

PY5325: Texts in Contemporary Metaphysics, Spring 2014

1. Practical Information for the Module

Contacts:

- Professor Katherine Hawley (kjh5, phone (46)2469, room G06 Edgecliffe). My schedule varies weekly, so I do not have regular office hours. But you are very welcome to make an appointment to see me, and you should do so as soon as possible if you are struggling with the module for any reason, or just want advice/suggestions for reading.
- Dr Aaron Cotnoir (ac117, phone (46)4438, room G07 Edgecliffe). Office hours: Mondays, 10.00–11.00 (or by appointment)

Class time: 1-3pm Thursdays, room 104 Edgecliffe.

Assessment: you are required to submit one 4000 word essay for this module, by **Monday 5th May**. In addition, you may submit an optional research plan of up to 1000 words, by Monday 14th April at the latest. We strongly encourage you to submit a research plan – sooner rather than later – so that we can provide feedback which will help you write your essay. You are encouraged to discuss your essay topic with Aaron or Katherine at any stage, and the sooner the better.

All coursework is to be submitted via the Module Management System. For full guidance on how to submit your work via MMS, read the Student Guide to MMS. <http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/philosophy/docs/mms_student_guide.pdf>

Coursework should be word-processed, double-spaced with one-and-a-half inch (4cm) margins. Coursework is marked anonymously, and so submitted work should be identified only by your matriculation number. Do not put your name anywhere on your coursework. On the first page of your coursework, you should include: your matriculation number, the module name and number, your tutor's name, the word count, the title of the essay, and the following statement: 'I hereby declare that the attached piece of written work is my own work and that I have not reproduced, without acknowledgement, the work of another'.

Please note that coursework must be in pdf format. This is to ensure that diagrams and symbols come out correctly. The word count for all coursework or for the dissertation should include all footnotes, endnotes, and quotes AND the bibliography. Part of your task in writing your abstract/essay is writing to the specified word limit: this is important preparation for professional writing either in academic philosophy or in the wider world.

2. Overview and Preparation

In this module we will discuss a range of issues concerned with identity, including the closely related topics of discernibility, bundle theory, the problem of change, multiple location, composition, necessity/contingency, relative identity, vagueness, the problem of the many, and metaontology.

There are three different types of preparatory reading you may find useful. You can start by reading a sequence of survey/overview articles on these topics. Try one of the following sets of articles:

- Sider, Hawthorne and Zimmerman, eds (2008): *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics*, Oxford: Blackwell (available in paperback). In particular, the pairs of chapters on persistence (Sider, Hawthorne), mereology (van Cleve, Markosian), or metaontology (Hirsch, Eklund).
- Philosophy Compass <http://www.blackwell-compass.com/subject/philosophy/> (university network only) has helpful articles on ‘The Open Future’ (Torre), ‘Ontic Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy’ (Barnes), ‘The Problem of Change’ (Wasserman), ‘Temporal Parts’ (McGrath), ‘Parts and Wholes’ (McDaniel), ‘Simples and Gunk’ (Hudson) and ‘Metaontology’ (Eklund). If you have some knowledge of physics, then also try ‘Persistence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime’ (Gilmore).
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/> (open access) is less focused, but you could read ‘Temporal Parts’ (Hawley), ‘Mereology’ (Varzi) if you have technical tastes, ‘The Problem of the Many’ (Weatherson), ‘Material Constitution’ (Wasserman), ‘Ordinary Objects’ (Korman) and/or ‘Change’ (Mortensen).

Depending on your background, you may find it useful to consult a general introduction to metaphysics whilst reading some of the above. Good ones include, in order of increasing length/detail:

- Conee, E. and Sider, T. (2007): *Riddles of Existence*, Oxford University Press.
- Loux, M (1998): *Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction*, London: Routledge. (Later editions are also fine.)
- Carroll, J. and Markosian, N. (2010): *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lowe, E.J. (2002): *A Survey of Metaphysics*, Oxford University Press.

For follow-up reading you can begin to investigate more deeply. You can of course take up the references in the introductory reading. Or you can tackle a contemporary classic monograph in this area of metaphysics. Try:

- Sider, T. (2001): *Four-Dimensionalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (available as an e-book through the library).
- Van Inwagen, P. (1990): *Material Beings*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Other resources:

- **Google Scholar** (<http://scholar.google.com/>) can be overwhelming, but it does link through to JSTOR etc if you’re on the university network. It is a good

way of finding an article or author you're already interested in. The 'Cited by' link helps locate published discussions of something you're interested in.

- The *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* is a huge resource, usually of very high quality: <http://plato.stanford.edu/> Try looking in the alphabetical table of contents for something resembling what you're interested in, and if that article's not quite right, follow the links for related entries at the end of the article.
- **Oxford Scholarship Online** gives access to many OUP books: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/philosophy/subject_home.html
- PhilPapers (www.philpapers.org) is an organised directory of philosophical papers and books. You can browse categories such as 'identity', or 'material objects', and investigate their sub-categories. A good strategy is to look up an article you already know to be relevant, check which category it falls under, then browse its neighbours.

3. Schedule and Key Reading

We have listed required reading for each week – everyone is expected to come to class prepared to discuss these items. Related reading will give you context or follow-ups, and will be useful for essay preparation. There is a lot of literature in this area, so we have just suggested some representative samples: if there is something particular you would like to follow up, please ask for more specific suggestions. Don't forget the *Philosophy Compass*, *Stanford Encyclopedia* and other surveys mentioned above. (NB we have listed our own publications where relevant, but please do not make these the focus of your essay.)

Each week, one student will begin the class by making a short presentation on the required reading. This should be maximum 20 minutes long, so you should not expect to cover every point in the reading: focus on highlighting a few key claims or arguments, and mentioning areas you would like to discuss further, issues you didn't understand, or questions you would like to raise.

Week 1 (30th January): Identity of Indiscernibles I

Required reading:

- Black, Max, 1952: 'The Identity of Indiscernibles', *Mind*, 61: 153-64.
- Hacking, Ian, 1975: 'The Identity of Indiscernibles', *Journal of Philosophy*, 72 (9): 249-256.

Related reading:

- Forrest, Peter, 2010: 'The Identity of Indiscernibles', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. [Good overview with helpful bibliography.]
- Della Rocca, Michael, 2005, "Two Spheres, Twenty Spheres, and the Identity of Indiscernibles", *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 86: 480–492.

- Hawley, Katherine, 2009, "Identity and Indiscernibility", *Mind*, 118: 101-119.
- Alexis Burgess (2012). A Puzzle About Identity. *Thought* 1 (2):90-99.
- French, Steven 1995: 'Hacking Away at the Identity of Indiscernibles', *Journal of Philosophy*, 92, pp. 455–66.
- French, Steven 2006: 'Identity and Individuality in Quantum Theory', The *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/qt-idind/>>.
- Caulton, Adam and Butterfield, Jeremy (2012): 'On Kinds of Indiscernibility in Logic and Metaphysics' *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 2012) 63 (1): 27-84. [logic & physics heavy]

Week 2 (6th February): Identity of Indiscernibles II – Bundle Theory

Required reading:

- James Van Cleve: 'Three Versions of the Bundle Theory', *Philosophical Studies* 47 (1):95 - 107 (1985)
- O'Leary-Hawthorne, John 1995: 'The Bundle Theory of Substance and the Identity of Indiscernibles', *Analysis*, 55, pp. 191–6.

Related reading:

- Hawthorne, John (2004): 'Identity', in *The Oxford Companion of Metaphysics*, edited by Michael J. Loux and Dean Zimmermann, Oxford: OUP, pp. 99-130. Reprinted in Hawthorne, J., *Metaphysical Essays*, ch.1, pp. 1-30.
- Christopher Hughes (1999). Bundle Theory From A to B. *Mind* 108 (429):149-156.
- Sun Demirli (2010). Indiscernibility and Bundles in a Structure. *Philosophical Studies* 7 (1):1-18.
- Hawthorne, John and Sider, Theodore 2002: 'Locations', *Philosophical Topics*, 30, pp. 53–76. [Also in Hawthorne's *Metaphysical Essays*.]
- Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2004). The Bundle Theory is Compatible with Distinct but Indiscernible Particulars. *Analysis* 64 (1):72–81.
- L. A. Paul (2002). Logical Parts. *Noûs* 36 (4):578–596.

Week 3 (13th February): Identity through Change

Required reading

- Lewis, David (1986): *On the Plurality of Worlds*, Blackwell., 202-204.
- Haslanger, Sally (1989). 'Endurance and Temporary Intrinsic' *Analysis* 49: 119-125.
- Eddon, Maya (2010): 'Three Arguments from Temporary Intrinsic', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 81.3: 605-19.

Related reading

- Donnelly, Maureen (2011): 'Endurantist and Perdurantist Accounts of Persistence', *Philosophical Studies* 154: 27-51.
- Sider, Theodore (2001): *Four-Dimensionalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rea, Michael C. (1998): 'Temporal Parts Unmotivated', *Philosophical Review* 107.2: 225-260.
- Hawley, Katherine: 'Lewis on Persistence' forthcoming in *Blackwell Companion to David Lewis*, eds Loewer and Schaffer. [on my website]
- Haslanger, Sally (2003): 'Persistence Through Time' in *The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics*, ed., M. Loux and D. Zimmerman. (Oxford: Oxford U. Press), pp. 315-354

Week 4 (20th February): Identity and Multi-Location

Required reading:

- Cody Gilmore (2007) 'Time Travel, Coinciding Objects, and Persistence.' in D. Zimmerman. ed. *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*. Vol. 3. Oxford: University Press. 177–198.
- Nikk Effingham & Jon Robson. (2007) 'A Mereological Challenge to Endurantism.' *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 85: 633–640.

Related reading

- Nikk Effingham (2010). 'Mereological Explanation and Time Travel.' *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 88(2): 333–345.
- Eagle, A. (2010) 'Location and Perdurantism,' in D. Zimmerman. ed. *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*. Vol. 5. Oxford: University Press. 53–94. [Reply to Gilmore]
- Cody Gilmore. (2010) 'Coinciding Objects and Duration Properties: Reply to Eagle.' in D. Zimmerman. ed. *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*. Vol. 5. Oxford: University Press. 95–111.
- Kris McDaniel (2003). No Paradox of Multi-Location. *Analysis* 63 (4):309–311.
- Helen Beebe & Michael Rush (2003). Non-Paradoxical Multi-Location. *Analysis* 63 (4):311–317
- Stephen Barker & Phil Dowe (2003). Paradoxes of Multi-Location. *Analysis* 63 (2):106–114
- Maureen Donnelly (2010). Parthood and Multi-Location. *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics* 5:203-243
- Kleinschmidt, S., 2011, "Multilocation and Mereology", in J. Hawthorne, ed., *Philosophical Perspectives*, 25: 253–276.
- Parsons, Josh. (2007). "Theories of Location." *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics* 3: 201–232.

Week 5 (6th March): Many-One Identity

Required reading:

- Lewis, David (1991): *Parts of Classes*, Oxford: Blackwell, section 3.6.
- Donald L. M. Baxter (1988). Many-One Identity. *Philosophical Papers* 17 (3):193-216.

Related reading:

- Wallace, Megan (2011): 'Composition as Identity 1' and 'Composition as Identity 2', *Philosophy Compass*, 6.11, pp. 804-816 and 817-827. [Lots more references in her bibliographies.]
- Van Inwagen, Peter (1994): 'Composition as Identity', *Philosophical Perspectives* 8: 207-220.
- Merricks, Trenton (1999): 'Composition as Identity, Mereological Essentialism and Counterpart Theory', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 77.2: 192-95.
- Sider, Theodore (2007): 'Parthood', *Philosophical Review* 116.1: 51-91.
- Cotnoir, Aaron (forthcoming): 'Composition as Identity: Framing the Debate', for *Composition as Identity*, co-edited with Donald Baxter, forthcoming with OUP [on Aaron's website].
- Cotnoir, Aaron (2013): 'Composition as General Identity', in *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*, eds. Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman, vol. 8: 294-322 .
- Hawley, Katherine (2013): 'Cotnoir on General Identity', in *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*, edited by Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman, vol. 8: 323-330 .
- Jason Turner (2013). Existence and Many-One Identity. *Philosophical Quarterly* 63 (250):313-329.

Week 6 (13th March): Absolute and Relative Identity

Required reading

- Geach, P.T., 1967: "Identity," *Review of Metaphysics*, 21: 3-12. Reprinted in Geach 1972, *Logic Matters*. Oxford: Blackwell pp. 238-247. (and available on JStor)
- Perry, John (1970): 'The Same *F*', *The Philosophical Review*, 79, pp.181-200.

Related reading

- Noonan, Harold: 'Relative Identity', in *Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Language*, edited by Crispin Wright and Bob Hale, 1997.
- Harry Deutsch, Relative Identity. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
- Koslicki, Kathrin, 2005: "Almost Indiscernible Objects and the Suspect Strategy," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 102: 55-77.
- Pawe Garbacz (2002). Logics of Relative Identity. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 43 (1):27-50. [logic heavy]
- Delia Graff Fara (2008). Relative-Sameness Counterpart Theory. *The Review of Symbolic Logic* 1 (2):167-189.

- E. J. Lowe (1986). Sortal Terms and Absolute Identity. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 64 (1):64 – 71.
- Jack Nelson (1970). Relative Identity. *Noûs* 4 (3):241-260.
- Ofra Magidor (2011). Arguments by Leibniz's Law in Metaphysics. *Philosophy Compass* 6 (3):180-195.

Week 7 (27th February): Necessary and Contingent Identity

Required reading

- Gibbard, Allan: (1975): 'Contingent Identity', *Journal of Philosophical Logic* Vol. 4, No. 2 (May, 1975), pp. 187-221
- Saul A. Kripke (1971). Identity and Necessity. In Milton K. Munitz (ed.), *Identity and Individuation*. New York University Press.

Related reading

- John P. Burgess (2013). On a Derivation of the Necessity of Identity. *Synthese*:1-19.
- Lowe, E.J. (1982): 'On the Alleged Necessity of the Identity Relation', *Mind* 91 (364):579-584 (1982)
- Wolfgang Schwarz (2013). Contingent Identity. *Philosophy Compass* 8 (5):486-495
- Saul A. Kripke (1980/1998). *Naming and Necessity*. Harvard University Press.
- Ralf M. Bader (2012). The Non-Transitivity of the Contingent and Occasional Identity Relations. *Philosophical Studies* 157 (1):141-152
- Yablo, S., 1987: "Identity, Essence and Indiscernibility," *Journal of Philosophy*, 84: 293-314.
- Joshua Schechter, (2011) "Weakly Classical Theories of Identity" *The Review of Symbolic Logic* 4 (4):607-644 [logic heavy]
- Zane Parks (1974). "Semantics for Contingent Identity Systems". *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 15 (2):333-334. [logic heavy]
- Timothy Williamson (2007). "Absolute Identity and Absolute Generality". In Gabriel Uzquiano & Agustín Rayo (eds.), *Absolute Generality*. OUP. [logic heavy]
- Mark Wilson (1983). "Why Contingent Identity is Necessary. *Philosophical Studies* 43 (3):301 - 327.
- Rosanna Keefe (1995). Contingent Identity and Vague Identity. *Analysis* 55 (3):183 - 190.
- Charles B. Cross (2011). Brute Facts, the Necessity of Identity, and the Identity of Indiscernibles. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 92 (1):1-10.

15th March – 30th March: Spring Break

Week 8 (3rd April): Vague Identity

Required reading

- Gareth Evans (1978). Can There Be Vague Objects? *Analysis* 38 (4):208.
- David Lewis (1988). Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood. *Analysis* 48 (3):128-130.
- Elizabeth Barnes (2009). Indeterminacy, Identity and Counterparts: Evans Reconsidered. *Synthese* 168 (1):81 - 96.

Related reading

- Elizabeth Barnes & J. R. G. Williams (2009). Vague Parts and Vague Identity. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 90 (2):176-187.
- Elizabeth Barnes (2010). Arguments Against Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vagueness. *Philosophy Compass* 5 (11):953-964
- J. A. Burgess (1989). Vague Identity: Evans Misrepresented. *Analysis* 49 (3):112 - 119.
- B. Jack Copeland (1997). Vague Identity and Fuzzy Logic. *Journal of Philosophy* 94 (10):514-534.
- Richard Heck (1998). That There Might Be Vague Objects (So Far as Concerns Logic). *The Monist* 81 (1):277-99.
- Rosanna Keefe (1995). Contingent Identity and Vague Identity. *Analysis* 55 (3):183 - 190.
- E. J. Lowe (2005). Identity, Vagueness, and Modality. In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), *Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans*. Clarendon Press.
- Kristie Miller (2006). Vagueness, Persistence and Indeterminate Identity. *Erkenntnis* 64 (2):223 - 230.
- Nicholas J. J. Smith (2008). Why Sense Cannot Be Made of Vague Identity. *Noûs* 42 (1):1–16.

Week 9 (10th April): The Problem of the Many

Required reading

- Lewis, David (1993): 'Many But Almost One', in Campbell, Bacon and Reinhardt (eds.) *Ontology, Causality and Mind*, Cambridge: CUP. Reprinted in Lewis's *Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology*, Cambridge: CUP (1999). (Google the title plus 'Andrew Bailey' to find a pdf.)
- McKinnon, Neil (2002): 'Supervaluations and the Problem of the Many' *Philosophical Quarterly* 52: 208, pp.320-339.

Related reading

- Hudson, Hud (2001): *A Materialist Metaphysic of the Human Person*, Ithaca: Cornell UP.
- Lowe, E. J. (1995) 'The Problem of the Many and the Vagueness of Constitution', *Analysis* 55: 179–82.
- Weatherson, Brian (2003): 'Many Many Problems' *Philosophical Quarterly*, 53: 481-501.
- Bennett, Karen (on her website): 'Lewis on Mereology' forthcoming in the *Blackwell Companion to David Lewis*, edited by Loewer and Schaffer.
- Donnelly, Maureen (2009): 'Mereological Vagueness and Existential Vagueness', *Synthese* 168: 53-79.

Week 10 (17th April): Criteria of Identity

Required reading:

- David Wiggins: 'Identity, Individuation and Substance', *European Journal of Philosophy* 20 (1):1-25 (2012)

Related Reading:

- Alan Sidelle (1992). Identity and the Identity-Like. *Philosophical Topics* 20 (1):269-292.
- Theodore Sider (2001). Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis. *Philosophical Perspectives* 15 (s15):189-209.
- Brian Epstein (2012). Sortals and Criteria of Identity. *Analysis* 72 (3):474-478.
- Katherine Hawley (2006). Principles of Composition and Criteria of Identity. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 84 (4):481 – 493.
- Hannes Leitgeb (2013). Criteria of Identity: Strong and Wrong. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 64 (1):61-68. [logic heavy]
- E. J. Lowe (1997). Objects and Criteria of Identity. In R. Hole & C. Wright (eds.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language*. Basil Blackwell.
- E. J. Lowe (1989) What is a criterion of identity? *Philosophical Quarterly* 39 (154):1-2
- Timothy Williamson (1986). Criteria of Identity and the Axiom of Choice. *Journal of Philosophy* 83 (7):380-394. [logic heavy]

Week 11 (24th April): Methodological Reflections

Required reading:

- Paul, L.A. (2012): "Metaphysics as Modeling: The Handmaiden's Tale." *Philosophical Studies* 160: 1-29
- Callendar, Craig (2011) "Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science" in French and Saatsi's *Continuum Companion to Philosophy of Science*. And on his website.

Related reading:

- Bennett, Karen (2009): 'Composition, Colocation and Metaontology', in *Metametaphysics*, edited by Chalmers, Manley and Wasserman, Oxford: OUP. Also available at her Cornell website.
- Hirsch, Eli (2008): 'Ontological Arguments: Interpretive Charity and Quantifier Variance', in *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics*, edited by Sider, Hawthorne and Zimmerman, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Eklund, Matti (2008): 'The Picture of Reality as an Amorphous Lump', in *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics*, edited by Sider, Hawthorne and Zimmerman, Oxford: Blackwell. Responds to Hirsch (2008).
- Hirsch, Eli (2005): 'Physical-object ontology, verbal disputes and common sense', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 70: 67-98.
- The *Metametaphysics* collection which contains the Bennett paper has lots of interesting stuff. You could start with David Manley's 'Introduction', and try Amie Thomasson (her book *Ordinary Objects* is also good), John Hawthorne or Kit Fine. Also check out Elizabeth Barnes's review in *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* [online].
- Sidelle, Alan (2010): 'Modality and Objects' *Philosophical Quarterly* 60: 109-125. Explores different versions of conventionalism in this area.
- Hawley, Katherine (2006): 'Science as a Guide to Metaphysics?' *Synthese*, 149: 451-470