of [A] - [C]. Only then will you be prepared for my Book of The Year for 1990. Edward Craig has written a little gem, which begins from the thought that it has been a mistake to look for analyses in the first place, and offers an alternative approach to the concept of knowledge. On the way through, he illuminates all the knotty problems which have beset the Gettier industry over the years. If you want to use one view in your exam preparation, this is surely it.
E.J. Craig
Knowledge and the State of Nature , Clarendon ( Oxford ), 1990
Some of you may want further help from secondary sources. The reading list on the Faculty's website gives half-a-dozen. I haven't read any of them, so no recommendations from me. To save you looking at them all, you could try
Jonathan Dancy
Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology , Blackwell, 1985
although I think he is crap. No insight, just a journeyman trot through what others have said.
And if there is pressure on journals, here is a collection which reprints the original Gettier article, the Goldman, and much else besides:
Bernecker &Dretske
Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology , OUP, 2000.
Do as much of this reading as you can before our first class, but I want you to also think about a small problem of detail, which we shall use in our exploration of the wider issues. Many authors have noted that there seem to be cases where we are tempted to attribute knowledge even in the absence of belief (back-of-the-mind answers at University Challenge, for instance). And if that is right, the standard tripartite analysis fails even before we get to Gettier cases.
If you want to read an engaging example, think about Colin Radford's French-Canadian Jean, and his mysterious grasp of English political history. The article is
Colin Radford
“Knowledge by Examples”, Analysis vol. 27 (1966)
and I have arranged for it to be held at the reception desk in Balliol Library, not languishing in the stacks where access is more difficult.
As I say, what is important is thinking about the case. Should we say that Jean does know? Or can we find ways of explaining away the temptation to attribute knowledge to him, thus preserving the belief condition. Or is there some other thought on the matter to develop?
But if you want help, you will find it in Craig, or perhaps in
David Armstrong
"Does Knowledge Entail Belief?”, PAS vol. 70 (1970)
Again, if there is pressure on journals, refer to pp. 143-9 of Armstrong's sensible little book on these things. Which, by the way, you might find useful as an introduction to the area.
David Armstrong
Belief, Truth and Knowledge , CUP, 1973