{"id":4072,"date":"2018-07-10T16:13:36","date_gmt":"2018-07-10T15:13:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/?post_type=tribe_events&#038;eventDate=2019-05-01#038;p=4067"},"modified":"2019-04-29T09:05:28","modified_gmt":"2019-04-29T08:05:28","slug":"epistemology-seminar-4-2019-05-01","status":"publish","type":"tribe_events","link":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/event\/epistemology-seminar-4-2019-05-01\/","title":{"rendered":"Epistemology Seminar: Peter Hawke (Amsterdam), &#8220;Relevant Alternatives and Missed Clues&#8221;"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Relevant Alternatives and Missed Clues: Redux<\/p>\n<p>I construe Relevant Alternatives Theory (RAT) as an abstract combination of epistemic fallibilism and epistemic modesty, then re-evaluate the challenge posed to it by the\u00a0<em>missed clue counterexamples\u00a0<\/em>of Schaffer (2002). The import of this challenge has been underestimated, since Schaffer\u2019s specific argument invites distracting objections. But more forceful and precise arguments are nearby. I offer a novel formalization of RAT that accommodates a suitably wide class of concrete theories. Then, I introduce\u00a0<em>abstract missed clue counterexamples\u00a0<\/em>and prove that every RA theory, as formalized, admits such a counter-example. This yields an argument &#8211; in the spirit of Schaffer\u2019s &#8211; that resists easy dismissal. To respond, the RA theorist must endorse an error theory concerning our intuitive judgments about missed clue cases. Her best bet is to admit a category of \u2018primitive\u2019 knowledge and explain the problematic intuitions as discomfort with acknowledging knowledge that has no rational basis.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Relevant Alternatives and Missed Clues: Redux I construe Relevant Alternatives Theory (RAT) as an abstract combination of epistemic fallibilism and epistemic modesty, then re-evaluate the&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_tribe_events_status":"","_tribe_events_status_reason":"","_tribe_events_is_hybrid":"","_tribe_events_is_virtual":"","_tribe_events_virtual_video_source":"","_tribe_events_virtual_embed_video":"","_tribe_events_virtual_linked_button_text":"","_tribe_events_virtual_linked_button":"","_tribe_events_virtual_show_embed_at":"","_tribe_events_virtual_show_embed_to":[],"_tribe_events_virtual_show_on_event":"","_tribe_events_virtual_show_on_views":"","_tribe_events_virtual_url":"","footnotes":"","_members_access_role":[],"_members_access_error":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"tags":[],"tribe_events_cat":[39],"class_list":["post-4072","tribe_events","type-tribe_events","status-publish","hentry","tribe_events_cat-epistemology-seminar","cat_epistemology-seminar"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events\/4072","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/tribe_events"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events\/4072\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4783,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events\/4072\/revisions\/4783"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4072"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4072"},{"taxonomy":"tribe_events_cat","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events_cat?post=4072"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}