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X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Arche
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230925T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230925T110000
DTSTAMP:20231105T211905Z
CREATED:20230829T092626Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231105T211905Z
UID:10018723-1695634200-1695639600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Ralph Strode\, Treatise on Consequences
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-4-2/2023-09-25/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230926T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230926T140000
DTSTAMP:20230914T131158Z
CREATED:20230914T130851Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230914T131158Z
UID:10018641-1695729600-1695736800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar: Matheus Valente (LOGOS and València)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Purely perspectival ignorance and purely perspectival differences\n\nAbstract: One might hold that de se and self-locating beliefs associated to ‘I’ and ‘now’ are philosophically significant but disagree with Lewis and Perry that this requires taking them to be relative or private. However\, a quick look at the recent literature – including surveys by Titelbaum & Egan (2022) and Torre & Weber (2021) – might give one a different impression\, for most who think that there’s something special about these beliefs overall agree with that it can be illustrated by the Lewis-Perry “either relative or private” dilemma. Indeed\, I’ll argue that\, deep down\, this applies even to authors like Stalnaker 2008 and Prosser 2005\, 2015 who otherwise are critical of Lewis and Perry. As far as I can see\, the ubiquity of the Lewis-Perry dilemma can only be justified\, if at all\, by two kinds of arguments: arguments from purely perspectival ignorance (PPI) and from purely perspectival differences (PPD). Let’s evaluate these arguments taking recent contributions into account. Like Kwon (2017)\, I’m sceptical about arguments from PPI. The issue is I find it impossible to conceive of a rational subject (like you and me) who is objectively omniscient but harbours a purely perspectival doubt\, as Lewis’ (1979) gods and\, more recently\, Shaw’s (2019) forgetful god are supposed to be. In any case\, I still think that Shaw’s discussion shows something important: de nunc ignorance can arise in a peculiar way\, we need only stop tracking time for a second. But I don’t think this needs to lead us to anything like the Lewis-Perry dilemma\, for there’s promise in an alternative approach\, the Frege-Evans view (the name comes from Prosser 2005 but the view is inspired by Evans 1982). In the end of the day\, whether the Frege-Evans view is ultimately tenable depends on the soundness of the argument from PPD\, which I see as the strongest and most resilient reason to hold on to the orthodoxy. Few people ever dare challenge this compelling argument\, but the last months have seen two exceptions: Lin (2022) and Hunter (2023). Let’s then look at their arguments against the entrenched assumption that purely perspectival differences give rise to belief differences. I’m sympathetic to Lin and Hunter’s ambitions but I think their arguments require improvement. I’ll do my best for this. One key idea is that\, from the perspective of rational explanation and belief individuation\, we can distinguish which action subjects perform from how they perform it. If so\, then hopefully your eyebrows won’t be raised too high when I say that a subject’s curling up into a ball and another’s running to get help are the same action performed in distinct ways. \n\n\nEvans\, G. (1982). The Varieties of Reference. OUP.\nHunter\, David (2023). On Believing. OUP.\nKwon\, Hongwoo (2017). ‘Mary and the Two Gods: Trying Out an Ability Hypothesis’. Philosophical Review 126 (2):191-217.\n\nLin\, Lixiao (forthcoming). ‘Attitudes and action: against de se exceptionalism’. Inquiry.\nProsser\, Simon (2005). ‘Cognitive dynamics and indexicals’. Mind and Language 20 (4):369–391.\nProsser\, Simon (2015). ‘Why Are Indexicals Essential?’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):211-233.\nStalnaker\, Robert (2008). Our Knowledge of the Internal World. OUP.\nShaw\, James R. (2019). ‘De Se Exceptionalism and Frege Puzzles’. Ergo 6:1057-1086.\nTitelbaum\, Michael & Egan\, Andy (2022). ‘Self-Locating Beliefs’\, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.\nTorre\, Stephan & Weber\, Clas (2021). ‘What is Special about De Se Attitudes?’ In Stephen Biggs & Heimir Geirsson (eds.)\, The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference. Routledge. pp. 464-481.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-13/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230927T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230927T170000
DTSTAMP:20230914T115645Z
CREATED:20230913T111808Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230914T115645Z
UID:10018669-1695826800-1695834000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Thomas Randriamahazaka (University of St Andrews and University of Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Impossibility results in the theory of partial truth and subject-matters \nAbstract: Truth is nice but sometimes (for prudential\, pragmatic or metaontological reasons) we can settle for less. Following that line of thought\, this talk is about partial truth – the idea that a false proposition can still have true parts. We assume that this notion has any semantic usefulness only if some falsities are partially true but not all of them. This requirement puts pressure on the logical principles partial truth can satisfy relative to the logic of propositions one ascribes to. Indeed\, it is known that the possible world account of propositions is incompatible with very desirable logical principles for partial truth. This has motivated an hybrid account of propositions which supplements sets of possible worlds with subject-matters. While this solves some issues\, we show that some problem persists involving the status of negation in the theory of subject-matters. More generally\, we argue that the interaction between the logic of partial truth and the hybrid account of propositions puts undesirable conditions of the behaviour of subject-matters.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-7/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230928T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230928T120000
DTSTAMP:20230915T091550Z
CREATED:20230829T094510Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230915T091550Z
UID:10018683-1695895200-1695902400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Plenary Seminar: No Meeting
DESCRIPTION:We use the plenary seminar time slot on occasions when we have a meeting of wider interest to the whole Arché community.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/plenary-seminar/2023-09-28/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230928T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230928T143000
DTSTAMP:20230925T025932Z
CREATED:20230925T025931Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230925T025932Z
UID:10018697-1695906000-1695911400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Discussion group led by Justin Snedegar
DESCRIPTION:We will be reading Julia Staffel’s “Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher-order evidence”\, Noûs\, 2023.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-6-10/
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