EC5220 - Game Theory
Academic year
2022 to 2023 (Semester 2)
Curricular information may be subject to change
Further information on which modules are specific to your programme.
Key module information
SCOTCAT credits
20
SCQF level
SCQF level 11
Planned timetable
To be arranged.
Module coordinator
Dr L Bridet
Module Staff
Luc Bridet
Module description
This module will provide a thorough advanced treatment of the core models and concepts used in modern game theory. Many serious things in life are games. Game theory is a set of formal techniques used to study situations of strategic interaction. These are situations where the reward obtained by each member of a group (e.g. firms, political parties, students) depends not only on the decision made by that member, but also on the decisions made by everybody else; and, in addition, everybody is aware of this interdependence. The methods of game theory are widely used in contemporary economics. An acquaintance with them is essential to the accomplished economist. In fact, game theory provides a unified language to address a spectrum of problems which is not limited to economics. Topics covered will include: strategic games; mixed strategy equilibria; extensive form games (with perfect information); bargaining games; repeated games; games of incomplete information; implementation theory; and bounded rationality. Students are expected to have a strong undergraduate level training in microeconomics and relevant mathematical and statistical techniques.
Assessment pattern
3-hour Written Examination = 75%, Coursework = 25%
Re-assessment
3-hour Written Examination = 100%
Learning and teaching methods and delivery
Weekly contact
2 lectures, occasional tutorials.
Intended learning outcomes
- Understand the foundations of the formal approach to strategic thinking
- Learn basic analytic tools of Game Theory, such as dominant strategies and Nash equilibrium
- Be familiar the central concepts in probability and statistics used by econometricians
- Apply game theoretic tools to analyse simple strategic interactions