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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240423T120000
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DTSTAMP:20240422T102502Z
CREATED:20240411T180138Z
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UID:10018921-1713873600-1713880800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar: Stefano Pugnaghi (University of St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Alethic Pluralism and the Meaning of “True” \nAbstract: Alethic pluralism is the view that there are many ways for truth-bearers to be true since different properties realise truth in different domains. Thus\, especially in its strong version\, pluralism amounts to the claim that the notion of truth we ordinarily employ is actually directly linked with a plurality of realizer properties. At the same time\, this conceptual unity is normally taken to be mirrored at the linguistic level by the existence of a single truth predicate “True”\, which must then also be characterised in plural terms. However\, although much has been said about the relation between the concept of truth and its realizers\, comparatively little attention has been devoted to the meaning of our ordinary predicate “True” and to model the plurality allegedly appearing in it.  In fact\, if the concept of truth is realized by different properties in different domain\, we should expect that different properties will also be relevant for different truth ascriptions (i.e. for different uses of the term “True”). In this paper I will offer a detailed discussion of various ways of modelling the alleged plurality in the meaning of “True”. First\, I will consider and discard some constant plural semantic accounts\, showing that “True” is importantly variable in meaning. Thene\, I will discuss and also criticise some options for a context-sensitive semantic analysis of this predicate\, showing that “True” is actually insensitive to contexts\, standardly conceived. Finally\, I will conclude this paper by arguing the “True”\, within a strong pluralist picture\, is actually polysemous. \n 
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-27/
LOCATION:Online Meeting via Teams
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240423T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240423T170000
DTSTAMP:20240422T150510Z
CREATED:20240408T102202Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240422T150510Z
UID:10018987-1713884400-1713891600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST Seminar - Cael Keegan (Carelton University) [online only]
DESCRIPTION:Title: How to do things with ‘trans’ \nAbstract: What is the conceptual formation trans\, and what can it do? While transgender studies is oriented against providing definitive answers\, the field does possess a history and an emergent set of critical tools\, both similar to and yet divergent from the more institutionally embraced field of queer studies. Drawing on Susan Stryker’s characterization of transgender studies as queer theory’s “evil twin\,” this talk explores the critical relation enacted between the two fields: Rather than envisioning them as opposites\, it explores their relation as a fruitful paradox in which each discourse problematizes and yet enlivens the other’s claims. It then demonstrates trans analytics through a reading of John Carpenter’s The Thing (1982).
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/fpst-seminar-12-4/
LOCATION:Online via Teams
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240424T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240424T170000
DTSTAMP:20240422T092537Z
CREATED:20240327T151149Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240422T092537Z
UID:10018855-1713970800-1713978000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Aybüke Özgün (University of Amsterdam)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Beliefs based on conflicting and uncertain evidence: connecting Dempster-Shafer theory and the topology of evidence \nAbstract:\nOne problem to solve in the context of information fusion\, decision-making\, and other artificial intelligence challenges is to compute justified beliefs based on evidence. In real-life examples\, this evidence may be inconsistent\, incomplete\, or uncertain\, making the problem of evidence fusion highly non-trivial. In this talk\, I will present a new model for measuring degrees of beliefs based on possibly inconsistent\, incomplete\, and uncertain evidence\, by combining tools from Dempster-Shafer Theory and Topological Models of Evidence. Our belief model is more general than the aforementioned approaches in two important ways: (1) it can reproduce them when appropriate constraints are imposed\, and\, more notably\, (2) it is flexible enough to compute beliefs according to various standards that represent agents’ evidential demands. The latter novelty allows to compute an agent’s (possibly) distinct degrees of belief\, based on the same evidence\, in situations when\, e.g\, the agent prioritizes avoiding false negatives and when it prioritizes avoiding false positives. Finally\, I will discuss further research directions and philosophical loose ends\, time permitting\, introduce a logic for comparing strengths of evidence and belief. \nThis talk is joint work between the speaker (Aybüke Özgün)\, Daira Pinto Prieto and Ronald de Haan\, and is based on the underlying topological formalism developed in collaboration with Alexandru Baltag\, Nick Bezhanishvili\, and Sonja Smets. \nThe speaker notes that “The talk will not assume any background in Dempster-Shafer theory or topological models for evidence.” And that “[she] will focus on the motivation and overall structure of the proposed framework rather than the technical details.”
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-19-5/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T120000
DTSTAMP:20240521T093518Z
CREATED:20240326T160125Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240521T093518Z
UID:10019053-1714039200-1714046400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Plenary Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/plenary-seminar-3/2024-04-25/
CATEGORIES:Plenary session
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T143000
DTSTAMP:20240422T125727Z
CREATED:20240320T132955Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240422T125727Z
UID:10018775-1714050000-1714055400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Catarina Dutilh Novaes (VU Amsterdam & St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Catarina Dutilh Novaes (VU Amsterdam & St Andrews) \nA Foucauldian critique of the epistemic injustice research program \nCatarina Dutilh Novaes (joint work with Merel Talbi and Solmu Anttila)\n\nSince the publication of Fricker’s groundbreaking Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (2007)\, vibrant debates on the complex relations between knowledge\, ethics and power have ensued\, arguably giving rise to a specific research program (in Lakatos’ sense). In contrast with apolitical social epistemology\, the epistemic injustice research program problematizes the roles of power and social identities in epistemic processes. Two of its core assumptions are: there is a reasonably neat separation between epistemic phenomena and ethical-political phenomena (even if they often intersect); while frequent\, occurrences of epistemic injustice are deviations from the norm that can be redressed—epistemic injustice is a bug\, not a feature.\n\nIn this talk\, I offer a critique of the epistemic injustice research program thus conceived\, drawing on broadly Foucauldian ideas on the relations between power and knowledge. I focus on the second assumption above\, specifically by revisiting Curry’s critique of Fricker’s and Medina’s respective analyses of To Kill a Mocking Bird\, and by presenting a similar critique of Lackey’s recent work on criminal testimonial injustice. In both cases\, the analyses of testimonial injustice as credibility deficit (Fricker and Medina) or as credibility excess (Lackey on confessions) miss the role and functions of these practices in perpetuating oppressive power structures (in these specific cases\, white supremacy). Thus seen\, epistemic injustice is a feature\, not a bug\, requiring much more than epistemic strategies to be redressed.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-7-3/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T170000
DTSTAMP:20240327T123155Z
CREATED:20240320T135220Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240327T123155Z
UID:10018840-1714057200-1714064400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Unity Pre-Reading: Gärdenfors Ch. 3
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/unity-pre-reading-gardenfors-ch-3/
LOCATION:Arché Seminar Room\, 17-19 College Street\, St Andrews\, KY169AL
CATEGORIES:Unity Seminar
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