Whom we know only through his contributions to the learned journals. Here are all the relevant ones. They are arranged in chronological order of publication. But you may wish to also see them organised thematically. If so, I shall produce a new page on request.
Tense and Time in English, Macquarie University (1981)
The first work of the opus. Included in the list for completeness, it was an in-house piece published at Macquarie and intended for internal circulation only. It is superseded by the next two works on the list, which contain all of worth which it contains, and much more besides. An original copy is available for inspection upon application to me.
Tense and Time in English Verb Clusters of the Primary Pattern, in The Australian Journal of Linguistics vol. 3 (1983), pp. 25-44
Written by a grammarian for grammarians. But philosophers would be well advised to read it, for it provides the essential basis for a purely grammatical solution to many of their presenting problems. One of the features, for instance, of logical studies these last fifty years has been the casual, not to say wildly abandoned manner in which philosophers and logicians have treated the central phenomenon of tense. Which is to say they have ignored it completely, as irrelevant to logic. Ha!
Offprints are available upon application to me. And here is a transcribed version, which contains a few minor errors. An amended version will be posted soon.
Conditional Interpretations of 'If'-sentences, in The Australian Journal of Linguistics vol. 4 (1984), pp. 143-204
This is the article which first raised the flag. Written by a grammarian, and for grammarians, in an obscure journal from the other side of the known universe. As you might guess, The Australian Journal of Linguistics is not a journal on most philosophers' shelves. So Our Revered Leader's new ideas languished for a while in an obscure corner of academia, despite his attempts, detailed below, to draw the attention of philosophers to a new way of thinking. It was not until 1988 that Dudman's ideas reached the philosophical mainstream, thanks to a famous article by The Apostate. And not until 1991 that they achieved respectability, when Frank Jackson (see below) included a revised version of the seminal article in Conditionals, a volume in the Oxford Readings in Philosophy series.
Offprints are available upon application to me.
Parsing 'If'-sentences, in Analysis vol. 44 (1984), pp. 145-153
Towards a Theory of Predication for English, in The Australian Journal of Linguistics vol.5 (1985), pp. 143-96
Again written by a grammarian for grammarians. This piece in its entirety will appeal only to those who are interested more widely in how English operates. They will find it a magisterial work. The first coherent account of English Tense in 400 years of investigation, it is a magnificent solo achievement. But sections 34-7 will speak to those philosophers interested solely in 'If'. I shall go to my grave happy if the article persuades those very people not to be solely interested in 'If'.
Thinking about the Future, in Analysis vol. 45 (1985), pp. 183-186
A response to a challenge by A.J. Dale in the very same volume of Analysis. Mostly business as usual, but considerable detail for those who wish to study the Oswald sentences. The necessary historical background to the case study is available here. And you can download a Word version in rtf here. Or as a straight Word document here.
Antecedents and Consequents, in Theoria vol. 52 (1986), pp. 168-199
The tradition affects to discern the presence of both both antecendents and consequents almost everywhere in 'if'-sentences. This superb article demonstrates that this matching pair of antique terms of art has no application whatsoever to vast swathes of messages encoded in English 'if'-sentences. And that when they do apply, the relation betwen them is botched by the logicians. Which has as one consequence that every treatise on 'if' which invokes a ternary structure of proposition + operator + proposition is obsolete; and that means almost all of them. And has as another consequence that reasoning with judgements is totally different from reasoning with propositions.
But there is much more besides: anyone who would like to know precisely how 'if' contributes to deductive logic should read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest. You can download a copy in Word (rtf) here. And in straight Word here.
Appiah on 'If'', in Analysis vol. 47 (1987), pp. 74-79
Anthony Appiah is an exponent (...or is he? See his Assertion and Conditionals, CUP 1985 at p. 197, where he seems to abandon the central doctrine of his own book) of the Adams Hypothesis, according to which 'conditionals' are to be understood as assertible or not depending on the conditional probability of 'consequent' given 'antecedent'. Here is Dudman's first reponse to Appiah's account, pursued in greater generality - and even more relentlessly - in Probability and Assertion (below) after a reply from Appiah to the present article..
Indicative and Subjunctive, in Analysis vol. 48 (1988), pp. 113-122
Another matching pair of antique terms. English, as empirically minded grammarians have known for centuries, is not marked for mood. Therefore it has no subjunctive mood. Therefore it has no indicative mood either, for the very idea of an indicative mood only makes sense if there is something to contrast it with. As a consequence, any treatise on 'if' which lays out its taxonomy with the aid of these (unexplained) terms is for the bin. And again, that means ( almost) all of them. Certainly all the popular ones. Here it is. See Against the Indicative below for more detail, and aome sharp rebuttals of responses from various characters, amongst them the larger figure of Frank Jackson.
Vive La Révolution!, in Mind vol. 98 (1989), pp. 591-603
Fame at last! This is Dudman's grateful and generous response to a most influential article by The Apostate, which advertised some of Dudman's ideas to a wider public. The Apostate had raised a series of challenges for the Dudman view, and Our Leader responds. You can download it as a Word document in rtf. And just in case, here it is again in straight Word..
Grammar, Semantics and Conditionals, in Analysis vol.50 (1990), pp. 214-224
Jackson Classifying Conditionals, in Analysis vol. 51 (1991), pp. 131-136
Worth reading for two reasons. (a) it contains Dudman's account of the 'Sly Pete' case, famous example, discussed by all serious participants. (b) it demolishes (the only reasonable) attempt to accommodate the Sly Pete case into something resembling the traditional account. Oh, and Jackson gets his comeuppance, which is nice to see. Available in rtf or in straight Word.
Interpretations of 'If'-sentences, in Frank Jackson (ed.) Conditionals, New York:Oxford (1991)
The major opus of the early years - at least as far as logicians and philosophers are concerned.. Here are all the themes laid out in one piece. But therefore very compressed, and best read with the help of the rest of the opus.
Probability and Assertion, in Analysis vol. 52 (1992), pp. 204-211
Ernest Adams, famous philosopher, is celebrated for his cunning introduction of probability theory to this contentious area. His account is untenable, and this article shows you why. Read it in conjunction with "Appiah on 'If'".
A Popular Presumption Refuted, in The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 89 (1992), pp. 431-432
A little gem! The presumption in question is that English has a future tense, marked by 'will', and its refutation takes less than a page. Fortunately, the article is downloadable as a Word document in rtf. Or, if you like, in straight Word. Why not take a look?
On a Point of Logic, in Analysis vol. 54 (1994), pp. 208-214
If you only have time to master one article from the opus, master this one. It is a kick-sand-in-the-face killer. Here is its message:
There are two traditional ways of accounting for the semantics of sentences of the form "If the bough breaks, the cradle will fall". One, which treats of probability, we owe to Ernest Adams. The other, which invokes possible-worlds theory, we owe to David Lewis/Robert Stalnaker. This brief article (a) explains why both these traditional tries are hopeless. And (b) explains why these famous names sometimes seem to be getting things right.
On Conditionals, in The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 91 (1994) pp. 113-128
The major opus of the later years. All the familiar themes, but now decorated with time-line diagrams to illustrate how our understanding of projective messages operates in detail. Highly recommended. This article is downloadable from Jstor.
Against the Indicative, in The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol.72 (1994), pp.17-26
Repeats and adds to the message laid out in 'Indicative and Subjunctive' above. And this time really sticks the boot in. English has no subjunctive mood. Therefore it has no indicative mood either. The so-called English indicative corresponds only to a dreadful rag-bag compilation of different grammatical constructions. Which unsurprisingly leads philosophers who deploy these terms into grievous confusion and error. You can download this excellent piece as a Word document in rtf. Or in straight Word..
On the Grammar of Conditionals: Reply to Barker, in Analysis vol. 58 (1998), pp. 277-285
Much of the article is ad hominem, but in the course of setting up his refutation of Barker, Dudman (a) devises an astonishingly swift refutation of the thesis that conditionals have both antecedents and consequents, and (b) comes to a new and improved account of the outermost structure of conditional messages. This one is available online. Indeed, all issues of Analysis since 1997 are available online. But they don't have stable URLs, so you will have to search yourself. Begin here. Or, if you don't want to bother searching the Analysis archives, or haven't got free access to Ingenta, you can download a Word (rtf) version here. And a straight Word version here.
Classifying 'Conditionals': The Traditional Way Is Wrong, in Analysis vol. 60 (2000), p. 147
This is the most delicious short article I know. It is Dudman's straight-for-the-jugular refutation of The Apostate's recantation, and it is wonderfully swift. It is again available online with the appropriate permissions. But as it is so brief, I reproduce it here. If you like, you can also download a Word version in rtf. Or, if need be, in straight Word..
Three Twentieth-century Commonplaces about 'If', in History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 22 (2001), pp. 119-127
In this, his valedictory, Our Leader demolishes a set of recent and especially feeble attempts by various large figures to undermine his account of the Oswald Sentences. Here it is in pdf. He has now laid down his exquisite pen in order to concentrate on a further and greater task: that of understanding and explaining The English Modals. He will not write again on 'If'. From now on, battles must be fought by the Sons and Daughters. He leaves us one final message.
V.H. Dudman 
