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DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20160507
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20160510
DTSTAMP:20170917T233855Z
CREATED:20170917T233855Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20170917T233855Z
UID:10016791-1462611600-1462784399@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Testimony and Context
DESCRIPTION:Confirmed speakers are: Emma Borg (Reading)\, Herman Cappelen (Oslo/St Andrews)\, Rachel Fraser (Oxford)\, Lizzie Fricker (Oxford)\, Sandy Goldberg (Northwestern)\, Mikkel Gerken (Edinburgh)\, Patrick Greenough (St Andrews)\, Katherine Hawley (St Andrews)\, Andrew Peet (St Andrews) and Joey Pollock (Edinburgh) \nIn acquiring knowledge from others we rely on speakers to be reliable and honest\, and we rely on our own ability to understand what we have been told. Most research in the epistemology of testimony focuses on the former reliance. However\, our ability to communicate successfully is no less important. Moreover\, given the widespread context sensitivity of natural language it is puzzling that we seem able to reliably acquire testimonial knowledge. Thus\, a complete epistemology of testimony will consider not only the epistemology of our reliance on others\, but also the epistemology of linguistic communication. This conference brings together epistemologists and philosophers of language to explore the epistemology of testimony in light of the complexities of linguistic communication. Topics addressed include: \nWhat are the conditions for communicative success? \nWhat are the implications of semantic minimalism\, radical contextualism\, or speech act pluralism for the epistemology of testimony? \nHow reliable is linguistic communication? \nDoes contextual knowledge contribute to the justificatory status of testimonial beliefs? \nWhat are the implications of the semantic internalism/externalism debate for the epistemology of testimony? \nCan implicit or non-literal communication be a source of testimonial knowledge? \nSchedule\nSaturday 7th May\n\n13.00-14.30 Emma Borg Linguistic Meaning\, Context and Assertion\n14.30-14.45-Break\n14.45-16.15 Rachel Fraser Saying and ‘De Se’-ing\n16.15-16.30 Break\n16.30-18.00 Elizabeth Fricker On Not Being Able to Believe What One Is Told\n18.00-19.00 Reception Edgecliffe Rm 104\n19:45 Workshop Dinner – Forgans Restaurant\n\nSunday 8th May\n\n09.30-11.00 Katherine Hawley Telling or Trying to Tell?\n11.00-11.15 Break\n11.15-12.45 Andrew Peet Knowledge-Yielding Communication\n12.45-13.45 Lunch\n13.45-15.15 Joey Pollock Testimony and linguistic understanding\n15.15-16.45 Sandy Goldberg Context\, Assertibility\, and the Epistemology of Testimony\n\n16.45-17.00 Break\n\n17.00-18.00: Roundtable Discussion (Herman Cappelen\, Mikkel Gerken\, Patrick Greenough) \n\nThe Workshop organisers are Patrick Greenough and Andrew Peet. For more information\, please send an email to Patrick at pmg2@st-andrews.ac.uk or Andrew at arp7@st-andrews.ac.uk  \nThis event is open to all philosophers in Scotland and beyond and is made possible by the generous support of the Scots Philosophical Association \, The Mind Association and Aristotelian Society. \nTo register for this event\, please send an email to arche@st-andrews.ac.uk \n \n\nAbstracts\nEmma Borg\nLinguistic Meaning\, Context and Assertion  \nAbstract: This paper explores the difference between asserting and implying\, and the role the context of utterance plays in determining either kind of content. I begin by introducing two distinct approaches to the difference between asserting and implying: one which locates the difference in the language\, as it were\, and one which locates it in the mind. However I argue that both these approaches face problems. Instead then I argue that the distinction is better captured in sociolinguistic terms\, whereby the difference between asserting and merely implying emerges from the distinct kinds of social role these speech acts play. I conclude by sketching how this socially-orientated view of assertion relates to debates about how and where to draw the semantics/pragmatics boundary. \nRachel Fraser\nSaying and ‘De Se’-ing  \nAbstract: I look at the consequences of de se content and attitudes for the epistemology of testimony. \nLizzie Fricker\nOn Not Being Able to Believe What One Is Told  \nAbstract: Testimony is a means of spreading knowledge that has the potential to iterate: suppose A knowledgeably tells B that P\, and B takes her word for it\, thereby coming also to know that P; then B may in turn tell C that P\, who in turn passes on that knowledge further. This process can in principle continue without limit. This being so\, testimony can spread knowledge widely across both space and time: it is used both to pass on knowledge\, and when concretised in written form\, to preserve it for future generations. But for B to learn from A’s testimony she must understand it; and this requires shared meanings between speaker and hearer. So\, for testimony widely to spread knowledge\, and to preserve it\, there must be shared stable linguistic meanings of expressions of a common language. In this paper I explore how the fact of context-sensitivity in determination of reference of many expressions of natural language complicates\, and in some cases renders problematic\, this spreading and preserving of knowledge via spoken and written word. \nSandy Goldberg\nContext\, Assertibility\, and the Epistemology of Testimony  \nAbstract: Though by no means a consensus\, a popular view in the literature on assertion is that the standards for warranted assertion can vary with context. I will call such a view\, ‘Variability in Assertion’s Standard\,’ or ‘VAS’ for short. Most familiarly\, VAS has been used\, together with the Knowledge Norm of Assertion\, as part of an argument for a contextualist semantics for ‘knows’ (see e.g. DeRose 2002; Shaffer 2008 defends a contrastivist account on these grounds). Others have used VAS\, together with a commitment to an invariantist semantics for ‘knows’\, to reject the Knowledge Norm of Assertion itself\, in favor of a contextualist account of the norm of assertion (Levin 2008; Maitra and Weatherson 2010; Gerken 2014; Goldberg 2015; McKinnon 2015). One might also try to explain away the phenomena that appear to support VAS\, by arguing that what appear to be warranted assertions answering to different standards are actually no such thing. Perhaps this is because the appearance of warrantedness itself is illusory. Alternatively\, perhaps this is because the appearance of warranted acts of assertion is illusory (Turri 2010). While the discussion surrounding VAS has taken place mainly in the literature on assertion\, we can shed some light on the commitments of these various views by linking that discussion to the literature in the epistemology of testimony. On the (plausible if not universally-endorsed) assumption that the act of testifying requires a speech act that is governed by the norm of assertion\, I ask what the various views described above imply for the epistemology of testimony – in particular\, for the conditions on\, and prevalence of\, justified testimonial belief and testimonial knowledge. \nKatherine Hawley\nTelling or Trying to Tell?  \nAbstract: We do not always control which type of speech act we perform. This opens up a gap between telling and trying to tell. In this paper I explore the consequences of this gap for the ethics and epistemology of testimony. \nAndrew Peet\nKnowledge-Yielding Communication  \nAbstract: Testimonial knowledge is knowledge acquired through communication. A complete epistemology of testimony will include an account of the communicative preconditions for testimonial knowledge. This talk sets out to provide such an account. Several conditions are considered\, including coordination on content\, knowledge of what is said\, mutual understanding\, and the satisfaction of complex Gricean intentions. These views are found to be inadequate. The second half of the talk develops an anti-luck and anti-individualist account of the communicative preconditions for testimonial knowledge. \nJoey Pollock\nTestimony and Linguistic Understanding \nAbstract How well do we need to understand a speaker in order to gain knowledge from her speech? One attractive answer to this question is that we do not need a very sophisticated understanding of the content of a speaker’s testimony in order to gain knowledge from this testimony: so long as we grasp the right content\, it does not matter if we understand this content poorly. Such a view looks especially promising when combined with the thesis that we share a public language that makes it very easy to grasp the content of a speaker’s testimony. This picture is attractive because it allows us to claim that we often and easily gain knowledge from others. In this talk\, I argue that this picture is epistemically problematic. Unless a hearer possesses a relatively good understanding of what a speaker’s asserts\, her resultant testimonial belief will not be justified. Given that we often do not possess a sufficiently good understanding of the testimony we consume\, I argue that we acquire far less knowledge from testimony than is popularly thought.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/testimony-and-context/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104\, United College\, St Salvator's Quad\, St Andrews\, KY169AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Workshops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20151206
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20151209
DTSTAMP:20220117T165138Z
CREATED:20170917T234603Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220117T165138Z
UID:10016793-1449392400-1449565199@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemic Incoherence
DESCRIPTION:What is Epistemic Incoherence? In one form\, it is roughly the idea that the concept of knowledge/justification is incoherent. In another form\, it is the idea that the rules governing ‘knows’/’is justified in believing’ issue in contradictory instructions if sufficiently pressed. In another guise\, it is the (related) idea that the demands of rationality are incoherent in that they place inconsistent requirements on action. These ideas have been kicking around for a while — see Vogel (1990)\, Schiffer (1996)\, Weiner (2009)\, and Spicer (2008). However\, there has been little systematic scrutiny of the nature and scope of Epistemic Incoherence. The broad idea belongs to an older tradition that holds that many or even most philosophically interesting concepts are incoherent—an idea found in Dummett (1975) and Wittgenstein; see also Frege and Tarski (1944). This workshop aims to explore just what Epistemic Incoherence amounts to and whether it is a useful notion in coming to understand the many puzzles and paradoxes concerning knowledge. \nConfirmed speakers are: Herman Cappelen (Oslo) Matti Eklund (Uppsala) Claire Field (St Andrews) Patrick Greenough (St Andrews) Nick Hughes (St Andrews) Gillian Russell (UNC Chapel Hill) Kevin Scharp (Ohio State) Elia Zardini (Lisbon) \nProvisional Schedule\nSunday 6th December\n\n10:30-12:00 Nick Hughes (Oslo) Damned if You Do\, Damned if You Don’t: A Defense of Doxastic Dilemmas\n12.00-13.00 Lunch\n13:00-14:30 Herman Cappelen (Oslo/St Andrews). Inconsistent concepts: What they are and what to do about them\n14.30-14.45 Break\n14.45-16.15 Elia Zardini (Lisbon) Unstable Knowledge\n16.15-16.30 Break\n16.30-18.00 Patrick Greenough (St Andrews) Is “Knows” Incoherent? \n18:00-19:00 Workshop Reception\n19:30 Workshop dinner at Forgans \n\nMonday 7th December\n\n09.45-11.15 Gillian Russell (UNC Chapel Hill) Knowledge Attributions and Inconsistency\n11.15-11.30 Break\n11.30-13.00 Kevin Scharp (Ohio State) Replacing Knowledge\n13.00-14.15 Lunch\n14.15-15.45 Matti Eklund (Uppsala) Epistemology and Inconsistent Concepts\n15.45-16.00 Break\n16.00-17.30: Claire Field (St Andrews)  Rational Incoherence: how to make mistakes about what rationality requires\n\nThe Workshop organiser is Patrick Greenough. For more information\, please send an email to Patrick at pmg2@st-andrews.ac.uk \nThis event is open to all philosophers in Scotland and beyond and is made possible by the generous support of the Scots Philosophical Association and The Mind Association. \nTo register for this event\, please send an email to arche@st-andrews.ac.uk \n \n\nAbstracts\nMatti Eklund\nEpistemology and Inconsistent Concepts \nAbstract: In my talk I plan to address the following cluster of questions: Is the concept of knowledge inconsistent? And what should talk of inconsistency of concepts even be taken to mean and imply? If the concept of knowledge – and other central epistemic concepts – are inconsistent\, what implications does that have for epistemology? When addressing these questions I will keep relating to Matt Weiner’s important paper “The (Mostly Harmless) Inconsistency of Knowledge Ascriptions”. My own view is that the concept of knowledge is inconsistent (whether or not for the kinds of reasons Weiner adduces)\, but that this inconsistency does not immediately have any radical implications. \nClaire Field\nRational Incoherence: how to make mistakes about what rationality requires  \nAbstract: I argue that accepting two plausible claims about rationality leads to trouble when we consider agents with particular kinds of perspectives\, and that this trouble is best avoided by accepting a view I call ‘incoherentism’. The two claims are: (a) that rationality involves conformity to wide-scope consistency requirements and\, (b) that what it is rational for you to believe is determined at least to some extent by features of your perspective. However\, all sorts of perspectives are possible\, including perspectives that misleadingly support falsehoods about what rationality requires – that is\, they support ‘mistakes’ about what rationality requires. Believing what is intelligible from these perspectives will mean that in fulfilling claim (b)\, agents will contravene (a). What\, then\, should agents with mistake-supporting perspectives believe\, according to rationality? I consider three views that offer an answer to this question: perspectivism\, dogmatism\, and incoherentism. I argue that despite its counterintuitive consequences – notably its rejection of the enkratic principle – incoherentism is the best solution if we want to retain both claims. \nNick Hughes\nDamned if You Do\, Damned if You Don’t: A Defense of Doxastic Dilemmas \nAbstract: I raise a challenge for the view that knowledge is the norm of belief in the sense that it is epistemically permissible to believe that p only if one knows that p. I then survey possible responses to the challenge. One of the responses involves embracing the existence of doxastic dilemmas: situations in which one faces conflicting epistemic obligations with respect to doxastic attitude formation with the result no matter what doxastic attitude one takes\, one is doomed to violate at least one epistemic obligation. I offer the beginnings of a defense of this view by considering and rejecting one important objection to it. \nKevin Scharp\nReplacing Knowledge \nAbstract: Of the dozens of purported solutions to epistemological skepticism published in the past fifty years\, the vast majority are “traditional” in the sense that they reject one of the premises or inference rules that are used to derive the skeptical conclusion. Over the years\, however\, several philosophers have developed an alternative to the traditional approaches; according to them\, our very competence with the concept of knowledge leads us to accept that the reasoning used to derive the skeptical conclusion. That is\, our conceptual competence leads us into skepticism. We can call this alternative the inconsistency approach to skepticism. Although this approach has many positive features\, I argue that several of the well-developed versions of it that have appeared recently are unacceptable. In particular\, they do not recognize that if knowledge is an inconsistent concept\, then we should replace it with new concepts that do the work of knowledge without giving rise to skeptical problems. I outline an inconsistency approach to epistemological skepticism that satisfies this condition. \nElia Zardini\nUnstable Knowledge \nAbstract: I start by arguing that the Knower paradox offers underappreciated resistance to standard non-classical approaches to the paradoxes of self-reference\, because of the divergence they require between rejecting a sentence and accepting its negation. I move on to address a problem which the Knower paradox raises for my own favoured non-contractive\, instability-based approach\, and which consists in the apparent lack of a suitable principle of “epistemic ascent”. Shifting from logic and metaphysics to pragmatics\, I defend the coherence and reasonableness of accepting sentences (like the Knower sentence or its negation) that express unstable states-of-affairs. Consequently\, appealing to unusual conceptual resources\, I close by revealing whether paradoxical sentences are true or not…
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemic-incoherence/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104\, United College\, St Salvator's Quad\, St Andrews\, KY169AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Workshops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20141101
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20141104
DTSTAMP:20170917T172947Z
CREATED:20170917T172947Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20170917T172947Z
UID:10016785-1414832400-1415005199@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Mereology Workshop
DESCRIPTION:Mereology is the formal theory of parts and wholes. It has become increasingly important in philosophical disputes in metaphysics and has found application in areas such as formal semantics\, the philosophy of mathematics\, and computer science. The aim of this workshop is to bring together researchers who are at the cutting edge of research into mereology and its applications. \nConfirmed speakers are: \, Kris McDaniel (Syracuse)\, Josh Parsons (Oxford)\, Marin Pickup (Oxford)\, Caroline Touborg (St Andrews)\, Achille Varzi (Columbia)\, Gabriel Uzquiano (USC/Arche) \nSchedule\nSaturday 1st Nov\n\n10:00-10:30 Coffee\n10:30-12:00 Josh Parsons The Earth and the Aleph  \n\nAisling Crean – chair\n\n\n12:00-14:00 Lunch\n14:00-15:30 Gabriel Uzquiano Ex Uno Plures: From Plenitude to Plural Coincidence \n\nMichael Traynor – chair\n\n\n15:30-16:00 Coffee\n16:00-17:30 Kris McDaniel Non-Standard Mereology: Questions about the Dialectical Situation \n\nMartin Lipman – chair\n\n\n19:00 Workshop Dinner at the  Russell Hotel \n\nSunday 2nd Nov\n\n10:00-10:30 Coffee\n10:30-12:00 Martin Pickup Situations and Persistence through Change\n\n Patrik Hummel – chair\n\n\n12:00-14:00 Lunch\n14:00-15:30 Caroline Touborg Admissible ways of counting \n\nStephen Read – chair\n\n\n15:30-16:00 Coffee\n16:00-17:30 Achille Varzi Atomism\, Gunk\, and the Limits of “Composition”\n\n Aaron Cotnoir – chair\n\n\n\nFor more information\, please send an email to the workshop organisers at arche@st-andrews.ac.uk \n\nAbstracts\nMartin Pickup\nSituations and Persistence through Change \nAbstract: In talk I present a new way to understand the persistence of material objects through change. It is a view that solves the problem of change\, which is the problem of how one and the same thing can have incompatible properties (at different times) without contradiction. To describe the view\, I will firstelaborate a metaphysical picture of the world that is drawn from the Fragmentalism of Kit Fine before giving some concrete shape to the metaphysics by modelling it using the tools of situation semantics. The key notion is mereological: fundamental reality is inherently partial and the combination of these parts leads to truth-value gaps. This view\, which I callsituationalism\, gives a new account of change and of the world more generally. The primary aim of the paper is therefore to providing a new theory of persistence. But thereis a subsidiary aim too: to get a better handle on the claims of Fragmentalism by cashing out the metaphysics in this novel context. \nCaroline Touborg\nAdmissible ways of counting \nAbstract: Imagine that you are looking up at the night sky. What you see\, one might say\, is just stuff. This stuff can be carved up into objects in many different ways. On one way of carving up what you see\, you might count a particular portion of stuff as one galaxy; on another\, you might count the same portion of stuff as many stars. Once we become aware of these different ways of counting – each corresponding to a way of carving up the world – we might ask: what does it take for a way of counting to be admissible\, in the sense that it accurately reflects the structure of the world? In this talk\, I propose a way of making such a notion of admissibility precise. I then go on to show how this gives us a new framework for thinking about the question: when do some objects compose one object? \nGabriel Uzquano\nEx Uno Plures: From Plenitude to Plural Coincidence \nAbstract: Consider the thesis that the Supreme Court is not identical to the set of Supreme Court Justices because the two exemplify different modal profiles. Furthermore\, the Supreme Court Justices compose the Supreme Court only to the extent to which they stand in a certain complex relation to each other. There is nothing special about the Supreme Court. Some individuals make up a queue only to the extent to which they stand in some spatial relation to each other. Nor is the phenomenon restricted to social groups; the Shetland Islands are composed of several islands\, but the archipelago is not to be identified with the set of them. Now\, the question naturally arises: under what conditions do some objects compose a group? It might seem objectionable to answer that they do only when such a group is recognized by common sense. So\, one may be tempted by a plenitudinous answer according to which no matter what some objects may be\, if they bear a certain relation to each other\, there is a group to which they belong to the extent to which they stand in the relation. This thought\, if taken seriously\, might force one to rethink the claim that a group is a single composite object over and above its members. \nAchille Varzi\nAtomism\, Gunk\, and the Limits of “Composition” \nAbstract: It is customary practice to define ‘x is a composed of the ys’ as ‘x is a sum of the ys and the ys are pairwise disjoint (i.e.\, no two of them have any parts in common)’. This predicate has played a central role in the debate on the special composition question and on related metaphysical issues concerning the mereological structure of objects. In this talk I will argue that the customary characterization is nonetheless inadequate. I will do so by constructing a mereological model where everything qualifies as composed of atoms even though some elements in the domain are gunky\, i.e.\, can be divided indefinitely into smaller and smaller proper parts.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/mereology-workshop/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104\, United College\, St Salvator's Quad\, St Andrews\, KY169AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Workshops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20141011
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20141014
DTSTAMP:20210315T102448Z
CREATED:20210310T122722Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210315T102448Z
UID:10017465-1413018000-1413190799@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Non-Alethic Aims of Enquiry
DESCRIPTION:Everyone admits that some theories are better than others. What makes good theories good? A natural first thought is that an ideal theory must at least be true\, so our acceptance of our best current theories rests on the idea that they are at least closer to truth than the seemingly inferior theories that they superseded. But this conception of inquiry has been called into question. Philosophers of science\, in particular\, have often maintained that scientific theories aim at usefulness\, or at observational adequacy\, so that an ideal scientific theory might be (at least in part) untrue. Despite much debate about particular views of scientific inquiry\, general questions about the metaphysics and epistemology of claims about aims and theoretical success have been relatively neglected. What are aims? What makes it the case that a given discipline (or theorist\, or theory) is aimed at truth\, and how can we tell? Moreover\, these questions are rarely addressed outside of philosophy of science. How do these debates play out with respect to theorizing in other areas (including philosophy itself)? Questions to be addressed include: \nDoes inquiry (in science\, in philosophy\, or elsewhere) aim at truth? If not\, what constitutes progress in these areas of inquiry?\nHow can we evaluate claims about aims?\nPlausibly\, most if not all forms of inquiry have multiple aims. (Even those who maintain that truth is an aim typically deny that compiling trivial truths is sufficient for theoretical success – features such as explanatory scope and power\, simplicity\, novelty\, beauty\, etc. are also necessary.) How are these aims related?\nWhat psychological states (belief\, suspension of belief\, etc.) are involved in inquiry? How do questions about the aims of theoretical inquiry relate to questions about the aims of psychological states\, such as belief?\nDo the roles of idealisations\, abstractions\, and models in some theoretical disciplines suggest that these disciplines do not aim at truth?\nSome well-known models of assertion and belief\, and of representational content generally\, (e.g.\, Stalnaker’s) seem to presuppose that inquiry aims at truth. How can these models be adapted to forms of inquiry that are not focused on truth? \nSpeakers include: Derek Ball (St Andrews)\, Nancy Cartwright (Durham/UCSD)\, Jane Friedman (NYU)\, Allan Hazlett (Edinburgh)\, Juha Saatsi (Leeds)\, Andreas Stokke (Umea) \nSaturday: \n09:30 – 10:00 Coffee/Tea\n10:00 -11:30 Allan Hazlett Understanding and Structure\n11:30 -12:00 Coffee\n12:00 -13:30 Juha Saatsi tba\n13:30 -14:30 Lunch\n14:30 -16:00 Jane Friedman Inquiry and the Doxastic Attitudes \nTba\nConference dinner\n Sunday: \n09:30 – 10:00 Coffee/Tea\n10:00 – 11:30 Derek Ball Untrue and Unbelievable: Assertion and Inquiry in Philosophy\n11:30 -12:00 Coffee\n12:00 -13:30 Andreas Stokke tba\n13:30 – 14:30 Lunch\n14:30 – 16:00 Nancy Cartwright tba\nThis event is made possible by the generous support of the Scots Philosophical Association. \nFor more information\, please send an email to the workshop organisers at arche@st-andrews.ac.uk \n 
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/non-alethic-aims-of-enquiry/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104\, United College\, St Salvator's Quad\, St Andrews\, KY169AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Workshops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20140616
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20140620
DTSTAMP:20210315T102109Z
CREATED:20210310T121132Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210315T102109Z
UID:10017462-1402909200-1403168399@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Gibbard on Meaning and Normativity
DESCRIPTION:A workshop on themes from Allan Gibbard’s book\, Meaning and Normativity. \nConfirmed speakers are: Derek Ball (St Andrews)\, Josh Dever (Texas)\, Allan Gibbard\, and Anandi Hattigandi (Stockholm) \, Dilip Ninan (Tufts)\, Åsa Wikforss (Stockholm)\, Seth Yalcin (Berkeley) \nSchedule\nMonday 16th June\n\n10:00 – 11:30 Allan Gibbard\n13:00 – 14:30. Allan Gibbard\n\nTuesday 17th June\n\n\n\n10:00-11:30 Åsa Wikforss ‘Does Semantics Need Normativity?’\n11:30-11:45 Short break\n11:45-13:15 Derek Ball tba\n13:15-14:30 Lunch\n14:30-16:00 Anandi Hattiangadi ‘The Limits of Expressivism.’\n16:00-16:30 Tea/coffee\n\n\n\n  \nWednesday 18th June\n\n10:00-11:30 Dilip Ninan“Gibbard on the Objects of Belief”\n11:30-11:45 Break\n11:45-13:15 Josh Dever tba\n13:15-14:30 Lunch\n14:30-16:00 Seth Yalcin tba\n\nFor more information about this event\, please send an email to the workshop organisers at arche@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/gibbard-on-meaning-and-normativity/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104\, United College\, St Salvator's Quad\, St Andrews\, KY169AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Workshops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20140605
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20140608
DTSTAMP:20210315T101830Z
CREATED:20210310T120441Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210315T101830Z
UID:10017461-1401958800-1402131599@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Tense in Semantics and Philosophy of Language
DESCRIPTION:This workshop aims to bring together researchers from philosophy and linguistics to discuss tense in natural language. Among the questions to be addressed may be the following: \nShould tense be analyzed with object-language quantifiers and variables\, or could an adequate analysis be provided using Priorian operators?\nTo what extent should tense and modality receive parallel treatments in semantics?\nWhat can we learn from data concerning embedded tenses?\nDoes the semantics of tense tell us anything about the metaphysics of time\, or vice versa?\nAre propositions temporally neutral\, or are they time-specific objects with eternal truth-conditions?\nCan the compositional semantics of tense tell us anything about whether temporalism or eternalism about propositions is correct?\nWhat is the status of the Kaplanian “operator argument” for temporalism?\nConfirmed speakers are: Dorit Abusch (Cornell) Berit Brogaard (Missouri) Peter Ludlow (Northwstern) Angelika Kratzer (UMass Amherst) Brian Rabern (Edinburgh) Mark Steedman (Edinburgh) \nSchedule\nThursday 5th June\n10:00-11:30 Brian Rabern The compositionality argument for temporalism\n11:30-11:45 Short break\n11:45-13:15 Mark Steedman Computation\, Probability\, and Temporal Ontology\n13:15-14:30 Lunch\n14:30-16:00 Berit Brogaard Temporalism and the Problem of Intentionality\n16:00-16:30 Tea/coffee \nFriday 6th June\n10:00-11:30 Peter Ludlow Four-dimensional Tensism\n11:30-11:45 Break\n11:45-13:15 Dorit Abusch Temporal succession and aspectual type in visual narrative\n13:15-14:30 Lunch\n14:30-16:00 Angelika Kratzer Representing temporal relations\nThis event is made possible by the generous support of the Scots Philosophical Association. \n \nFor more information about this event\, please send an email to the workshop organisers at arche@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/tense-in-semantics-and-philosophy-of-language/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104\, United College\, St Salvator's Quad\, St Andrews\, KY169AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Workshops
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DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20131116
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20131118
DTSTAMP:20170917T173536Z
CREATED:20170917T173426Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20170917T173536Z
UID:10016786-1384592400-1384678799@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Formal Metaphysics Workshop
DESCRIPTION:Confirmed speakers include: Mark Jago (Nottingham)\, Jean-David Lafrance (Oxford) Bryan Pickel (Edinburgh) \nSchedule\n09:00 – 10:20 Jean-David Lafrance  On the Fusion of an Object with Itself \n10:20 – 10:30 tea/coffee\n10:30 – 11:50 Aaron J Cotnoir Composite Objects as Ersatz Constructions\n11:50 – 12:00 break\n12:00 – 13:20 Bryan Pickel In Defence of Tarski on Variables \n13:20 – 14:30 lunch\n14:30 – 15:50 Bruno Jacinto\nSupervaluationism\, its Model -Theory and Higher-Order Vagueness \n15:50 – 16:00 tea/coffee\n16:00 – 17:20 Mark Jago Truthmaking Logics\n19:00 Workshop dinner at Playfairs Restaurant \nFor more information about this event\, please send an email to the workshop organisers at  arche@st-andrews.ac.uk \nThis workshop has been sponsored by the Scots Philosophical Association \n \n\nAbstracts\nAaron Cotnoir\nComposite Objects as Ersatz Constructions  \nAbstract: In this paper\, I explore an under-represented view in the metaphysics of material objects — what I call mereological ersatzism\, or the view that ordinary objects are set-theoretic constructions built up from fundamental things. I show how ersatzists can represent any mereological structure\, and any non-emergent properties of macrophysical objects. The technique applies some formal results in temporal logics in a novel way. \nMark Jago\nTruthmaking Logics  \nAbstract: This paper describes preliminary investigations into truthmaking logic. I develop several semantics in terms of truthmakers\, and use these to construct various notions of truthmaking entailment\, which stands to classical entailment as truthmaking stands to truth. The resulting logics are relevant logics\, and this fact provides a neat way to give semantics for (some) relevant logics in terms of a truth-like notion. I present a number of technical results about these truthmaking semantics\, and discuss some of their philosophical applications. \nJean-David Lafrance\nOn the Fusion of an Object with Itself  \nAbstract: Any object is both the mereological fusion of its proper parts and of its improper part: an object fuses the many things that are parts of it\, as well as itself. Surprisingly\, many philosophers think that the fusion of an object with itself could be another\, distinct object. They contend that an object that is (wholly) located at more than one place at once can compose alone a further thing. In these cases\, the operation of fusion operates on an object\, but results in something that is not the object. I call ‘cases of magical composition’ these alleged cases of composition\, and I argue that they are not coherent. Along the way\, I show that we should think of cases of magical composition as cases of coincidence. \nBryan Pickel\nIn Defence of Tarski on Variables  \nAbstract: The theory of quantification developed by Tarski is a fixed point for many debates in metaphysics\, formal semantics\, and philosophy of logic. Kit Fine (2003\,2007) has offered an intriguing set of challenges to Tarski’s account\, which threaten to undermine it at its very heart. Fine insists that a version of Russell’s “antimony of the variable” plagues all extant treatments of variables\, including the standard Tarskian approach. He says\, “There are deep problems concerning the role of variables that have never been properly recognized\, let alone solved\, and once we attempt to solve them we see that they have profound implications not only for our understanding of variables but also for our understanding of other forms of expression and for the general nature of semantics.” We show how Fine’s arguments can be resisted\, and thus that there is no compelling reason to abandon the Tarskian semantics of variables and variable binding. \nBruno Jacinto\nSupervaluationism\, its Model-Theory and Higher-Order Vagueness  \nAbstract: Some attempts to capture the supervaluationist logic for a propositional language with a ‘definitely’ operator (standing for supertruth) have made use of model-theoretic semantics for modal logic\, with some debate ensuing concerning what are the definitions of model\, truth in a model and validity that best capture the commitments of supervaluationists. I show how Williamson’s (1994) suggestion of seeing the points in a supervaluationist model as ω-level precisifications leads to definitions of these notions that the supervaluationist should see as appropriately reflecting their commitments\, and a fortiori\, to the correct supervaluationist logic for the language in question. Furthermore\, I show that the resulting semantics provides the supervaluationist with a sound reply to Delia Graff Fara’s gap-principles’ argument\, an argument purporting to show that there is some incoherency in the supervaluationist position\, since given a finite sorites series for a vague predicate\, not all of its gap-principles can be true.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/formal-metaphysics-workshop/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104\, United College\, St Salvator's Quad\, St Andrews\, KY169AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Workshops
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