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DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220418
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220420
DTSTAMP:20211214T160016Z
CREATED:20211214T092102Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211214T160016Z
UID:10017715-1650272400-1650358799@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Logic of Identity
DESCRIPTION:Given a theory – e.g.\, in mathematics\, theology\, physics\, sociology\, political theory – what is it for the objects of that theory to be identical? Not all true theories give the same answer: it can depend on the objects of the theory. The logic of identity\, as current research stands\, is largely confined to the standard framework of classical logic. Non-classical logics have proven to be important in philosophy\, and they are promising for related disciplines. What we lack\, as current research stands\, are natural\, simple\, and widely applicable accounts of identity for the family of non-classical frameworks. This one-day Arché workshop will explore the prospects for non-classical logical approaches to identity and their possible applications.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/logic-of-identity/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Workshops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220418T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220418T170000
DTSTAMP:20220414T151956Z
CREATED:20210628T121010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220414T151956Z
UID:10017567-1650272400-1650301200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Workshop: Logic of Identity
DESCRIPTION:Given a theory – e.g.\, in mathematics\, theology\, physics\, sociology\, political theory – what is it for the objects of that theory to be identical? Not all true theories give the same answer: it can depend on the objects of the theory. The logic of identity\, as current research stands\, is largely confined to the standard framework of classical logic. Non-classical logics have proven to be important in philosophy\, and they are promising for related disciplines. What we lack\, as current research stands\, are natural\, simple\, and widely applicable accounts of identity for the family of non-classical frameworks. This one-day Arché workshop will explore the prospects for non-classical logical approaches to identity and their possible applications. \nVenue: G03\, Edgecliffe\nTime: From 9am till 5pm on Monday April 18th\, 2022 (BST)\nFormat: In person\nRegistration:  Please register your interest in attending by emailing our workshop organisers at mn85@st-andrews.ac.uk \nSchedule \n\n9.00-9.30 Coffee and registration\n9.30-10.45 Speaker: Matteo Nizzardo (University of St Andrews)\nTitle: The Identity of Indiscernibles’ Weakest Interesting Interpretation\n10.45-11.15 Coffee\n11.15-12.30 Speaker: JC Beall (University of Notre Dame)\nTitle: The leibnizian recipe\, difference makers\, and relative identity\n12.30-14.00 Lunch break\n14.00-15.15 Speaker: Greg Restall (University of St Andrews)\nTitle: Exploring three-valued models for identity\n15:15-15.45 Coffee\n15:45-17:00 Franz Berto (University of St Andrews)\nTitle: Counting the Particles: Permutations\, Identity\, and Indiscernibility\n\nTitles and Abstracts \nMatteo Nizzardo — The Identity of Indiscernibles’ Weakest Interesting Interpretation \nAccording to Strawson (1959) the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) holds that no two individuals can share all their qualitative properties. This has been challenged by Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006)\, who suggests a weaker non-trivial interpretation of PII according to which no two individuals can share all their nontrivializing properties. I argue that Rodriguez-Pereyra’s reading of PII entails an infinite regress\, which can be avoided only by committing to individuals that differ only numerically. I generalise the result to any interpretation of PII that is weaker than Strawson’s\, and conclude that the weakest interesting version of PII is the one restricting the domain of quantification to qualitative properties only. \n  \nJC Beall — The leibnizian recipe\, difference makers\, and relative identity \nI think of identity relations as the product of the leibnizian recipe\, which basically defines an identity relation R via a biconditional scheme: \naRb is true iff all relevant instances of PHI(a)<—>PHI(b) are true. \naRb is false iff some relevant instance of PHI(a)<—>PHI(b) is false. \nClearly\, the entailment behavior of the identity relation R will turn not only on the entailment behavior of the biconditional in the scheme but also on the range of the schematic variable. Example: use classical-logic ingredients (ergo\, classical material conditional) and R is an equivalence relation. Use subclassical ingredients (e.g.\, FDE) and\, well\, R certainly needn’t be an equivalence relation (though\, in the confines of some theories\, can be an equivalence relation\, depending on the language of the given theory and especially the range of PHI). \nAll of this is familiar; it’s basically the standard recipe for identity relations. (And if you shop at the standard store for your ingredients\, you’ll get the standard identity relation sometimes called ‘classical identity’.) Let’s assume — as I in fact believe — that this standard recipe is correct (though standard ingredients aren’t necessary). \nAgainst the backdrop of (by my lights) the somewhat perplexing debate over “relative identity” (e.g.\, Geach\, Martin\, van Inwagen\, Rea)\, I show that relative identity relations simply drop out of the standard leibnizian recipe\, at least if associated sets of “difference makers” are made explicit. \nAgainst some (so-called “pure”) relative-identity theorists\, I think that we have not only a gazillion relative-identity relations (as all relative-identity theorists believe); we also have many (if not exactly a gazillion) non-relative identity relations — all easily traced back to the leibnizian recipe. \nThe result should be good news for so-called relative-identity theorists. The reason is that\, to my knowledge\, such theorists never actually explicitly define relative-identity relations; they just wave at features of “is-the-same-PHI-as” that’s supposed to somehow define the relations. (But they don’t\, so far as I’ve seen.) If I’m right\, relative-identity theorists are just leibnizian-recipe theorists with a few small twists.   \n  \nGreg Restall — Exploring three-valued models for identity\n \nThere is an very natural way to interpret the propositional connectives and quantifiers\, relative to the algebra of three semantic values\, {0\, i\, 1} where 0 and 1 are understood as the traditional values of falsity and truth\, and the third value is some intermediate value. The evaluation clauses do not\, by themselves\, determine the logic\, because for that\, you need to determine how models are used to provide a counterexample to a sequent. If a counterexample is given by a model that assigns every premise the value 1 and assigns every conclusion a value other than 1\, the resulting logic is Kleene’s strong three-valued logic\, K3. If a counterexample is a model assigning every premise the value 1 or i and every conclusion the value 0\, the resulting logic is Priest’s logic of paradox\, LP. If a counterexample is a model assigning every premise the value 1 and every conclusion the value 0\, you get the logic ST of Strict-Tolerant validity. ST is distinctive\, in that it is\, in some sense\, classical logic—every classically valid sequent in this language is ST-valid—but since it has strictly non-classical models\, there are ST theories which are not classical theories. \nWhat does this mean for the logic of identity in a three-valued context? \nIn this talk\, I will explain how the classical logic of identity\, when interpreted in ST models\, gives us a well-behaved class of three-valued models for identity—much larger than the traditional models for identity\, used by afficianados of LP or K3—which can be used to model the distinctive non-classical behaviour of identity statements\, with a greater degree of freedom than we might have thought. \n  \nFranz Berto — Counting the Particles: Permutations\, Identity\, and Indiscernibility  \nI’d like to attack a certain view: the view that the concept of identity can fail to apply to some things although\, for some positive integer n\, we have n of them. The idea of entities without self-identity is seriously entertained in the philosophy of quantum mechanics. It is so pervasive that it has been labelled the Received View. In this talk\, I introduce the Received View; I explain what I mean by “entity” (synonymously\, by “object” and “thing”)\, and I argue that supporters of the Received View should agree with my characterization of the corresponding notion of entity (object\, thing). I also explain what I mean by “identity”\, and I show that supporters of the Received View agree with my characterization of that notion. Then\, I argue that the concept of identity\, so characterized\, is one with the concept of oneness. Thus\, it cannot but apply to what belongs to a collection with n elements\, n being a positive integer. I add some considerations on the primitiveness of identity or unity and the status of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Finally\, I say something on the problem of how reference to indiscernible objects with identity can be achieved.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-seminar-6-2022-04-18/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220411
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220413
DTSTAMP:20220517T125304Z
CREATED:20211214T091754Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220517T125304Z
UID:10017714-1649667600-1649753999@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Logical Disagreement
DESCRIPTION:Over the past fifteen years the epistemology of disagreement has been one of the most widely discussed research topics in epistemology. A special case of disagreement is logical disagreement\, i.e. disputes regarding the validity of certain inferences\, or the status of fundamental logical principles. This one-day Arché workshop is dedicated to the topic Disagreement in Logic and related issues such as logical pluralism\, the normativity of logic\, logical evidence. It will feature renowned experts of the epistemology of logic as well as early-career researchers. \nVenue: G03\, Edgecliffe\nTime: From 9am till 6pm on Monday April 11th\, 2022 (GMT)\nFormat: In person\nRegistration:  Please register your interest in attending by emailing our workshop organisers at fja4@st-andrews.ac.uk. \nSchedule\n• 9.00-9.30 Coffee and registration\n• 9.30-10.30 Speaker: Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm University)\nTitle: A Puzzle about Logical Disagreement\n• 10.30-11.00 Coffee\n• 11.00-12.00 Speaker: Alessandro Rossi (NCH)\nTitle: The Contingently Non-Concrete. Or Real Rivalry in the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic\n• 12.00-13.30 Lunch (vegetarian and vegan options available)\n• 13.30-14.30 Speaker: Claire Field (University of Stirling)\nTitle: Rational Incoherence for Logical and Non-Logical Requirements\n• 14.30-15.00 Coffee\n• 15.00-16.00 Frederik J. Andersen (University of St Andrews)\nTitle: Logical Akrasia\n• 16.00-16.30 Coffee\n• 16.30-17.30 Speaker: Jc Beall (University of Notre Dame)\nTitle: Classical logic is dead. Long live classical logic \nTitles and Abstracts \nAnandi Hattiangadi—A Puzzle about Logical Disagreement\nLogical disagreement is comprehensive: proponents of different logics disagree not only about the validity of particular logical laws\, but about the meanings of the logical constants\, and about the meaning or extension of the concept of logical consequence itself. This raises a puzzle. On the face of it\, there appear to be genuine disagreements about logic. However\, genuine disagreement requires a common subject matter about which to disagree: if A and B are not talking about the same thing\, then they are talking past one another; any apparent disagreement between them is merely verbal. The trouble is that since logical disagreement is so often comprehensive\, proponents of different logics seem to have too little in common to determine a common subject matter about which to disagree. If A and B apparently disagree whether some logical law is valid\, but they use ‘valid’ with different meanings or extensions\, they are talking past one another; their disagreement is merely verbal. My aim in this paper will be to explore this puzzle. \nAlessandro Rossi—The Contingently Non-Concrete. Or Real Rivalry in the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic\nConstant domain S5\, or the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic\, seems to demand that we take (non)concreteness as a contingent feature of things. But could there be two equally correct views about the ontology of the contingently non-concrete? It is shown that a similar thesis incurs a principled and necessary refutation. Three objections to our claim are then considered and all are found wanting. \nClaire Field—Rational Incoherence for Logical and Non-Logical Requirements\nIf logical pluralism is true\, then rational disagreement about logic is possible. Is rational disagreement also possible if logical pluralism is false? That is\, is it possible to rationally disagree about which is the correct logic\, while also being mistaken? Some have thought not\, and that it must always be irrational to believe falsely about what is rationally required (Titelbaum 2015). In so far as the correct logic encodes what is rationally required\, this means that mistakes about it cannot be rational. I compare this question to analogous one about non-logical requirements of rationality\, and show how answering it is somewhat more complicated for logical requirements\, because of the possibility that weighing one’s evidence implicates a background logic. I explore a proposal for treating mistakes about logical and non-logical requirements in the same way\, and argue that this gives us reason to think that level-incoherence is sometimes rationally required. \nFrederik J. Andersen—Logical Akrasia\nThe aim of this paper is twofold. First\, §1 and §2 introduce the novel concept logical akrasia pace analogy to epistemic akrasia. Second\, §3 and §4 present a dilemma based on logical akrasia. From a case involving the consistency of Peano arithmetic and Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem it’s shown that either we must be agnostic about the consistency of Peano arithmetic or akratic in our logical theorizing. It will then be left as an open question for future research what consequences the dilemma has for epistemic rationality. \nJc Beall—Classical logic is dead. Long live classical logic\nAn account L of logical consequence (henceforth\, of logic) is subclassical if and only if \ni) every classically invalid argument is invalid according to L\, and\nii) some classically valid argument is invalid according to L. \nIn this talk I argue that the true account of logic is subclassical. (That’s the “classical logic is dead” part.) On the other hand—I believe (and so do you)—the vast majority of our true theories are classically closed; they rely on the full force of classical logic. And so such theories do; and so such theories should. (This is the “long live classical logic” part.) But there is no tension whatsoever in the death of classical logic together with its apparent ubiquity in our true theories. So I shall argue in this talk. \n 
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/disagreement-in-logic/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Workshops
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/WLD-e1645456834730.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220411T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220411T173000
DTSTAMP:20220428T140329Z
CREATED:20210628T121010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220428T140329Z
UID:10017566-1649667600-1649698200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Workshop: Logical Disagreement
DESCRIPTION:Over the past fifteen years the epistemology of disagreement has been one of the most widely discussed research topics in epistemology. A special case of disagreement is logical disagreement\, i.e. disputes regarding the validity of certain inferences\, or the status of fundamental logical principles. This one-day Arché workshop is dedicated to the topic Disagreement in Logic and related issues such as logical pluralism\, the normativity of logic\, logical evidence. It will feature renowned experts of the epistemology of logic as well as early-career researchers. \nVenue: G03\, Edgecliffe\nTime: From 9am till 6pm on Monday April 11th\, 2022 (GMT)\nFormat: In person\nRegistration:  Please register your interest in attending by emailing our workshop organisers at fja4@st-andrews.ac.uk. \nSchedule\n• 9.00-9.30 Coffee and registration\n• 9.30-10.30 Speaker: Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm University)\nTitle: A Puzzle about Logical Disagreement\n• 10.30-11.00 Coffee\n• 11.00-12.00 Speaker: Alessandro Rossi (NCH)\nTitle: The Contingently Non-Concrete. Or Real Rivalry in the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic\n• 12.00-13.30 Lunch (vegetarian and vegan options available)\n• 13.30-14.30 Speaker: Claire Field (University of Stirling)\nTitle: Rational Incoherence for Logical and Non-Logical Requirements\n• 14.30-15.00 Coffee\n• 15.00-16.00 Frederik J. Andersen (University of St Andrews)\nTitle: Logical Akrasia\n• 16.00-16.30 Coffee\n• 16.30-17.30 Speaker: Jc Beall (University of Notre Dame)\nTitle: Classical logic is dead. Long live classical logic \nTitles and Abstracts \nAnandi Hattiangadi—A Puzzle about Logical Disagreement\nLogical disagreement is comprehensive: proponents of different logics disagree not only about the validity of particular logical laws\, but about the meanings of the logical constants\, and about the meaning or extension of the concept of logical consequence itself. This raises a puzzle. On the face of it\, there appear to be genuine disagreements about logic. However\, genuine disagreement requires a common subject matter about which to disagree: if A and B are not talking about the same thing\, then they are talking past one another; any apparent disagreement between them is merely verbal. The trouble is that since logical disagreement is so often comprehensive\, proponents of different logics seem to have too little in common to determine a common subject matter about which to disagree. If A and B apparently disagree whether some logical law is valid\, but they use ‘valid’ with different meanings or extensions\, they are talking past one another; their disagreement is merely verbal. My aim in this paper will be to explore this puzzle. \nAlessandro Rossi—The Contingently Non-Concrete. Or Real Rivalry in the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic\nConstant domain S5\, or the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic\, seems to demand that we take (non)concreteness as a contingent feature of things. But could there be two equally correct views about the ontology of the contingently non-concrete? It is shown that a similar thesis incurs a principled and necessary refutation. Three objections to our claim are then considered and all are found wanting. \nClaire Field—Rational Incoherence for Logical and Non-Logical Requirements\nIf logical pluralism is true\, then rational disagreement about logic is possible. Is rational disagreement also possible if logical pluralism is false? That is\, is it possible to rationally disagree about which is the correct logic\, while also being mistaken? Some have thought not\, and that it must always be irrational to believe falsely about what is rationally required (Titelbaum 2015). In so far as the correct logic encodes what is rationally required\, this means that mistakes about it cannot be rational. I compare this question to analogous one about non-logical requirements of rationality\, and show how answering it is somewhat more complicated for logical requirements\, because of the possibility that weighing one’s evidence implicates a background logic. I explore a proposal for treating mistakes about logical and non-logical requirements in the same way\, and argue that this gives us reason to think that level-incoherence is sometimes rationally required. \nFrederik J. Andersen—Logical Akrasia\nThe aim of this paper is twofold. First\, §1 and §2 introduce the novel concept logical akrasia pace analogy to epistemic akrasia. Second\, §3 and §4 present a dilemma based on logical akrasia. From a case involving the consistency of Peano arithmetic and Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem it’s shown that either we must be agnostic about the consistency of Peano arithmetic or akratic in our logical theorizing. It will then be left as an open question for future research what consequences the dilemma has for epistemic rationality. \nJc Beall—Classical logic is dead. Long live classical logic\nAn account L of logical consequence (henceforth\, of logic) is subclassical if and only if \ni) every classically invalid argument is invalid according to L\, and\nii) some classically valid argument is invalid according to L. \nIn this talk I argue that the true account of logic is subclassical. (That’s the “classical logic is dead” part.) On the other hand—I believe (and so do you)—the vast majority of our true theories are classically closed; they rely on the full force of classical logic. And so such theories do; and so such theories should. (This is the “long live classical logic” part.) But there is no tension whatsoever in the death of classical logic together with its apparent ubiquity in our true theories. So I shall argue in this talk.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-seminar-6-2022-04-11/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220405T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220405T140000
DTSTAMP:20220329T092933Z
CREATED:20210628T122532Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220329T092933Z
UID:10017580-1649160000-1649167200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language & Mind Seminar: Tom Kaspers (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Correspondence as Convenient Friction: \nIn this talk\, I use Huw Price’s paper “Truth as Convenient Friction” (2003) as a blueprint for arguing that the correspondence theory of truth satisfies the Pragmatic Maxim. By aiming for correspondence\, friction is added to our disagreements — a kind of urgency to resolve disagreements — which transforms our inquiry from a mere expression of opinions into a proper assertoric dialogue. The article argues that other notions of truth\, like deflationary or epistemic notions\, do not have the resources required to explain this friction.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-9-2022-04-05/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220328T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220328T170000
DTSTAMP:20220322T192757Z
CREATED:20210628T121010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220322T192757Z
UID:10017564-1648479600-1648486800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Matteo Nizzardo (University of St. Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:TITLE: On Qualitative Properties \nABSTRACT: In his Possible Worlds\, Divers (2002:349) complains: “I know of no detailed discussion of the qualitative/non-qualitative distinction for properties”. This is surprising given the distinction is at the heart of many debates on Leibniz’s Identity of Indiscernibles and Haecceitism. In the literature\, attempts to clarify the qualitative/non-qualitative divide have all been found wanting. To make matters worse\, since the publishing of Possible Worlds\, the use of the qualitative distinction has become more popular. We find it in Diekemper (2009\, 2015)\, Eddon (2011)\, Locke (2012)\, Cowling (2015)\, Hoffmann-Kolls (2019)\, and Simmons (2020)\, just to name a few; and yet\, we still lack a sound criterion to discern qualitative and non-qualitative properties. Here I attempt to fill this gap. Very roughly\, the idea is to discern qualitative and non-qualitative properties based on invariance of formulas under permutation of constants.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-seminar-6/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220315T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220315T110000
DTSTAMP:20220307T114317Z
CREATED:20210628T115628Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220307T114317Z
UID:10017544-1647336600-1647342000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-2-2022-03-14/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20191210T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20191210T170000
DTSTAMP:20191207T170205Z
CREATED:20191028T153230Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20191207T170205Z
UID:10017268-1575990000-1575997200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar: Talk by Clotilde Torregrossa on "Experimental Aesthetics and Conceptual Engineering"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract \nExperimental Philosophy (X-Phi) is now a fully-fledged methodological project with applications in almost all areas of analytic philosophy\, including\, as of recently\, aesthetics. Another methodological project which has been attracting attention in the last few years is conceptual engineering (CE). Its areas of implementation are now diverse\, but as was the case initially with experimental philosophy\, aesthetics has unfortunately been left out. In this paper I argue that if conceptual engineers are interested in expanding their project to the field of aesthetics\, which would greatly benefit the field\, then they should rely on the existing experimental work of aestheticians. Instead of building a CE project in aesthetics from the ground up\, this paper explores the potential support experimental aesthetics could provide to CE\, thereby making its development more efficiently realizable. Furthermore\, I argue that doing so would be beneficial to experimental aesthetics. Currently\, the integration of X-Phi to the wider field of aesthetics is losing ground because certain objections\, predominantly the objection that X-Phi cannot be of relevance to normative questions\, have not been properly refuted. By pairing up with a normative programme like CE\, experimental aestheticians could finally put these objections to rest. 
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-talk-by-clotilde-torregrossa-tbd/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190627T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190627T170000
DTSTAMP:20190624T071234Z
CREATED:20180710T152005Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190624T071234Z
UID:10017056-1561647600-1561654800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Semantics/Arche Logic Group: No Meeting
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/semantics-arche-logic-group-2019-06-27/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Arche Logic Group,ASG Semantics Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190627T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190627T130000
DTSTAMP:20190625T101353Z
CREATED:20180710T151454Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190625T101353Z
UID:10017043-1561633200-1561640400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar: Gillian Russell Is there any such thing as feminist logic?
DESCRIPTION:Abstract\nI’ll discuss and evaluate four answers to this question\, and argue for a fifth. 
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/super-special-seminar-3-2019-06-27/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190626T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190626T143000
DTSTAMP:20190212T141226Z
CREATED:20180710T151336Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190212T141226Z
UID:10017030-1561554000-1561559400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Matt McGrath\, "Neutrality in Epistemology"
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-4-2019-06-26/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190625T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190625T170000
DTSTAMP:20190622T164650Z
CREATED:20180710T151204Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190622T164650Z
UID:10017018-1561474800-1561482000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar: Talk by Ryan Miller on "Conceptual Engineering in Software Systems"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract \nTaking the engineering part of conceptual engineering seriously means learning from the methods of other engineering disciplines.  Since the concepts that philosophers want to engineer are generally parts of large\, complex\, existing systems\, they are attempting to engage in systems engineering.  The branch of systems engineering that deals most in concepts is software systems engineering.  This is a relatively new discipline\, having emerged out of less systematic software development practices by borrowing certain key methods from recent developments in architecture.  This talk traces the close analogy between architects’ design patternsand philosophers’ concepts\, then follows the lessons learned in software systems engineering about what makes a good design pattern\, how to engineer a better one\, and how to evangelize better design patterns after their invention.  Two key lessons are a sweet spot in the scope of conceptual engineering projects and the importance of structures of collaboration.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-2-2019-06-25/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190625T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190625T140000
DTSTAMP:20190619T174654Z
CREATED:20180831T080117Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190619T174654Z
UID:10017083-1561464000-1561471200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar: Discussion of Chiwook Won's 'Overdetermination\, Counterfactuals\, and Mental Causation'
DESCRIPTION:We will discuss Chiwook Won’s paper ‘Overdetermination\, Counterfactuals\, and Mental Causation’. You can find the paper here https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article/123/2/205/87565/Overdetermination-Counterfactuals-and-Mental \nAs usual\, the seminar will take place in Edgecliffe\, room G03\, 12-2pm.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-4-2019-06-25/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190624T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190624T170000
DTSTAMP:20190622T164416Z
CREATED:20180710T150824Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190622T164416Z
UID:10017006-1561388400-1561395600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar: Talk by Michael Rea (Notre Dame) on "The Metaphysics of the Narrative Self"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract \nThis paper sketches\, and partially defends\, a metaphysics of human persons and “the self” that will help make sense of and lend support to a narrative conception of the self. Narrative\, or the activity of constructing narratives\, has been credited with all manner of different roles in our lives\, from contributing to positive outcomes in the wake of trauma\, to helping us make sense of and find meaning in our own actions and other events that make up our lives\, to unifying our consciousness and explaining important aspects of our agency\, to constituting us as persons.  Important figures in multiple academic disciplines maintain that in some sense “the self” is\, or is constituted by\, narrative. Despite their popularity over the past couple of decades\, such claims remain as metaphysically mysterious as they are theoretically rich and provocative.  This paper sketches a novel theory about the relationship between persons and their “selves” that makes metaphysical sense of claims like “the self is narratively constituted” without implying (as many narrative-self theories do) that persons are either fictional entities or narratively-structured events.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-seminar-2-2019-06-24/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190621T101500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190621T114500
DTSTAMP:20190510T140910Z
CREATED:20180710T152140Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190510T140910Z
UID:10017068-1561112100-1561117500@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Reading Group (no meeting)
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-reading-group-3-2019-06-21/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190620T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190620T170000
DTSTAMP:20190616T072706Z
CREATED:20180710T152005Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190616T072706Z
UID:10017055-1561042800-1561050000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Semantics/Arche Logic Group: No Meeting
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/semantics-arche-logic-group-2019-06-20/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Arche Logic Group,ASG Semantics Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190620T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190620T130000
DTSTAMP:20221020T095929Z
CREATED:20180710T151454Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221020T095929Z
UID:10017038-1561028400-1561035600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/super-special-seminar-3/2019-06-20/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190619T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190619T143000
DTSTAMP:20221020T095837Z
CREATED:20180710T151336Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221020T095837Z
UID:10017029-1560949200-1560954600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-4-2019-06-19/2019-06-19/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190618T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190618T170000
DTSTAMP:20190615T122753Z
CREATED:20180710T151204Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190615T122753Z
UID:10017017-1560870000-1560877200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar: Talk by Kimon Sourlas-Kotzamanis on "Metalinguistic Negotiation\, Semantic Externalism\, and Meaning Change"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract \nA metalinguistic negotiation occurs when conversational partners are seemingly having a descriptive dispute about the world\, but instead they are having a normative dispute about what the words they are using should mean. Cappelen (2018) argues that if semantic externalism is true\, the meanings of our words are beyond our control. If this is the case\, however\, metalinguistic negotiation cannot be successful unless by a complete fluke. I examine whether Cappelen’s conclusion follows the orthodox externalist views. I conclude that it does not straightforwardly do so\, but more needs to be said about the relationship between metalinguistic negotiation and meaning control. I take on that task\, introducing a framework that distinguishes between conversation-level and linguistic community-level metalinguistic negotiations\, which I use to draw two conclusions. The first\, and more modest one\, is that Cappelen’s worry turns out to be nothing more than the platitude that one speaker cannot by herself change the meaning of a word for the whole linguistic community\, which does not in any way show that individual acts of metalinguistic negotiation are not worth pursuing. The second\, and less modest one\, is that metalinguistic negotiation is (one of the) main driving mechanism(s) for meaning change under a social externalist picture. Finally\, I reflect on what these two conclusions mean for conceptual engineering and how we should go about improving our representational devices.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-2-2019-06-18/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190618T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190618T140000
DTSTAMP:20190615T153739Z
CREATED:20180831T080117Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190615T153739Z
UID:10017082-1560859200-1560866400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar: Gillian Russell (UNC Chapel Hill): "Social Spheres"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract:  This paper adapts Lewis’ “Ptolemaic Astronomy” from Counterfactuals for use in looking at social hierarchy and subordination.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-4-2019-06-18/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190617T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190617T170000
DTSTAMP:20190615T122448Z
CREATED:20180710T150824Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190615T122448Z
UID:10017005-1560783600-1560790800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar: No Meeting.
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-seminar-2-2019-06-17/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190613T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190613T170000
DTSTAMP:20221020T095844Z
CREATED:20180710T152005Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221020T095844Z
UID:10017054-1560438000-1560445200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Semantics/Arche Logic Group
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/semantics-arche-logic-group-2019-06-13/2019-06-13/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Arche Logic Group,ASG Semantics Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190613T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190613T130000
DTSTAMP:20190614T081136Z
CREATED:20180710T151454Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190614T081136Z
UID:10017042-1560423600-1560430800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar: Thomas Schindler Deflationism and the function of truth
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \nDeflationists claim that the truth predicate was introduced into our language merely to fulfil a certain logico-linguistic function. Oddly enough\, the question what this function exactly consists in has received little attention. We argue that the best way of understanding the function of the truth predicate is as enabling us to mimic higher-order quantification in a first-order framework. Indeed\, one can show that the full simple theory of types is reducible to disquotational principles of truth. Our analysis has important consequences for our understanding of truth. In this paper\, we can only touch on one of them: we will argue that the insubstantiality of truth does not imply a conservativity requirement on our best theories of truth.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/super-special-seminar-3-2019-06-13/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190612T133000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190612T150000
DTSTAMP:20190608T111227Z
CREATED:20180710T151336Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190608T111227Z
UID:10017028-1560346200-1560351600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Leslie Stevenson\, "Conceptual Fault-Lines and Human Agency"
DESCRIPTION:NB: Start time is 1.30pm! \nI will argue from various examples that the inaccessibility of As in terms of Bs need not imply that As do not exist\, pointing to such conceptual fault-lines involving legal concepts\, aesthetic concepts\, and meanings of language.   We make  conceptual jumps when we learn to apply a new vocabulary that cannot be defined in terms we already understand.    I hope to throw light on the differences between intentional action and bodily processes and movements.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-4-2019-06-12/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190611T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190611T170000
DTSTAMP:20190609T113512Z
CREATED:20180710T151204Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190609T113512Z
UID:10017016-1560265200-1560272400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar: talk by Mona Simion (Glasgow)
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-2-2019-06-11/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190611T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190611T140000
DTSTAMP:20190605T225930Z
CREATED:20180831T080117Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190605T225930Z
UID:10017081-1560254400-1560261600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar: Yuri Cath (La Trobe) - Know How and Skill: The Puzzles of Priority and Equivalence
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: This paper is concerned with the relationship between knowledge-how and a family of success in action notions\, namely\, skills\, abilities\, dispositions\, and intentional actions. The nature of this relationship is puzzling. For example\, one reason it is puzzling is that some considerations suggest that knowledge-how is the explanatorily basic notion—that can be used to explain successful actions\, and skills and abilities to so succeed—whereas other considerations suggest exactly the opposite. My aim here is to explore one way in which these puzzles might be resolved within a broadly intellectualist approach to knowledge-how. I offer a novel version of intellectualism called practical attitude intellectualism\, and I illustrate how this view can be used to illuminate and solve these puzzles. This view is also of interest because it shows us how to reconcile intellectualism with the Rylean claim that knowledge-how is a complex dispositional state.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-4-2019-06-11/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190610T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190610T170000
DTSTAMP:20190529T145149Z
CREATED:20180710T150824Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190529T145149Z
UID:10017004-1560178800-1560186000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar: Talk by David Nicolas (Institut Jean Nicod) on "Mereological Choices for Count Nouns and Mass Nouns"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract \nMany semantic theories about count nouns and mass nouns use mereological notions like part and sum. At the lexical level\, count nouns are often deemed to be “atomic” (a part of a cat could not be a cat)\, while mass nouns are sometimes deemed to be “distributive” (any part of some water would also be water). At the compositional level\, one sometimes uses “individual” sums as the denotations of plural count nouns\, and “material” sums as the denotations of mass nouns. Are mereological notions like these intimately related\, or should they be distinguished? In this talk\, we examine how certain key theoretical choices determine answers to this question. We notably compare two broad approaches. The first (inspired by Link 1983) is eventually forced to distinguish three parthood relations: one specific to mass nouns\, one specific to plurals\, and a more ordinary parthood relation. It cannot accommodate an intuition of co-reference between certain mass terms and plurals. The second (inspired by Gillon 1992) uses additional semantic machinery\, namely coverings. This allows it to have a single parthood relation for mass nouns and plurals and to accommodate the intuition of co-reference. However it suffers of difficulties of its own\, whose ramifications we investigate.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-seminar-2-2019-06-10/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190607T101500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190607T114500
DTSTAMP:20190524T160512Z
CREATED:20180710T152140Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190524T160512Z
UID:10017066-1559902500-1559907900@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Reading Group (no meeting)
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-reading-group-3-2019-06-07/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190606T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190606T170000
DTSTAMP:20190530T071417Z
CREATED:20180710T152005Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190530T071417Z
UID:10017053-1559833200-1559840400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Semantics/Arche Logic Group: Thomas Schindler Talk
DESCRIPTION:Thomas Schindler: A Gödelian solution of the class-theoretic paradoxes\n\nAbstract: A class is the extension of some predicate. Classes are not to be confused with sets: many sets cannot be defined by a predicate\, and some predicates have extensions which are “too big” to be set. Classes are useful because they allow us to generalise predicate places in our language (I’ll elaborate on this in my talk). Unfortunately\, due to Russell’s paradox\, the naive notion of class is inconsistent\, and the standard solution to the paradoxes – the theory of types – is insufficient for many purposes in logic and philosophy (I’ll elaborate this point as well). In this talk I will present a type-free theory of classes (i.e. a theory that admits self-membered classes) that is loosely based on some ideas of Gödel. In particular\, I’ll present an axiom which essentially states that all paradoxes are due to some form of circularity\, and show that this axiom gives you full second-order logic. I’ll also present a strengthening of the circularity axiom from which one can derive axioms of infinity\, separation\, sums\, pairs\, and instances of replacement. If time permits\, I’ll argue that Gödel’s idea allows one to formulate a (positive) solution to the problem of unrestricted quantification – the question whether we can quantify over absolutely everything.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/semantics-arche-logic-group-2019-06-06/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Arche Logic Group,ASG Semantics Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190606T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190606T130000
DTSTAMP:20190527T095645Z
CREATED:20180710T151454Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190527T095645Z
UID:10017041-1559818800-1559826000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Arche Council Meeting
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/super-special-seminar-3-2019-06-06/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR