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DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240520
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240523
DTSTAMP:20250114T142437Z
CREATED:20231103T111724Z
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UID:10018751-1716195600-1716368399@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:The Epistemology of Inquiry
DESCRIPTION:The event is hybrid and open to philosophy faculty and students outside St Andrews. Remote participants can access the teams link by requesting it from Patrick Winther-Larsen (pjwl@st-andrews.ac.uk) or Jessica Brown (jab30@st-andrews.ac.uk). \nSpeakers: \nEndre Begby (Simon Fraser University)\nSanford Goldberg (Northwestern/St Andrews)\nJoshua Habgood-Coote (Leeds)\nChris Kelp (Glasgow)\nJulia Staffel (Colorado)\nElise Woodard (KCL\, London) \nProgramme: \nMay 20th:  \n11:30AM — 1PM: Sanford Goldberg; \n1PM — 2PM: Lunch; \n2PM — 3:30PM: Joshua Habgood-Coote; \n3:30PM — 4PM: afternoon coffee/tea plus biscuits; \n4PM — 5:30PM: Elise Woodard; \nDinner: 6:30 at Forgans \nMay 21st:  \n9:30AM — 11AM: Chris Kelp; \n11AM — 11:30AM: morning tea/coffee; \n11:30AM — 1PM: Julia Staffel; \n1PM — 2PM: lunch; \n2PM — 3:30PM: Endre Begby. \nAbstracts\nEndre Begby. Doxastic and zetetic norms: mutually dependent and equally fundamental \nThe recent resurgence of interest in the epistemology of inquiry has produced a discussion that is generally structured around the following types of questions: (i) granted that in addition to norms governing how we should form our beliefs in light of our evidence (“doxastic norms”) there also exist norms governing what we should do to provide ourselves with evidence in the first place (“zetetic norms”). But are these latter norms properly construed as epistemic norms\, as opposed to belonging to some broader category of prudential norms? (ii) If doxastic norms and zetetic norms are both epistemic norms\, which is more fundamental? Can we derive one set of norms from the other? Or (iii) should we be open to the possibility that they might be mutually irreducible and independent\, so that they might well generate incompatible obligations in context? \nIn this talk\, I offer some reasons to think that this dialectic is misguided. It is true that we sometimes criticize epistemic agents for the inferences they draw from the evidence currently at their disposal. Likewise\, it is true that we sometimes criticize them for their failure to gather more evidence\, where such evidence is there to be had. What doesn’t follow is that we are always (or even typically) invoking distinct norms in articulating these criticisms. \nTo support this claim\, I will present examples suggesting that in a large (and representative) range of cases — spanning science\, policy decisions\, and everyday life –\, what we should believe on our current evidence is importantly indeterminate: in order to settle which hypothesis our current evidence supports we require more evidence\, evidence which we could only gain by engaging in further inquiry. But on the other hand\, we could never know what sort of inquiry we thereby ought to engage in unless we also had a reasonably clear sense of what epistemic possibilities our current evidence leaves open and what it forecloses. I conclude that from the point of view of epistemic normativity\, the doxastic and zetetic perspectives are complementary\, mutually dependent\, and equally fundamental. \nSanford Goldberg. The norms of inquiry and the demands of conversation \nIn this paper I want to revisit Stalnaker’s (1978; 2002) Common Ground (CG) model as a way of thinking about inquiry.  While the CG is standardly used to model information updates in the course of (conversations about) inquiry\, my aim is to show how we can use the CG to model how the norms of inquiry bear on epistemic assessment.  I pursue this aim by developing several ideas regarding the CG.  Among these ideas I highlight the following: (1) there are types of conversation (Green 2017) which are such that participants are properly expected to presuppose certain things throughout the conversation (I call these the conversation’s “normative presuppositions”); (2) some inquiries are such that there is a corresponding conversation-type associated with them (throughout the period of inquiring); (3) for some social (or institutional) roles\, subjects who occupy these roles are properly expected to participate in certain conversations (including some associated with inquiries); (4) assertions made in the context of inquiry answer to an epistemic standard; and (5) assertions that contradict\, or are in tension with\, the conversation’s normative presuppositions are presumptively criticizable.  In this way\, I hope to show that there are types of inquiry for which the CG model enables us to capture our answerability to the norms of inquiry themselves and to the widely-accepted results thereby attained. \nJoshua Habgood-Coote. Bad Questions.  \nThis paper is about questions which are bad as questions\, in the sense that pursuing them will impede progress in inquiry. It seeks to do three things. First\, to gather examples of question critique: criticisms of views based not on their claims or arguments\, but the questions they ask. Second to give an account of the function of questions which sheds light on the varieties of bad question. And thirdly\, to provide us with a sound normative basis on which to undertake question critique.  \nChris Kelp. Inquiry and Epistemic Psychology \nThis paper proposes an account of epistemic psychological attitudes (such as belief\, credences\, suspension\, etc.) according to which they are types of moves in inquiry that have their own constitutive aims. I zoom in on belief and show how the account I developed in Inquiry\, Knowledge\, and Understanding can deal with a range of objections that have been raised in recent literature. The remainder of the paper takes a closer look at an alternative view of the relation between inquiry and epistemic psychology\, developed in recent work by Jane Friedman and provides reason to think that my account compares favourably with Friedman’s. \nJulia Staffel. Are there transitional beliefs? – I think so? \nA question that has gathered much interest in epistemology recently is whether it can ever be rational to keep inquiring into a question once one has adopted a belief that answers it. Friedman (2019) has prominently argued for a negative answer to this question. \nI am interested in a related\, but slightly different question here\, which has not gathered any attention\, but will help us better understand the nature of belief and its relation to inquiry and deliberation: Is it ever rationally permissible to believe something prior to concluding one’s deliberation? My question differs from the more commonly discussed one\, insofar as it asks about the rationality of believing that p before settling on p as the answer to some question Q\, while the commonly discussed one asks about the rationality of continuing to inquire into Q after coming to believe that p is the answer to Q. \nI will argue that it is possible for rational agents to hold beliefs of a certain kind\, which I call transitional beliefs\, prior to settling on an answer to a question. Further\, I will show that many common claims about what beliefs are don’t identify important features of belief itself\, but of attitudes that are held as conclusions of deliberations more generally. \nElise Woodard. How to Change Your Mind \nIf realists are more likely to become anti-realists than vice versa\, is that evidence that anti-realism is true? I argue that the answer is yes. When more people move from view A to B than B to A\, this is defeasible evidence that B is more likely correct than A. This idea\, which I refer to as “Migration as Evidence\,” suggests that widespread changes in belief could be meaningful indicators of truth. This approach has two main benefits. First\, it provides an additional tool for forming opinions on complex and controversial issues in areas like philosophy\, politics\, and religion\, where even experts disagree. Second\, it encourages a culture where changing one’s mind is more openly shared and less socially penalized\, fostering an environment where the pursuit of truth is prioritized over consistency. If correct\, “Migration as Evidence” highlights a valuable yet overlooked source of information when inquiring about complex and contentious issues. \n  \n 
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/the-epistemology-of-inquiry/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104\, United College\, St Salvator's Quad\, St Andrews\, KY169AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Workshops
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240521T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240521T140000
DTSTAMP:20240507T173318Z
CREATED:20240507T173154Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240507T173318Z
UID:10018925-1716292800-1716300000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar: Suzuka Komatsu (University of St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Depression and the Open Future\nAbstract: We intuitively think that the past is fixed or closed whereas the future is open. In a phenomenological description of depression\, however\, depressed subjects often report that the future is closed. Our naïve view of the open future thus seems to be impaired. What makes the depressed subjects to represent the future to be closed? I argue that depressed subject come to have a psychological orientation towards certain ontological views related to the openness of the future. To argue this\, I examine four candidate ontological views: presentism\, the growing block theory\, the block theory\, and the branch theory. I argue that the seeming lack of asymmetry is caused by depressed subjects’ psychological orientation towards either presentism\, the growing block theory\, or the block theory. This tells us\, when we represent the future to be open\, we are implicitly committed to the branch theory.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-32/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240521T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240521T170000
DTSTAMP:20240516T112459Z
CREATED:20240408T102507Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240516T112459Z
UID:10018991-1716303600-1716310800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST Seminar - Lorna Finlayson (Essex)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Are kids oppressed? Child liberation beyond equal rights \nAbstract: Thinking about childhood often has a paradoxical quality. Children and young people are at once idealised and demonised. Childhood is romanticised in memory and imagination at the same time as it is the receptacle for our deepest traumas. The idea of children as an oppressed group is subject to a similar tension. On the face of it\, the social situation of childhood (in most or all historical and present societies) satisfies most or all of the criteria normally treated as indicative of oppression: children are involuntarily members of a group which is subject to pervasive formal and informal discrimination\, segregation\, confinement and also\, disproportionately\, to all forms of violence (physical\, sexual\, economic). At the same time\, the idea that children qua children constitute an oppressed group is almost universally regarded as laughable (when it is contemplated at all). The subordination and control of children\, it is argued\, really is ‘for their own good’ (whereas the same claim\, where it has been made in the case of e.g. women and colonised peoples\, has been false). Children\, it is argued\, are different from adults in ways that justify this subordination and control – being\, for example\, irrational\, emotional\, and naturally dependent on others to identify and secure their best interests. I will not contest the obvious truth that there are significant differences between adults and children (and that these differences themselves differ from the differences that obtain between other groups such as men and women). I will argue\, however\, that the claim that children are oppressed does not rely on the denial of this truth. The claim of oppression is a claim about what a given power structure does to those who are subject to it\, namely that it restricts them in ways that are to their detriment and\, in some sense\, to the benefit of a dominant group. I will suggest that this claim\, applied to the social structures that regulate childhood (the actual ones\, at least\, rather than some hypothetical ones) is highly plausible. If this is correct\, then it follows that children stand in need of liberation from that oppression. Child liberationists\, whose influence peaked in the 1970s\, have typically framed the demand for the liberation in terms of ‘equal rights’. As a former child-child-liberationist with enduring sympathies in that direction\, I will argue that the apparatus of (equal) ‘rights’ is not the most promising vehicle for a liberationist project\, and that if we are interested in understanding and countering the oppression of children\, we would do well to look beyond it.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/fpst-seminar-12-6/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240522T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240522T170000
DTSTAMP:20240516T100921Z
CREATED:20240327T151725Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240516T100921Z
UID:10018859-1716390000-1716397200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Matteo Nizzardo (University of St Andrews and University of Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Reference Without Identity \nAbstract: Singular reference to non-individuals is often thought to be impossible. At present\, however\, this claim rests solely on intuitions. In this paper\, I present four arguments in favour of the impossibility of singular reference to non-individuals.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-19-9/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240523T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240523T120000
DTSTAMP:20240519T172652Z
CREATED:20240328T173751Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240519T172652Z
UID:10019050-1716458400-1716465600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Plenary Seminar: Kit Fine (NYU)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Numerical and Mereological Indeterminacy.\nAbstract:This talk has two aims\, one negative and the other positive.  The negative aim is to argue against the possibility of numerical or mereological indeterminacy by showing how the arguments given by Sider and Lewis can be modified so as to be resistant to the objections that might reasonably be leveled against them.  However\, these arguments presuppose a ‘localist’ conception of vagueness\, under which the notion of a borderline case\, or of determinate truth\, is taken to be meaningful.  I have elsewhere proposed a globalist conception of vagueness (Fine [2020])\, under which indeterminacy is essentially a global rather than a local phenomenon.  The positive aim is to argue for the possibility of numerical and mereological indeterminacy once the localist framework is given up in favor of a globalist framework.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/plenary-seminar-3-2/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Plenary session
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240523T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240523T143000
DTSTAMP:20240320T133929Z
CREATED:20240320T133929Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240320T133929Z
UID:10018779-1716469200-1716474600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: CANCELLED
DESCRIPTION:Regular meeting is cancelled. Instead\, the stream will host a workshop: \nThe Epistemology of Inquiry
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-7-11/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240523T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240523T170000
DTSTAMP:20240327T132454Z
CREATED:20240320T135401Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240327T132454Z
UID:10018844-1716476400-1716483600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Unity Pre-Reading: Prototypes
DESCRIPTION:Belastegui\, Javier (2022). ‘A Qualitative Approach to Conceptual Spaces: Prototypes as Qualitative Atoms.’ Erkenntnis (Online):1-36.\nhttps://philpapers.org/rec/BELAQA-2
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/unity-pre-reading-prototypes/
LOCATION:Arché Seminar Room\, 17-19 College Street\, St Andrews\, KY169AL
CATEGORIES:Unity Seminar
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