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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230619T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230619T110000
DTSTAMP:20230508T101413Z
CREATED:20221025T081119Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230508T101413Z
UID:10017822-1687167000-1687172400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Ralph Strode\, Obligationes
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-3/2023-06-19/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230619T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230619T170000
DTSTAMP:20230614T122004Z
CREATED:20230614T122004Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230614T122004Z
UID:10017837-1687186800-1687194000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Huw Price (University of Bonn and University of Cambridge)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Why entanglement? \nAbstract: In this piece\, written for a general audience\, we propose a mechanism for quantum entanglement. The key ingredient is the familiar statistical phenomenon of collider bias\, or Berkson’s bias. In the language of causal models\, a collider is a variable causally influenced by two or more other variables. Conditioning on a collider typically produces non-causal associations between its contributing causes\, even if they are actually independent. It is easy to show that this phenomenon can produce associations analogous to Bell correlations\, in suitable post-selected ensembles. It is also straightforward that such collider artefacts may become real connections\, resembling causality\, if a collider is ‘constrained’ (e.g.\, by a future boundary condition). We consider the time-reversed analogues of these points in the context of retrocausal models of QM. Retrocausality yields a collider at the source of an EPR-Bell particle pair\, and in this case constraint of the collider is possible by normal methods of experimental preparation. It follows that connections resembling causality may be expected to emerge across such colliders\, from one branch of the experiment to the other. Our hypothesis is that this constrained retrocausal collider bias is the origin of entanglement.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-4-11/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230620T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230620T140000
DTSTAMP:20230619T083648Z
CREATED:20230619T083647Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230619T083648Z
UID:10018049-1687262400-1687269600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar: Lixiao Lin How to use true evaluative sentences to lie
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-10-4-10/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230621T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230621T180000
DTSTAMP:20230619T083858Z
CREATED:20230619T083857Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230619T083858Z
UID:10018621-1687363200-1687370400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory: tbc
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/feminist-philosphy-and-social-theory-2-9/
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230622T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230622T120000
DTSTAMP:20230111T164225Z
CREATED:20230111T164225Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230111T164225Z
UID:10018300-1687428000-1687435200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:SS Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/ss-seminar/2023-06-22/
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230622T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230622T143000
DTSTAMP:20230526T114107Z
CREATED:20221025T084455Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230526T114107Z
UID:10018036-1687438800-1687444200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Current Themes Seminar: Matthew McGrath (Washington University St Louis) "Do Epistemic Norms have Positive Critical Power?"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Epistemic norms have negative critical power\, let’s say\, iff there are cases in which an agent has a doxastic attitude but\, according to epistemic norms\, shouldn’t have it. They have positive critical power iff there are cases in which an agent lacks a doxastic attitude but\, according to the norms\, should have it. \nMost epistemologists readily accept that epistemic norms have negative critical power\, and I assume as much in this talk. For instance\, there are cases in which someone believes p\, but because they have counterevidence against p\, epistemically shouldn’t believe p. But it is a matter of controversy whether agents ever epistemically should have beliefs they lack\, or even should have particular beliefs at all. Some philosophers\, e.g.\, Mark Nelson\, Earl Conee and Richard Feldman\, argue that epistemic norms are merely permissive and do not tell us to believe particular propositions. \nI argue that in a range of paradigm cases in which one epistemically shouldn’t have certain beliefs which one has are also cases in which one epistemically should have beliefs which one lacks\, namely those beliefs that comprise parts of the “route” to the abandonment of the belief one shouldn’t have. Thus\, we see that epistemic norms must have positive critical power if they are to have the negative critical power they plausibly have. \nHaving argued that epistemic norms have positive critical power\, I explore other sorts of cases in which\, plausibly\, we epistemically should hold a particular belief. \nI finally consider possible explanations of the source of the positive critical power of epistemic norms.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-current-themes-seminar/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
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