BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Arche - ECPv6.17.4.1//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Arche REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/London BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20210328T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20211031T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20220327T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20221030T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20230326T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20231029T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20240331T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20241027T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20250330T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20251026T010000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241217T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241217T170000 DTSTAMP:20241115T140215Z CREATED:20240530T072146Z LAST-MODIFIED:20241115T140215Z UID:10019171-1734447600-1734454800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:FPST Seminar: Anne Eaton (UIC) - Online DESCRIPTION:Title: Beyond Speech: Pictures and Oppression \nAbstract: Philosophical work on oppressive forms of expression strongly tends to give verbal and written linguistic expression pride of place. When it comes to pictures\, there is a tendency to either treat them as if they were language – one sees this in feminist work on pornography – or worse\, to ignore pictures altogether when the topic at hand least typically pictorial or typically has a significant pictorial dimension – one sees this in Jason Stanley’s work on propaganda. \nAgainst this linguisticism\, I argue that central and influential forms of oppressive “speech” are in fact pictorial and that to understand how they do their oppressive work\, we must approach pictures as pictures rather than as forms of spoken or written language. In this paper\, I first examine one glaring case of linguisticism\, then say something about what I think is going on here\, and finally briefly examine examples of oppressive pictures and give the outlines of an explanation of how they do their oppressive work. \nPlease note that I will be discussing pictures that glorify and eroticize rape\, and pictures that mock\, shame\, and demean Black persons. I will also mention pictures of lynchings. I will also briefly show some of these pictures\, though not the lynching pictures. I will not leave any pictures up for long because they are triggering or otherwise injurious for many of us. That\, after all\, is part of the point of this paper. I will give warning before I show or mention these pictures. URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/fpst-seminar-13/2024-12-17/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241216T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241216T140000 DTSTAMP:20241203T144751Z CREATED:20240912T141746Z LAST-MODIFIED:20241203T144751Z UID:10019355-1734350400-1734357600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Unity Seminar: No Session DESCRIPTION: URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/unity-seminar-14/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Unity Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241213T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241213T173000 DTSTAMP:20241212T221120Z CREATED:20241104T131006Z LAST-MODIFIED:20241212T221120Z UID:10019379-1734082200-1734111000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:All Arché Research Day (Winter 2024) DESCRIPTION:This Friday\, the Arché term wraps up with another all-day all-Arché get-together\, featuring research presentations from Sabina Domínguez Parrado\, Lara Scheibli\, Stephen Read\, and Franz Berto\, and five-minute lightning talks from brave presenters including Jessica Brown\, Simon Prosser\, Christopher Masterman\, and more. \nWe’ll be in G03 from 9:30am. \n9:45: Stephen Read (Insolubles in Fourteenth-Century Logic\, or: What Have I Been Doing For The Last Seven Years) \n10:45: Coffee Break \n11:15: Lightning Talks: Simon Prosser (Mental Hypertime)\, Jessica Brown (Defending Epistemology)\, Sophie Nagler (Two logicians walk into a bar… A talk of misunderstandings)\, … \n11:45: Sabina Domínguez Parrado (The Semantic Motivation for Logical Pluralism) \n1:00: Lunch Break \n2:00: Franz Berto (From the Gospel According to David Lewis: Counterfactuals\, §3.2 — and Beyond) \n3:00: Coffee Break \n3:15: Lightning Talks: Christopher Masterman (Explaining Composition)\, Greg Restall (What Can We Mean?)\, … \n3:45: Lara Scheibli (Why Professors Should Not Sleep With Their Students – The Epistemology of Consent and Professor-Student Sex) \nAll of the presentations are in-person. The Teams link is provided for Arché Members who are not able to attend in person. URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/all-arche-research-day-2/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Workshops END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241031T110000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241031T120000 DTSTAMP:20241029T111542Z CREATED:20241009T132357Z LAST-MODIFIED:20241029T111542Z UID:10019190-1730372400-1730376000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Arché Staff/Student Organisational Meeting DESCRIPTION:Every semester\, we hold an all-of-Arché Staff/Student organisational meeting for everyone to attend. Tea/Coffee will be available. Agenda TBC URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/plenary-seminar-5-3/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Workshops END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241015T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241015T140000 DTSTAMP:20241009T130244Z CREATED:20241009T130210Z LAST-MODIFIED:20241009T130244Z UID:10019120-1728993600-1729000800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar: Brice Bantegnie DESCRIPTION:Title: It’s personal and it’s fine \nAbstract: Believing is something that one does\, or so one might say. Seeing as well. Detecting the edges of objects is not. Believing is a personal state. Seeing as well. Detecting is a sub-personal event or process. The personal/sub-personal distinction is intuitive. In recent papers\, some have argued that it is problematic. I argue that it is not. Two criticisms are that it is not principled (cf. Mason Westfall) and that it potentially stifles the work of cognitive scientists by misdescribing their practices (cf. Robert Rupert.) The personal/sub-personal distinction\, as applied to states\, is a special case of a distinction between the state something is in and the states its parts are in. Further commitments are not necessary and only come down the line. As a consequence\, one can both take it that there is such a distinction in cognitive science and that it puts no external constraint on the activity of cognitive scientists URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-34-2/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240702T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240702T170000 DTSTAMP:20240701T101531Z CREATED:20240408T103032Z LAST-MODIFIED:20240701T101531Z UID:10018997-1719932400-1719939600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:CANCELLED FPST Seminar - Clare Chambers (Cambridge) DESCRIPTION:Title: Respect\, Religion\, and Feminism: Political Liberalism as Feminist Liberalism?\nAbstract: This chapter considers whether political liberalism\, specifically\, can be used for feminist ends. There is significant disagreement among feminists and liberals about the compatibility between their two doctrines. Political liberalism is vulnerable to particular criticism from feminists\, who argue that its restricted form of equality is insufficient. In contrast\, Lori Watson and Christie Hartley argue that political liberalism can and must be feminist. This chapter raises three areas of disagreement with Watson and Hartley’s incisive account of feminist political liberalism. First\, the chapter argues that an appeal to a comprehensive doctrine can be compatible with respecting others\, if that appeal is to the value of equality. Second\, the chapter takes issue with Watson and Hartley’s defence of religious exemptions to equality law. Third\, the chapter argues that political liberalism can be compatible with feminism\, but that it is not itself adequately feminist. The chapter concludes that political liberalism is not enough for feminists. URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/fpst-seminar-12-10/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240627T130000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240627T143000 DTSTAMP:20240624T103556Z CREATED:20240320T133438Z LAST-MODIFIED:20240624T103556Z UID:10018784-1719493200-1719498600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Matt McGrath (Washington University in St Louis) DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Matt McGrath (Washington University in St Louis) \nShould have Known and Epistemically Appropriate Belief\nSometimes people don’t know things they should have known. For instance\, cardiologists should know about recent major developments that bear on their practice; if they don’t know\, they should have. Can what a person should have known matter to what they’re epistemically appropriate to believe? Call the view that it can “should-have-known impurism.” If the cardiologist believes the usual treatment for a certain type of heart disease is best but should have known that an alternative treatment outperformed it in a recent large study\, it seems the cardiologist isn’t believing as she should. In this paper\, I dig into the reasoning behind or suggested by intuitions like this. Once we locate this reasoning\, we can probe its structure\, assess its quality\, and explore variations of it\, along with its relation to intuitions on the opposing “purist” side. In the end\, I argue that we can capture what the impurist gets right without accepting impurism. This is important because\, as I argue\, impurism faces serious problems. URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-7-8/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T173000 DTSTAMP:20240603T100818Z CREATED:20240603T100739Z LAST-MODIFIED:20240603T100818Z UID:10019340-1717689600-1717695000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:FPST x CEPPA - Sophie Grace Chappell 'Trans figured' book launch. DESCRIPTION:Sophie Grace Chappell will present her new book Trans Figured: On Being a Transgender Person in a Cisgender World – followed by bubbles to celebrate! URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/fpst-x-ceppa-sophie-grace-chappell-trans-figured-book-launch/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/9781509561506.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231212T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231212T170000 DTSTAMP:20231211T132258Z CREATED:20231211T132257Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231211T132258Z UID:10018666-1702393200-1702400400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:FPST Seminar - Emma Holmes (St Andrews & Stirling) DESCRIPTION:This week will be a reading group on Gayle Rubin’s ‘Thinking sex’ URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/fpst-seminar-11-2/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231211T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231211T110000 DTSTAMP:20231105T211905Z CREATED:20230829T092626Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231105T211905Z UID:10018734-1702287000-1702292400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Ralph Strode\, Treatise on Consequences DESCRIPTION: URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-4-2/2023-12-11/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230824 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230826 DTSTAMP:20231103T112902Z CREATED:20230425T101803Z LAST-MODIFIED:20231103T112902Z UID:10018624-1692867600-1692953999@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:2nd Scottish Epistemology Early Career Researchers (SEECRs) Pre-Read Workshop DESCRIPTION:The Scottish Epistemology Early Career Researchers (SEECRs) group is holding a workshop for papers in any area of epistemology\, authored by postgraduate students and self-identified early career researchers based in\, or with research links to\, Scotland. \nThe workshop will take place at the University of St. Andrews on the 24th August 2023. \n  \nThe aim of the workshop is to share cutting-edge research and facilitate the exchange of ideas among early career epistemologists in Scotland\, as well as to provide early career epistemologists with detailed feedback on their work in a supportive and constructive environment. \nFive papers will be selected to be pre-read and discussed at the workshop with a group of other postgraduate students and early career researchers based in Scotland. Each paper will receive a response from a member of SEECRs who works on the same or a similar research topic. \nConference Venue: G03\, Edgecliffe\, St Andrews (coffee breaks and lunch in G01). \nFormat: In person. \nInfo: fja4@st-andrews.ac.uk. \nProgramme (Time Zone: GMT) \n10:30 – 11:00  Registration and Coffee\n11:00 – 12:00  Giada Fratantonio (Glasgow)—“Knowledge-first Evidentialism” \nRespondent: Fred Andersen (St Andrews) \n12:05 – 13:05  James Shearer (St Andrews)—“If You’re So Rational\, Why Don’t You Have Any Friends?” \nRespondent: Tim Kearl (Glasgow) \n13:05 – 14:05    Lunch \n14:05 -15:05  Oscar A. Piedrahita (Glasgow)—”In what sense is ignorance a failure” \nRespondent: Cian Brennan (Glasgow) \n15:10-16:10    Ísak Ólafsson (Glasgow)—”The Limits of Epistemic Gatekeeping” \nRespondent: Edoardo Cavasin (Aberdeen) \n16:10 – 16:30 Coffee Break \n16:30-17:30    ”Katharina Bernhard (St Andrews)—“Inductive Risk Decisions\, Jamesian Lockean thresholds\, and the Ethical Limits of Epistemic Permissivism” \nRespondent: Petronella Randell (St Andrews) \n18:30 Dinner (at the Adamson) URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/2nd-scottish-epistemology-early-career-researchers-seecrs-pre-read-workshop/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Workshops END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230426T103000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230426T120000 DTSTAMP:20230503T102807Z CREATED:20230301T144118Z LAST-MODIFIED:20230503T102807Z UID:10018568-1682505000-1682510400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Masterclass on Synthetic Philosophy DESCRIPTION:Three-session masterclass delivered online by Arché Professorial Fellow Catarina Dutilh Novaes\, via Teams and in Edgecliffe\, Room G03 on (UK time zone): \nApril 12 10:30am-12noon  \nApril 19 10:30am-12noon  \nApril 26 10:30am-12noon  \nThis 3-session masterclass will introduce an approach in philosophy that is now known as ‘synthetic philosophy’: “the enterprise of bringing together insights\, knowledge\, and arguments from the special sciences with the aim to offer a theoretically (reasonably) unified\, coherent account of complex systems and connect these to a wider culture or other philosophical projects (or both).” (Schliesser\, 2019) It is related to\, but interestingly different from\, naturalism in philosophy and empirically-informed philosophy. Current practitioners of synthetic philosophy include Daniel Dennett\, Kim Sterelny and Peter Godfrey-Smith. With the growing fragmentation of scientific knowledge into hyperspecialized disciplines\, there is much need for over-arching\, comprehensive perspectives that provide unified accounts of complex phenomena drawing on various disciplines\, and philosophy is arguably ideally placed for this purpose. \nSession 1: What is synthetic philosophy?   \nGeneral presentation\, historical precedents\, contrast with other styles of philosophy. \nSession 2: The dialogical roots of deduction as an example of synthetic philosophy  \nPresentation of the book The Dialogical Roots of Deduction as a project of synthetic philosophy. \nSession 3: How to design a synthetic philosophy research program  \nPractical discussion of how to design and carry out a research program\, focusing on methodological considerations. \nThis masterclass is open to non-St Andrews research postgrads as well – for info and the link to the online meeting\, e-mail Viviane Fairbank vf45@st-andrews.ac.uk. URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/masterclass-on-synthetic-philosophy-2/2023-04-26/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Conference,Workshops ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Chemical_compounds.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230404T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230404T140000 DTSTAMP:20230403T093207Z CREATED:20230403T091556Z LAST-MODIFIED:20230403T093207Z UID:10018040-1680609600-1680616800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar: Ryan Miller (University of Geneva) Lexical Negotiators DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Nearly every aspect of words is subject to alteration: pronunciation\, spelling\, part of speech\, and definition. These aspects are often altered intentionally\, yet speakers can err in each of them when using words. Using the semantics of ‘equality’ and ‘equity’ as an example\, this paper resolves the puzzle by suggesting that such alterations are negotiated between speaker and audience\, and introduces a formal framework from financial theory governing those negotiations. The model suggests that successful lexical negotiations are constrained by transaction costs\, which implies that some conceptual engineering projects (like Haslanger’s revision of the word ‘woman’) are likely to fail even though the semantic revision of ‘equality’ and ‘equity’ was largely successful. URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-10-3/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230328T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230328T140000 DTSTAMP:20230403T091300Z CREATED:20230403T091058Z LAST-MODIFIED:20230403T091300Z UID:10018039-1680004800-1680012000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar: Edgar Phillips Making Sense of Intelligibility DESCRIPTION:Abstract: It’s not uncommon in contemporary philosophical work on desire\, emotions\, intentional action\, rational attitudes and the like to speak of a distinctive form of ‘intelligibility’ that characterises instances of these phenomena\, at least when things are going as they should. Often this is contrasted with a correlative form of ‘unintelligibility’ that may be on display when things go as they shouldn’t. Usually some bit of philosophical theory then comes in to explain what makes the difference\, and the intelligible–unintelligible contrast is thus used to support the relevant bit of theory. This paper raises some questions about the philosophical uses of ‘intelligibility’ and makes a start at addressing them. I distinguish two different ways of drawing an intelligible–unintelligible contrast\, corresponding to (something like) two senses of ‘intelligible’. This raises a question as to whether arguments of the sort just described might be equivocating\, at least in some cases. I end by discussing one way in which the two senses of intelligibility could be connected in the specific case of intentional action\, and raise some doubts about the extent to which this connection will generalise. URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-10-2/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230323 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230325 DTSTAMP:20230403T091814Z CREATED:20230227T182313Z LAST-MODIFIED:20230403T091814Z UID:10018507-1679562000-1679648399@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Sandy Goldberg Day DESCRIPTION:Sandy Goldberg is a Chester D.Tripp Professor of Philosophy at Northwestern University\, and a professorial fellow at the University of St Andrews. He works in the areas of Epistemology\, Philosophy of Language\, and Philosophy of Mind. His recent research focuses on the social dimensions of knowledge and the informational responsibilities of citizens. \nSCHEDULE: \nIn the morning\, Sandy will give a presentation for students and postgraduates in philosophy on PhD programs and the philosophy job market in the United States. Afterward\, a few postgraduates will present their current research in epistemology\, philosophy of language\, and philosophy of mind. \n9:30–10:30 Sandy Goldberg ‘Information Session on Academic Philosophy in the United States’ \nBreak \n11:00–12:00 Katharina Bernhard ‘Inductive Risk Decision-Making Maximizes Expected Accuracy’ \nInductive Risk requires scientists (qua scientists) to weigh the risks of error when believing or disbelieving a scientific claim. This activity requires of scientists to consider practical or social utilities and decide whether the probability of a claim’s truth is high enough to warrant belief (or low enough for disbelief) in light of those utilities. I will show that weighing the risks of error in Inductive Risk decisions can be understood as a genuine epistemic activity that – under appropriate formal constraints – can maximize (expected) accuracy. To that end\, I will introduce the “Jamesian-Lockean threshold model” (echoing “generalized Lockeanism”\, Dorst 2019). This model embeds Lockeanism (“believe p iff you have sufficient credence in it”)\, and Jamesian epistemic goals (“belief truly!” and “avoid error!”) in a framework of expected epistemic utility. It allows to determine a proposition- and context-dependent credal threshold for epistemically rational belief and disbelief. The Jamesian-Lockean threshold model entails a specific type of permissivism for rational belief. What singles out Inductive Risk decisions as a special kind of Jamesian-Lockean belief formation is how this permissivism is (or ought to be) dealt with in scientific inquiry. \n12:00–13:00 Nathan Bray ‘Religious Disagreement and Divine Psychology’ \nThe argument that religious peer disagreement should lead to moderation of one’s theistic views has been subject to objections that rely on appeals to divine psychology\, such as Moon’s (2021) argument. However\, such objections are suspect because humans\, as finite beings\, are not well-equipped to determine what God or the Holy Spirit would do. Relying on these appeals weakens the argument and risks resurrecting the logical problem of evil that skeptical theism has seemingly resolved. Theists\, including Alvin Plantinga\, should be accountable for making similar moves in their arguments. I conclude that most responses to this argument are examples of appeals to divine psychology\, thereby diminishing their strength. \n Break \n14:00–15:00 Viviane Fairbank ‘How Journalists Know: A Case Study in Epistemic Justification’ \nA subset of applied epistemology\, the epistemology of journalism investigates how journalists know what they know\, and in what that knowledge consists. In this talk\, I apply an epistemological analysis to the methods used by journalists to report on and verify the facts they publish; I am interested in the journalistic practices that make a fact into a journalistic fact. Based on the literature in contemporary journalism studies\, I argue that journalists are epistemic agents of a distinctive kind because of the importance they place on testimonial knowledge and on justification as verification. This makes them a particularly interesting case study for philosophers interested in developing a non-ideal epistemology of testimony—where non-ideal epistemology is epistemology that is grounded in our everyday\, “real-world” knowledge practices\, including the acknowledgment of structural injustices and oppression. As proof of concept\, I present three case studies from contemporary journalism\, each of which serves to elucidate the norms of journalistic verification. The main takeaways are that (good) journalists subscribe to a well-defined practice of “responsible communication”; they distinguish between different kinds of facts based on what kind of verification should be expected for them; and they rely on a notion of authority that is fact- and source-sensitive. \n15:00–16:00 Francisca Silva ‘(In a Sense) Yes and (In a Different Sense) No’ \nThere are conversational contexts where we are confronted with yes-or-no questions for which neither option seems entirely right but where we are inclined to answer instead with “Yes and no” where this does not commit us with true contradictions for we are\, as we say\, talking “in different senses”. In this talk I aim to present a model for what goes on in such conversational contexts in terms of speakers taking the inquirers to have posed a defective question which is ambiguous between two non-defective questions that the speaker could appropriately answer with “Yes” and “No”\, respectively. From this model we can derive a method to determine what concepts can be employed to ask what adequate questions. \n16:00–17:00 Daniel Garibay Garcia ‘Authority and Group Assertion’  \nRecently there is a lot of interest in collective phenomena; group assertion among those. In everyday conversations\, it is very common that we attribute assertions not to individuals but to institutions\, governments\, companies\, research groups\,  etc. For example\, when the U.K. government says “Shortages are not related to Brexit” through a spokesperson\, or a research team publishes an article stating “Microplastics have been found in human bloodstream”. In this work\, I offer an account of group assertion. Utterances of sentences and expressions are paradigmatically performed by individuals\, then there is an interesting question about if assertions can be attributed to groups (and not just to individuals) and when. I aim to provide an account that distinguishes between group and individual assertions (meaning assertions that belong to individuals). I expect my account to inform us about the nature of group assertion as a speech act and its relation to individual assertion. In my account\, group assertion requires a special kind of authority: the authority to assert on behalf of a group. An assertion is a group assertion if the individual(s) performing the utterance have the authority to assert for it. To argue that my account is better than previous accounts\, I present a case of group assertion that I hold other accounts can’t explain. This is the case of what I call “individualistic collaborative assertions”. I also discuss relevant details about the concept of authority that other accounts that speak of authority in relation to group assertion have overlooked. \n  \nThe event is hosted by the Arché Philosophical Research Centre Epistemology: Current Themes. URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/sandy-goldberg-day/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Conference,Speaker visit ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/D206F397-CF8F-4CC3-AA62-013CED50008B.jpeg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221220T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221220T140000 DTSTAMP:20220925T101514Z CREATED:20220707T115653Z LAST-MODIFIED:20220925T101514Z UID:10017763-1671537600-1671544800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-10-2022-12-06-2022-12-20/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221219T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221219T170000 DTSTAMP:20221019T223824Z CREATED:20220707T115344Z LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T223824Z UID:10017749-1671462000-1671469200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-2-2022-09-19-2022-10-17/2022-12-19/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221215T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221215T120000 DTSTAMP:20221019T145458Z CREATED:20220707T120351Z LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T145458Z UID:10017789-1671098400-1671105600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/super-special-seminar-7/2022-12-15/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221214T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221214T180000 DTSTAMP:20221019T145518Z CREATED:20220707T120014Z LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T145518Z UID:10017766-1671033600-1671040800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/feminist-philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar/2022-12-14/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221213T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221213T140000 DTSTAMP:20221212T103105Z CREATED:20220707T115653Z LAST-MODIFIED:20221212T103105Z UID:10017762-1670932800-1670940000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar | Lixiao Lin "Self-location\, other-location\, and impossible world" DESCRIPTION:Self-locating (or de se\, first-person) attitudes (e.g. the belief that I am great) and other-locating (or de re) attitudes (e.g. the hope that that person is awesome) raise problems for theories of propositions. In this talk\, I develop an impossible-world theory of self-locating and other-locating attitudes\, according to which the propositional contents of the two types of attitudes can be fully characterised in terms of impossible-world propositions (i.e. propositions that are sets of possible and impossible worlds). I will argue that my impossible-world theory is preferable to the standard centred-world theory.  URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-10-2022-12-06-2022-12-13/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221208T130000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221208T143000 DTSTAMP:20221202T134046Z CREATED:20221020T151759Z LAST-MODIFIED:20221202T134046Z UID:10017808-1670504400-1670509800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Current Themes Seminar: Katharina Bernhard (St Andrews) "Permissivism and Inductive Risk" DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Proponents of inductive risk make three claims: (1) When accepting or not-accepting a hypothesis\, a scientist qua scientist must weigh the risks of error. (2) In weighing the risks of error\, a scientist must resort to non-epistemic utilities. (3) Epistemically\, these (non-epistemic) utilities ought to merely play an indirect role.To make sense of (1)-(3)\, I will draw on recent discussions in epistemic utility theory concerning epistemic risk and Permissivism. Presupposing a Lockean Thesis\, epistemic risk requires us to make a decision as to whether to believe\, (suspend judgement on\,) or disbelieve a proposition in light of the risks of error. These risks of error can be of two kinds: believing a false proposition or not believing a true one. I will introduce three types of Permissivism within this epistemic risk framework that look particularly promising as a model for inductive risk. The first concerns the permissiveness of different decision rules (risk inclined\, risk neutral\, risk averse) while the other two types “encode” Permissivism in the epistemic utilities (how much one disvalues one type of error over the other). \nI will ultimately dismiss the decision-rule type of Permissivism as a suitable model of inductive risk\, and argue that the remaining two types of Permissivism both are attractive options for the proponent of inductive risk to endorse. URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-current-themes-seminar-katharina-bernhard-st-andrews/ CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221207T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221207T180000 DTSTAMP:20221003T081846Z CREATED:20220707T120014Z LAST-MODIFIED:20221003T081846Z UID:10017776-1670428800-1670436000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar: Lara Jost DESCRIPTION: URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/feminist-philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-2022-12-07/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221130T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221130T180000 DTSTAMP:20221128T103846Z CREATED:20220707T120014Z LAST-MODIFIED:20221128T103846Z UID:10017775-1669824000-1669831200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar: [CANCELLED] DESCRIPTION: URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/feminist-philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-2022-11-30/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221116T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221116T180000 DTSTAMP:20221110T173042Z CREATED:20220707T120014Z LAST-MODIFIED:20221110T173042Z UID:10017774-1668614400-1668621600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar: Elaina Gauthier DESCRIPTION:This seminar will take place entirely online via Teams: if you would like to attend please email arche-fem-soc[at]st-andrews.ac.uk for details. This will be a short work-in-progress presentation\, lasting 20 minutes\, to leave ample time for discussion.\n\nTitle: Zombie Déjà Vu: Haunted histories of rebuilding after the apocalypse\nAbstract: We are living in a transitional time as our Western societies move out of crisis mode vis-à-vis the COVID-19 pandemic. As such\, different narratives are forming\, including those around COVID long-haulers\, disability\, and “going back to normal”. I am investigating how these narratives are being haunted by the eugenic and ableist attitudes that have shaped our current healthcare system. I am using the figure of the zombie to explore the tension surrounding the inclusion/exclusion of newly (and more) disabled people in our healthcare and public health strategies moving forward. URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/feminist-philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-2022-11-16/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221109T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221109T170000 DTSTAMP:20220922T161656Z CREATED:20220707T120014Z LAST-MODIFIED:20220922T161656Z UID:10017773-1668006000-1668013200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar: Sophie-Grace Chappell DESCRIPTION: URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/feminist-philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-2022-11-09/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221102T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221102T180000 DTSTAMP:20221031T075804Z CREATED:20220707T120014Z LAST-MODIFIED:20221031T075804Z UID:10017772-1667404800-1667412000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar: Elizabeth Barnes DESCRIPTION:Title: The Limits of Trust: First Person Testimony\, Unreliability\, and the case of ‘Medical Gaslighting’\n\n\n  \nAbstract: Recent work in social and feminist epistemology has emphasized the importance of first-person testimony. But its sometimes unclear when and to what extent we are obligated to believe people’s testimony about their own experiences. I use Katherine Hawley’s framework of trust and trustworthiness to explore a particular example: the case of medical gaslighting and testimonial injustice in healthcare contexts. I argue that Hawley’s framework can help to illuminate places where concepts like ‘gaslighting’ and ‘testimonial injustice’ might be over-extended. \n\nThe seminar will take place online via teams 4-6pm.  URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/feminist-philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-2022-11-02/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221101T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221101T140000 DTSTAMP:20221024T103939Z CREATED:20220707T115653Z LAST-MODIFIED:20221024T103939Z UID:10017756-1667304000-1667311200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar | Mahrad Almotahari "Blameless Irrationality and Frege’s Puzzle" DESCRIPTION:I sketch a new puzzle about rational belief and use it to motivate the coherence of blameless irrationality. Relying on a recent framework developed by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Timothy Williamson\, I use the idea of blameless irrationality to argue that Frege’s Puzzle rests on a mistake: it poses no threat to coarse-grained conceptions of content. URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-10-2022-11-01/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221026T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221026T170000 DTSTAMP:20220922T161538Z CREATED:20220707T120014Z LAST-MODIFIED:20220922T161538Z UID:10017771-1666796400-1666803600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar: Michael Rea DESCRIPTION: URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/feminist-philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-2022-10-26/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221025T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221025T140000 DTSTAMP:20221024T103819Z CREATED:20220707T115653Z LAST-MODIFIED:20221024T103819Z UID:10017755-1666699200-1666706400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar | Justin D'Ambrosio "The Indeterminacy of Consciousness" DESCRIPTION:Much recent work in the philosophy of consciousness has centered around the Determinacy thesis: the thesis that for each \, it is determinate whether  is conscious. Whether this thesis is true is a matter of considerable urgency\, for it is widely taken to entail the falsehood of both physicalism about consciousness and gradualism about its evolution. Here we offer a new argument against the determinacy thesis. We first argue that if consciousness is multidimensional\, the main argument in favour of determinacy—the No Borderline Case argument—is unsound. We then argue that multidimensionality makes it highly probable that Determinacy is false\, because multidimensionality brings with it a distinctive and heretofore unrecognized form of indeterminacy. We then offer arguments that consciousness is in fact multidimensional\, and accordingly\, that the drastic consequences of Determinacy should not concern us. URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-10-2022-10-25/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221018T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221018T140000 DTSTAMP:20220925T100818Z CREATED:20220707T115653Z LAST-MODIFIED:20220925T100818Z UID:10017754-1666094400-1666101600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar | Independent Learning Week (no meeting) DESCRIPTION: URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-10-2022-10-18/ LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR