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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240430T120000
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UID:10018922-1714478400-1714485600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar: Haoxu Wang (University of St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Can a Russellian Monist Be a Genuine Physicalist?\n\nAbstract:\nCurrently\, Russellian Monism is a cutting-edge theory in the discussion of phenomenal consciousness. It has the potential to retain the advantages of both narrow physicalism and narrow dualism by locating phenomenal consciousness in a fundamentally unified universe\, having it play essential causal roles in the physical aspect\, and at the same time respecting its specific features.   Many see Russellian Monism as an opportunity to construct a new version of physicalism\, Russellian physicalism\, which has more advantages than narrow physicalism because it can avoid the difficulties faced by narrow physicalism\, especially those posed by the knowledge argument (Jackson\, 1982; 1986)\, the explanatory gap argument (Levine\, 1983; 2006)\, and the conceivability argument (Chalmers\, 2009). But the issue here is more complex. Some argue that a genuine or full-blooded physicalist must deny that there is anything specific to phenomenal consciousness at the fundamental level of the universe. Russellian Monism takes intrinsic natures (or quiddities) underlying structures and relations at the fundamental level in the universe as the keys to explaining the generation of high-level phenomenal consciousness\, which is itself the high-level intrinsic nature of high-level structural systems such as human brains. However\, it is argued that Russellian fundamental quiddities must be specific to consciousness\, and thus\, Russellian physicalism is itself an inconsistent theory. This is bad news for physicalists in general.\nIn this paper\, I will argue that it is compatible for a Russellian Monist to be a genuine physicalist or that the concept of “Russellian physicalism” is consistent. There have been some illuminating arguments for the compatibility on this issue\, but I will argue that they\, in some sense\, miss the core point of the challenge of incompatibility or inconsistency to Russellian physicalism. After setting out this core point\, I will offer my own responses.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-29/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240430T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240430T170000
DTSTAMP:20240429T094022Z
CREATED:20240429T094021Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240429T094022Z
UID:10018988-1714489200-1714496400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST Seminar - Sebastián Stuart (St. Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: grounding metaphysics on Reddit posts\, a work in progress. \nAbstract: In this presentation I will be walking us through the methodological challenges I face in writing the second chapter of my thesis. Broadly\, my thesis is an attempt to ameliorate the concept of ‘gender dysphoria’. The first chapter argued that the current mainstream construals of gender dysphoria are ethically and descriptively inaccurate of the phenomenon in question. The aim of the second chapter is to provide an alternative definition of gender dysphoria that is able to meet the desiderata the previously considered construals failed to meet. In order to do this I have three steps planned: The first is identifying paradigmatic dysphoric/euphoric-like experiences in trans* testimony from Reddit. The second step is a stipulation of two new ‘dysphoria/euphoria’ concept pairs in light of the testimony. The third step reintegrates the ameliorated concepts within testimonial case studies in order to demonstrate two things: First\, that the concept pairs clearly track real features of the world. Second\, that the concept pairs can provide a full account of the nature of gender dysphoria.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/fpst-seminar-12-11/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240501T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240501T170000
DTSTAMP:20240425T135604Z
CREATED:20240327T151307Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240425T135604Z
UID:10018856-1714575600-1714582800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Roy Sorensen (UT Austin and University of St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Seeing Holes-without seeing what they are holes in \nAbstract: Peering down into a tall box\, you see a ring. The ring is removed. To your surprise this uncovers a second duplicate ring. Did you see the hole of the bottom ring before you saw the bottom ring? Each answer is backed by good reasons. I resolve the antinomy by arguing yes: you saw the bottom hole without seeing what it was a hole in! Therefore\, a hole cannot be a part of what it is a hole in – its host. For a hole can be seen without seeing its host. Nor can a hole be an intrinsic property of its host\, such as its shape. Nor can it be a way of seeing its host. Seeing a hole is not a matter of seeing the matter in which it is a hole. The metaphysical dependence of a hole on its host does not make it perceptually dependent. Seeing a hole merely requires matter to serve as a visual aid. This loosened association between hosts and holes confirms other theories of holes such as the theory that holes are spacetime regions. \nThere will be a little magic show to illustrate the nature of holes and how they are seen.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-19-6/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T120000
DTSTAMP:20240521T093518Z
CREATED:20240326T160125Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240521T093518Z
UID:10019054-1714644000-1714651200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Plenary Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/plenary-seminar-3/2024-05-02/
CATEGORIES:Plenary session
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T143000
DTSTAMP:20240415T144316Z
CREATED:20240320T134033Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240415T144316Z
UID:10018776-1714654800-1714660200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Carlotta Pavese (Cornell University)
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Carlotta Pavese (Cornell University) \nAre there essentially intentional actions? \nA long tradition in action theory holds that there are such things as essentially intentional actions—actions that are intentional whenever performed (Anscombe\, Davidson\, Bennett\, Turri\, etc). In my talk\, I argue that the existence of essentially intentional action is a philosophical myth and that this has interesting repercussions in action theory and in epistemology. In the first part of my talk\, I defend the claim that the doctrine of essentially intentional actions is incompatible with a desirable practical knowledge condition on intentional actions\, which I argue we have independent reasons to embrace. In the second part of my talk I argue that the doctrine of essentially intentional actions is incompatible with a plausible solution to a puzzle—the puzzle of novice learning—-that arises for certain kinds of theories of action and I contend that is an additional reason to reject the doctrine. Finally\, I explore some interesting conclusions that follow from rejecting the doctrine of essentially intentional actions.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-7-13/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T170000
DTSTAMP:20240320T135242Z
CREATED:20240320T135242Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240320T135242Z
UID:10018841-1714662000-1714669200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Unity: No Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/unity-no-seminar/
CATEGORIES:Unity Seminar
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